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This Ph.D. dissertation studies innovation in Germany from 1877 to 1914. The 
German patents that had survived for at least ten years are used as a proxy of innovation. 
The introduction briefly outlines the issues to be investigated. The first chapter examines 
the successive waves of technological progress during the German industrialization. It 
discusses the distribution of patents across industries and across regions. The second 
chapter investigates the regional innovation system (RIS) in Prussia. In particular, it 
focuses on the determinants of innovation in Prussian regions. The third chapter goes 
beyond Prussia and studies innovation in German cities (1890-1914). Using firm-level 
data of Baden region, the fourth chapter tries to study the linkage between clusters and 
innovation by examining whether firms located in clusters were more innovative. The 
fifth chapter studies the knowledge spillover from schools to firms and from firms to 
firms. The sixth chapter uses patent renewal data. Employing Cox regression technique, 
we explore the question what factors (such as patent’s technological class and patentee’s 
nationality) impact patent survival. The concluding part of this dissertation summarizes 























INNOVATION AND KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
 
Technology is a major engine of long-term economic growth.1 Accordingly, from 
the birth of modern economics, economists have appreciated the importance of 
technological progress. Over the past three centuries, the main source of wealth in market 
economies has shifted from natural assets (notably land), through tangible, man-made 
assets (such as machinery) to intangible, created assets (notably knowledge and 
information). With the approach of the knowledge economy (which refers to the use of 
knowledge to produce economic benefits) accompanied with globalization and internet-
driven information revolution, technological innovation plays an increasingly important 
role in our modern society. As intangible inputs, such as knowledge, gain importance in 
economic activities, our economy becomes more knowledge-based and “weightless”. 
Alan Greenspan comments that in 1996, America’s total output, measured in tons, is little 
more than it was one century ago, although America’s real GDP has increased 20 times.2 
Even the traditional manufacturing sector experiences this shift from brawn to brain. An 
OECD study in 1996 shows that high-skill industries have doubled their share of 
manufacturing output to 25 % from 1975 to 1996.3 The idea that technology is the 
foundation of our future especially applies to a country such as Germany, which does not 
have abundant natural resources.  
Today, innovation is certainly a topic that draws much interests and enthusiasm. 
Yet until very recently, innovation was a word with at least some negative denotation and 
connotation.4 The positive connotation of innovation, as a valuable improvement, is itself 
a relatively new idea. This neatly illustrates the ambiguity that underlies the role of 
innovation in society. Schumpeter’s concept of innovation as “creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter, 1942) highlights this ambiguity: Creative firms bring new products or better 
                                                          
1 Theoretical and empirical works supporting the contention that innovative economies are prosperous are 
too abundant to enumerate. For a few examples, see Jacobs (1969, 1984), Landes (1969), Murphy et al. 
(1991), Porter (1990), Romer (1986, 1994), Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986), and many more. 
2 “The World Economy Survey”, The Economist, September 28, 1996, p. 43, cited in Neef (1998), p.4. 
3 “The Knowledge-Based Economy”, OECD, 1996, cited in Neef (1998), p.4. 
4 Looking up the word “innovation” in the Oxford English Dictionary reveals that the use of the word in 
English had strongly negative meaning from the 16th century into the 19th century.  
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technology into the economy, but this destroys stagnant non-innovative firms.5 This 
destruction is the downside of innovation. Christensen (1997) articulated his theory of 
disruptive technology. The term “disruptive technology” was coined to describe a new, 
lower performance, but less expensive product. The disruptive technology starts by 
gaining a foothold in the low-end (and less demanding part) of the market, successively 
moving up-market through performance improvements, and finally displacing the 
incumbent’s product. Therefore, innovation is a mixed blessing and two-edged sword. 
When the Luddite movement (1811-1816) took place in England, seeking to increase 
their wages, the Luddites became the machine breakers and wreckers. As a matter of fact, 
innovation phobia is a rather widespread phenomenon. 
The following broad trends are behind the current upsurge of interest in 
knowledge. Firstly, globalization is reshaping the world economic landscape and is 
putting great pressure on firms to increase adaptability, which demands innovation.6 
Secondly, in coping with the pressure of globalization, economic agents are increasingly 
aware of the value of knowledge, which is often embedded in organizational processes 
and routines (such as corporate culture) and often yields significant market values. 
Thirdly, networked information technology gives us a powerful tool for working with and 




The innovation system approach has emerged during the last few decades for the 
study of innovation process as an endogenous part of the economy. The approach is not a 
formal theory, but a conceptual framework. The idea that lies at the center of this 
framework is that the economic performance of localities depends not only on how actors 
perform individually, but also on how they interact with each other in knowledge creation 
and dissemination. Lundvall (1992) is one of the first works to promote thinking about 
systems of innovation. It mentioned regionalization in relation to globalization and 
referred to regional networks, but it did not believe a regional perspective on innovation 
could be as useful as national systems, even in respect of such geographically contingent 
                                                          
5 The term Schumpeterian evolution is also used to describe creative destruction. Schumpeterian evolution, 
like Darwinian evolution, is the survival of the fittest. But in Schumpeterian evolution, firms purposefully 
make themselves the fittest by investing in innovation. 
6 Hall et al. (1993) show that firms with high R&D spending (input of innovation) have above industry-
average financial performance. 
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processes as tacit knowledge exchange. Contradicting Porter (1990, 1998), Lundvall 
(1992) suggested that transnational innovation interactions were likely to gain in 
importance over national ones, but that regional processes were unlikely to. In the 
literature on innovation, the meaning of the term “system” is not analyzed in great details. 
Some general definitions of a system of innovation do exist. For example, Lundvall 
defines a system of innovation as being constituted of a number of elements and by the 
relationship between these elements (Nelson and Winter 1982; Lundvall 1992; Edquist 
1997). It follows that a system of innovation is constituted of elements and relationships 
that interact in the production, diffusion and use of new and economically useful 
knowledge (Lundvall 1992). It becomes quite clear that an innovation system is a social 
system, which means that innovations are the result of social interaction between 
economic actors. And it is an open system, which interacts with its environment. The 
National Innovation System (NIS) approach highlights the importance of interactive 
learning and the role of nation-based institution in explaining the difference in innovation 
performance and hence, economic growth, across different countries. Freeman (1987) 
first used the “national innovation system” concept in his analysis of Japan’s blooming 
economy. National innovation systems can be defined as the “... set of distinct institutions 
which jointly and individually contribute to the development and diffusion of new 
technologies and which provide the framework within which governments form and 
implement policies to influence the innovation process. As such it is a system of 
interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer the knowledge, skills and artifacts 
which define new technologies” (Metcalfe, 1995). From this perspective, the innovative 
performance of an economy depends not only on how the individual institutions (e.g. 
firms, research institutes, universities) perform in isolation, but on “how they interact 
with each other as elements of a collective system of knowledge creation and use, and on 
their interplay with social institutions (such as values, norms, legal frameworks)” (Smith, 
1996). Now, there is an extensive literature on national innovation systems. Some 
representative works are Lundvall (1992), Nelson (1993), Freeman (1995), and Niosi, et 
al. (1993). Figure 1 helps us to visualize the various actors and their interactions in a 




























Source: OECD, Managing National Innovation Systems, 1999 
 
USING PATENT AS PROXY FOR INNOVATION 
 
Economists often aspire to quantify their variables. Many economists (for 
instance, Pavitt, 1982 and Griliches, 1990) have been debating about the issue of 
measuring innovative activity and technological progress, but, not surprisingly, no 
universal solution has been found. There are at least three basic problems in measuring 
innovation: 
Firstly, innovation is a dynamic process rather than a static point in time. Yet we 
have to impose a beginning and an end to make our analysis tractable. We have to be 
reliant on static indicators to measure a dynamic process. What we can track is often only 
the successful innovation as final product. Secondly, inputs and outputs of innovation are 
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heterogeneous. The quality of R&D effort varies. Some patents have little economic 
value. Thirdly, we have to acknowledge the unobservability of much innovative activity. 
Most process innovations are not marketed. Some firms tend to keep their inventions as 
trade secret.7  
The empirical literature on innovation most often uses one or more of three 
quantitative measures of innovative activity. None of these measures is perfect, and the 
flaws of each are discussed below. 
(1). Research and Development (R&D) spending and/or employment 
Corporate R&D expenditure/employment is widely used as a measure of a firm’s 
investment in innovation. And the data are often disclosed in annual reports or financial 
statements of firms. The main methodological criticism of using R&D expenditure and/or 
employment is that the data measure an input to innovation, not the number or value of 
the innovations actually produced. We know that firms often invest money and labor in 
unprofitable projects, so the possibility that most R&D spending and/or employment 
might be wasted cannot be dismissed. Moreover, R&D data is biased towards large firms 
and publicly-listed firms. 
(2). Innovation counts 
Innovation counts are comprehensive lists of innovations made by various firms. 
They are usually constructed from large surveys. In principle, innovation counts should 
be the best data, for they clearly measure output, and the survey organizers can apply 
similar rules in constructing data for different firms, industries and countries. In practice, 
innovation counting is often criticized as arbitrary. The surveyors must decide what is an 
“innovation” and what is not. Patent counts also usually try to distinguish “important” 
from “unimportant” innovations, but this too is a judgment call. Sometimes, the surveyors 
lack the ability to judgment. Sometimes, they are not inclined to give unbiased judgment 
because their self interest is involved. Finally, innovation counts are not available at the 
firm level in most countries. 
                                                          
7 A trade secret is an item of information (commonly a customer list, business plan, or manufacturing 
process) that has commercial value and that the firm possessing the information wants to conceal from its 
competitors in order to prevent them from duplicating it. A trade secret is not property in the usual sense–
the sense it bears in the law of real and personal property or even in such areas of intellectual property law 
as copyright–because it is not something that the possessor has the exclusive right to use or enjoy. If 
through accident the secret leaks out, or if a competitor unmasks it by reverse engineering, the law gives no 
remedy. The law does give a remedy if the secret is lost through a breach of contract–say by a former 
employee who had promised not to disclose what he learned on the job. But the violation is not of a 
property right to the secret but of a common law right defined without regard to trade secrets. See Friedman 




In fact, one of the longest lasting debates in the history of economic measurement 
has been whether the noise and the biases in patent count measures can be minimized 
enough to make patent counts maximally useful indicator of innovative output in 
economic studies (see, for example, the papers of Kuznets and Sanders, and the 
comments of Schmookler, both in Nelson, 1962). 
There has been quite noted criticism on using patents to study technological 
innovation. Patent data can sometimes be misleading and the patent approach does have 
its limits. Some of the deficiencies are as follows. Firstly, patent laws can be very 
different in different countries. For example, Japan allowed seven-year patents to be filed 
for minimal innovations, while most other countries only granted patents for real 
innovations, and those patents lasted for close to twenty years. Patent laws in different 
countries are now converging, so these problems will not affect very recent and future 
years’ data. But it is difficult to use historical patent data in cross-country comparisons 
without controlling carefully for these factors. Different countries often have different 
classification of patents. Many types of innovation, including software and some 
biological innovations, are not patentable in many countries. Therefore, it is difficult to 
compare patents from different countries. Secondly, patents are a measure of invention, 
not innovation. Innovation is the embodiment of an invention in the productive process. 
From an economic standpoint, innovation is about applying new ideas and technology to 
improve human life, not just about having ideas. High patent counts do not necessarily 
mean a high level of innovation. Thirdly, firms that have a new technology and fear that 
other firms might try to steal their technology by finding superficially different 
technological processes that circumvent the innovator’s patent are thought to engage in 
patent thicketing.8 This involves filing numerous patents on minor variants of the original 
patent, not because these are real innovations, but because they “might” head off a 
competitor’s attempt to circumvent the original patent. Nevertheless, this practice implies 
that there is at least one important data hidden behind the inflated patent data pool. 
Fourthly, there is essentially not an easy way to weight patents by their importance. Pure 
patent counts allocate the same weight to every patent, no matter whether it has a high or 
a low economic value for the patentee or the society. Using the number of patents as an 
indicator for new technological knowledge suitable to foster economic growth therefore 
                                                          
8 See Bernstein (2001) for a detailed discussion about this problem.  
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leads to a potentially very large measurement error.9 To decrease this measurement error 
it is necessary to distinguish patents with a high economic value from those with a low 
one. A possibility to do this is to let the patents be evaluated by experts. Townsend, for 
example, rated patents related to coal mining according to their importance on a scale 
from 1 to 4.10 This procedure might be recommendable for specific industry studies with 
a small number of observations, but does not work for large patent populations when the 
careful evaluation of every single patent would be very time consuming and would 
require engineering competence in a wide range of technological fields. Fifthly, not all 
important inventions were patented. Some inventors do not want to pay or cannot afford 
to pay the required fee to register patents. Some inventors prefer to keep their patents 
secret. Sixthly, the propensity to patent inventions has been declining for most of the 20th 
century (Wilson, 2003). Thus, long-run time series analysis is hazardous. Seventhly, the 
propensity to patent varies across industries and firms. Thus, cross-section analysis is 
difficult. Levin et al (1989), for example, find out that some industries try to appropriate 
the returns of their inventions primarily by keeping them secret while others, like the 
chemical or pharmaceutical industries, prefer patenting to reach this goal.11 Because of 
industries’ different propensities to patent, it might be misleading to interpret a particular 
industry’s comparatively high number of patents automatically as a sign for its alleged 
above-average innovativeness. In the econometric analysis, however, we can take care of 
this problem by controlling for industry fixed effects. Eighthly, patent application data is 
biased towards large firms, manufacturing firms and those firms that are financially more 
powerful.  
Overall, the pros and cons of using patent data to study innovation have been quite 
thoroughly studied. Two good survey articles are Griliches (1990) and Archibugi (1992). 
For more recent discussions, see Desrochers (1998, 2001) and Kleinknecht et al. (2002). 
Scherer (1984) has argued quite convincingly that patents can serve as tangible indicators 
of inventive activities that are embedded in the innovation processes driving general 
technological development. Various remedies have been proposed to make patent data 
more suitable for research. Lanjouw et al. (1998) discuss the imperfection of patent 
                                                          
9  The academic debate about the extent of this kind of measurement error is still far from settled. On the 
one hand, Schankerman and Pakes state that “one cannot draw inferences on changes in the value of cohorts 
of [European] patents ... from changes in the quantity of patents during this period” [1955-1975]. 
Schankerman and Pakes (1986), p. 1070. Sullivan, on the other hand, shows that for the 1852-76 period 
fluctuations of the number and aggregate value of British and Irish patents generally moved in the same 
direction. See Sullivan (1994), p. 49. 
10  See Townsend (1980), p. 150. 
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counts as measures of innovative output, and methods of dealing with at least some of the 
problems listed above.  
Therefore, despite all its shortcomings, patent data is a useful source to study 
innovation. It has several advantages. Patents are easily available in large quantity for 
long time series. Patented inventions are a good representative sample of the population 
of inventive activity. Patent records contain information about the place of patentees. 
Thus, we can map the spatial distribution of innovation. Patent statistics is disaggregated 
to industry level. Patents offer us even detailed information at the firm level. Thus, we 
can study the clustering effect of firms, as we will do in chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
Sullivan (1994) has argued that the variability in patent quality may not be a serious 




A patent is a set of exclusive rights granted by a government to an inventor for a 
limited amount of time (normally 15-20 years from the filing date). It is the most 
common form of intellectual property, which is the cornerstone of the modern knowledge 
economy.12 Patent laws are a manifestation of the state’s police powers designed to 
prevent other people from “free-riding” on an innovator’s idea (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
1980). The patent system tries to solve the paradox of innovation: creation and 
diffusion.13 The essence of the patent system is that the state trades patent protection for 
invention disclosure. In order to use the patented idea and benefit, other people have to 
get the patentee’s permission and pay a license fee. 
The word patent comes from the Latin “litterae patentes”, meaning an open letter. 
Such letters were used by medieval monarchs to confer rights and privileges. With a royal 
seal, the letters served as proof of those rights, for all to see. Although there is evidence 
suggesting that something like patents was used among some ancient Greek cities, patents 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11  See also Arundel and Kabla (1998). 
12 Other common forms of intellectual property are copyrights and trademarks. A trademark is a word, 
name, symbol or device which is used in trade with goods to indicate the source of the goods and to 
distinguish them from the goods of others. Copyright is a form of protection provided to the authors of 
"original works of authorship" including literary, dramatic, musical, artistic, and certain other intellectual 
works, both published and unpublished. For more details, see the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office web page (http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/whatis.htm). 
13 The patent system trades off the private property rights that create incentives ex ante versus the welfare 
costs of restricting an output which could be provided ex post at a relatively low cost, which means that, 
unfortunately, a single solution that will apply at all times and in all cases cannot be given.  
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in the modern sense originated in Renaissance Italy. The first recorded patent for an 
industrial invention is the one granted in 1421 in Florence. In 1474 the Republic of 
Venice issued a decree in which new and inventive devices, once they had been put into 
practice, had to be communicated to the Republic in order to obtain legal protection 
against potential infringements.14 Such privileged grants to inventors spread from Italy to 
other European nations over the next few centuries. England followed with the Statute of 
Monopolies in 1624 under King James I of England. The right of the US Congress to pass 
laws regulating intellectual property was established in the US Constitution in 1787.15 
The Patent Commission of the U.S. was created in 1790 and issued the first patent in the 
same year.16 France enacted its patent system the following year. The French Patent Law 
of 1844 remained in effect with little change up to the 1960s. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, all major industrial powers in the world had established patent systems except 
Switzerland. Today there exist approximately 100 separate jurisdictions regarding 
patents. 
Typically, an application for a patent is examined before a patent is issued or 
granted for an invention. That is to say, the application is reviewed by a patent examiner 
for patentability. Different patent systems use different criteria for reviewing patents. In 
most cases, an invention must be considered novel and useful in order to receive a patent. 
It must also represent a relatively significant advance in the state of the art and cannot 
merely be an obvious change from what is already known.17 While examining patent 
applications, most countries in the world use first-to-file principle while, granting a patent 
and all rights to the first person who files a patent application for an invention. The US is 
quite unusual in that it has first-to-invent principle, granting a patent to the first inventor 
who conceives the technology or invention.18 This practice often requires substantial 
burden of proof.  
                                                          
14 Encyclopedia Britannica, Standard Edition, 2002.  
15 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution stipulates: “Congress shall have power . . . to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” 
16 See Nard and Morris (2004) for a survey of the historical development of the US constitutional patent 
law. The basic structure of the present US patent law was adopted in 1952. 
17 “Copycat” innovation may involve simply replicating another firm’s invention and should not get a 
patent for the crude imitation. 
18 Clause 101 of US Code 35 states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.. . .” This has further been defined by some 
following case laws. 
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The patent system is controversial. Several key questions are at the center of the 
controversy. How long should patent protection be maximally?19 What items should be 
entitled to be patented? Is patent system effective in fostering innovation?20 Do patents 
allow firms to appropriate the benefit that flows from their intellectual property?21 
Moreover, it is an open question whether patent applications are competently examined 
and properly issued by trained, skilled and thoughtful patent examiners who often have 
heavy workload and have to work under pressure. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the 
patent system, despite a few faults, continues to make a substantial contribution to the 
economic well-being of society. 
 
OUR PATENT DATABASE 
 
Patent data is the major data used in this dissertation. It appears in every chapter. 
We use patents as a proxy of technological innovation. Over the time period under 
consideration, the patent rules were subjected to several changes. Nevertheless, these 
changes do not significantly affect our study over this time period. Our prime data source 
is the annual Verzeichnis der im Vorjahre erteilten Patente published by the German 
patent office (located in Berlin).22 The directory lists all patents granted in the 
immediately preceding year. To be exact, in the directory, for each patent we get the 
                                                          
19 Nordhaus (1969) developed the first model of optimal patent protection. Longer patent lives give a 
greater financial incentive to prospective innovators, but also slow the diffusion of an innovation through 
the economy. The optimal patent life balances these two factors. Economists, for example Scotchmer and 
Green (1990), Scotchmer (1996), and O’Donoghue et al. (1998), have proposed various interesting models 
subsequently. Yet little is known about the parameter values needed to operationalize these models. 
Therefore, we have to admit that we still have little idea about what the optimal patent life should be, 
whether it is the same across industries and, if not, how it should differ across industries, or whether patent 
lives should be the same for different innovations in the same industry. Neither do we know whether 
current patent laws in various countries provide optimal, sub-optimal or super-optimal patent lives. 
20 The question whether the patent system has the desired effect on innovation has proven exceedingly 
difficult to answer, partially owing to the lack of real experiments (a common problem in social sciences). 
Most researchers who investigate this topic have looked at historical data when there were changes to the 
system and examined the consequences for subsequent innovative activities. Moser (2001) argues 
provocatively that some countries may be better off without strong patent laws. The positive results are 
presented by Park and Ginarte (1997). Using aggregate data across 60 countries for the 1960-90 period, the 
paper finds out that the strength of the patent system is positively related with R&D investments in the 30 
countries with the highest incomes (that is, G7 countries and other rich nations). 
21 Jaffe (2000, p. 555) concludes that although important, patents are not central to appropriating the returns 
to R&D in some industries. Yet using a 1994 survey of more than a thousand managers of manufacturing 
industry R&D laboratories on methods adopted to protect income flows generated by intellectual assets, 
Cohen et al (2000) suggest that in many industries, in particular pharmaceuticals, patents are indeed highly 
effective in protecting the firm’s competitive advantage gained from innovations. 
22  For a survey on the publications of the Reichspatentamt see Theobald (1927). 
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following information: (1). patent class code23, (2). patent number24, (3). name of the 
patentee (person or firm)25, and (4). residence place of the patentee.26 The directory also 
contains a short description (often just one or two lines) of invention patented (we do not 
use this information since it is difficult to quantify).27 One typical patent is randomly 
chosen and provided here as one example: 
Klasse 21. Elektrotechnik.  
21 a. Telegraphie und Fernsprechwesen.  
134410. Siemens & Halske Akt.-Ges., Berlin. Gesprächszähler.28 
The regular directory also contains a list of all patents still in force, which enables 
us to calculate the life spans of particular patents. We will use patent’s life spans to study 
patent survival in chapter 6.  
Between 1877 and 1918, in total 311,019 patents were granted in Germany. The 
starting year of the observation period is determined by the establishment of the German 
patent law of 187729 that for the first time in German history gave inventors the 
possibility to apply for patent protection not only in single states but in the whole German 
Empire.30 The patent protection could last up to fifteen years but was not for free. Rather, 
the patentee had to pay at the beginning of each year an increasing renewal fee in order to 
keep his patent in force. This annual renewal fee came to 50 Marks in the first two 
years31, and grew then by 50 Marks each year up to 700 Marks at the beginning of the 
fifteenth year. Patent holders were supposed to decide to renew their patent only when the 
costs of doing this were lower than the expected future return of the patent. Following 
this contemporary assumption about the behavior of patent holders, we will use 
information on the actual life span of a patent as an indicator for its private economic 
                                                          
23 The patents are classified according to a technologically oriented classification system. The system has 
89 patents classes (from 1 to 89). From 1900 on, there are sub-classes under each patent class. 
24 The number will not be given to another patent even if the original patent becomes invalid. 
25 The information tells us whether a particular patent was held by an individual or a firm. 
26 From this information, we know whether a patent is held by a German or foreign patentee. In general, the 
patents filed by large firms might be biased to a certain extent in geographic location, since it is conceivable 
that some patents were filed by the headquarters of a firm, even though the inventions might be developed 
in geographically distant subsidies. Yet during the time period under our study, this problem is not serious 
as not many firms had establishments over many geographic places in Germany at that time.  
27 Please note that patent applications that had been rejected are not public information. 
28 This entry is from the patent directory 1902, p. 96. 
29  See “Patentgesetz vom 25. Mai 1877”, Reichsgesetzblatt, (1877), pp. 501-510. In 1877 (the year when 
the patent law was introduced), only 190 patents were registered. In 1878, 4,227 patents were registered.  
30  For the genesis of the German patent law see Heggen (1977). 
31  In the first year the potential patentee had to pay 20 Marks for the application and additional 30 Marks 
after the patent was granted. 50 Marks were approximately the monthly gross income of the average 
industrial worker. See Bry (1960), p. 51. 
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value. One big drawback of using patent data is that patents have various qualities as not 
all patents are equally important (see, for example, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001). To 
address this concern, following Schankerman and Pakes (1986), in this dissertation we 
use only the patents that have been prolonged for at least ten years.32 Following the 
selection criterion of the 10-year renewal, we have 39,343 patents from 1877 to 1918 in 
our database.33 Patentees had to pay substantially fees to keep their patents alive. 
Therefore these long-lived patents can well be regarded as high-value patents. A patent 
stands for an invention, but a patent that is held for ten years is a good proxy for 
innovation. Some inventors might register patents for leisure, but they normally would 
not spend money to renew patents for ten consecutive years. Moreover, the drawbacks of 
using patent data are more severe when small units (such as firms) and short periods of 
time are considered.34 Our use of relatively large regions and of more than three decades 




The patents that we use in this dissertation date from 1877 to 1914. Germany 
quickly industrialized during this period. The importance of the German industrialization 
can hardly be exaggerated. However, not much research has been done on innovation in 
Germany at this time period. As a matter of fact, historical research using patent data in 
general is scanty. In this dissertation, the author strives to fill this gap.   
Industrialization fundamentally changed the trajectory of world history. 
Correspondingly, one of the most interesting problems of economic history is still the 
question why some nations were able to industrialize successfully and others were not. 
England was the first nation to undertake industrialization after the Industrial Revolution. 
Yet in academia, even the very name “industrial revolution” has been heatedly debated.35 
Is it “industrial revolution” or “industrious revolution?”36 Is it evolution or revolution? 
The role of technological innovation and human capital in the British Industrial 
                                                          
32 Schankerman and Pakes (1986) found that most of the value of the patent stock in Britain, France and the 
former West Germany between 1955 and 1981 was represented by the upper five percent of patents. 
33 From 1877 to 1914, there are around 34,300 patents that survived for at least ten years.  
34 Schmookler (1962) specifically argues against the use of annual patent data (which may be influenced by 
many non-invention related factors) preferring instead 5-year periods. 
35 Coleman (1983) argues rather provocatively that the term “Industrial Revolution” is confusing and too 
vague to be useful. This view has been echoed by Jones (1988) and Lee (1986). 
36 See DeVries (1994) for a good survey on this debate.  
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Revolution has also been heatedly debated and no convincing conclusions have been 
reached.37 
After the British Industrial Revolution, the German industrialization is a landmark 
event in human history. It had profound and long-lasting impacts. Accordingly, it 
stimulates much research.38 In general, industrialization can be characterized as the 
transition process that leads an economy from stagnation to sustainable growth.39 Mokyr 
suggests that the key factor of this transition is a fundamental change in the behavior of 
economic actors who have to develop both the willingness and ability to create a 
permanent stream of innovations that shifts the production frontier determined by the 
efficient use of the resources land, labor and capital steadily outwards.40 North and 
Thomas stress that the willingness to innovate depends on the efficiency of institutional 
arrangements that are supposed to channel individual economic effort in the socially most 
profitable activities.41 According to this view the liberal reforms of the 19th century that 
defined property rights with respect to land, real capital and finally inventions clearly 
were a necessary precondition for the industrialization of Germany. Keck (1993) adds 
that during the German industrialization the ability to innovate was considerably 
increased by new organizations like an advanced education system, public research 
organizations or industrial research departments. Despite the general consensus among 
economic historians that the application of new technological knowledge (rather than 
increased input of production) was the prime source for overcoming economic stagnation, 
not much is known about the concrete timing of innovations and their distribution over 
industries and regions during the German industrialization.42 We would like to examine 
the role of technological innovation in the German industrialization and economic 
development.  
  
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
  
                                                          
37 See Mokyr (1993) for a fine survey on the research on the British Industrial Revolution.  
38 Gerschenkron made his fame by studying the role of universal bank in the German industrialization.  
39  See Landes (1969). See also Rostow (1960). 
40  See Mokyr (1990), p. 4 
41  See North and Thomas (1973), p. 2. 
42  See Metz and Watteler (2002), pp. 37-41. For the patenting activities during the British and American 
industrialization, see Khan and Sokoloff (1998); MacLeod (1988); and Sokoloff (1988). 
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This Ph.D. dissertation strives to study innovation during the German 
industrialization in a systematic and analytical way. Each chapter constitutes an integral 
facet of the whole structure in the intellectual inquiry.  
The role of technological innovation in the German industrialization, an important 
topic, has not been thoroughly examined so far. In chapter 1, we investigate whether there 
are some particular waves of patents from certain technological classes that correspond 
with the development of certain industries during the German industrialization. Since 
Adam Smith, economists have paid great attention to geography. And there has been 
growing literature on the topic of geography of innovation. Until recently, relevant 
literature has focused almost exclusively on the case of the USA. Little work has been 
done on Germany.43 Chapter 2 tries to fill the void and study innovation in Prussian 
regions. Some intriguing questions (such as regional catch-up and convergence) are 
examined. And the important role of human capital and infrastructure in fostering 
innovation is confirmed. These research results surely have policy implications. 
Innovation and cities are inextricably related. Urban residents acquired most of the 
patents in Germany. Chapter 3 extends the geographic scope to Germany as a whole and 
studies innovation in German cities. 
Knowledge production and spillover occupy the center stage of the innovation 
system approach. Economists used to believe that there is no free lunch in this world. 
Many contemporary economists provide counter arguments to this general statement. 
Mokyr (1990) argues that economic history is full of free lunches, as well as (more 
frequently) very cheap lunches. Knowledge spillovers are very typical examples for free 
lunches or cheap lunches as knowledge has the feature of a quasi public good. One 
important reason behind the phenomenon that firms tend to cluster is that firms can 
benefit more from knowledge spillover from clustering. This is especially true for 
knowledge-intensive firms. Therefore, it is impossible to discuss innovation in a 
sophisticated way without taking clustering and knowledge spillover into account. Are 
firms in clusters really more innovative? Using firm-level data from Baden region, 
chapter 4 tries to answer this question empirically. It examines whether firms located in 
industrial clusters are more innovative than firms located outside these clusters. Chapter 5 
is dedicated primarily to the study of knowledge spillover. Interestingly, we confirm that 
                                                          
43 Caniels (1997) covered five European countries (Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom), but missed Germany. The author stated regretfully, “However, it should be kept in mind that the 
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knowledge spillover is geographically bound as knowledge spillover is facilitated by 
close interactions among people. 
Research (re-search) is accumulative by nature. It is, like innovation, essentially a 
process that never ends. Any research should open windows towards more research and 
stimulate further studies. As we stated above, if used properly, patents can serve as good 
indicator of innovation. From chapter 1 to chapter 5, we have used patents that have 
survived at least ten years to decrease the noise/signal ratio of patents. Yet we can further 
improve the quality of the patent data used in our research. In chapter 6, the last chapter 
of this dissertation, we use patent survival data. Employing Cox regression technique, we 
study whether patents from different technological classes and different countries have 
distinct survival rates. Thus, in future, we would be able to attach different values to 
patents to get weighted patent data, which is a more precise measure of innovation. 
Moreover, the survival data would enable us to study the value of patent protection, an 
important and interesting topic. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sample used in this paper does not include German regions, even though recent studies (Verspagen 1997, 










We demonstrate that technological progress during German industrialization 
occurred in at least four different technological waves. We distinguish the railway wave 
(1877-1886), the dye wave (1887-1896), the chemical wave (1897-1902), and the wave of 
electrical engineering (1903-1918). Evidence is presented that inter-industry knowledge 
spillovers between technologically, economically and geographically related industries 
were a major source for innovative activities during the German industrialization. We 
also show that technological change affected the geographical distribution of innovative 
regions. Using an index of comparative advantage in technological sectors, we find out 
that the regions that increased their innovativeness during the waves of technological 
progress revealed special strength in the technological clusters electrical or mechanical 




It has been argued that the diffusion of new technological knowledge might be as 
important as its creation to make an economy grow.45 This is especially true for 
knowledge spillovers that increase the productivity of firms in the technological or 
geographical neighborhood of the original inventor.46 Jacobs (1969) believes that the 
most important knowledge spillovers take place across industries in highly diversified 
industrial regions. This argument has received further support by studies that confirm the 
significance of inter-industry technology flows and point out that technological solutions 
are often transferred from the sector where they were originally invented to a variety of 
                                                          
44 See also Streb, Baten and Yin (2005) on these issues.  
45  See Streb (2003a) as a recent representative work. 
46  For a survey on knowledge spillovers, see Griliches (1992). 
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industries applying them.47 In this respect, Lundvall (1988) emphasizes the importance of 
inter-industry knowledge spillovers between suppliers and customers. However, except 
for some anecdotal evidence regarding the information exchange between German dye 
producers and textile firms in the late 19th century,48 not much is known about the actual 
impact of knowledge spillovers during the German industrialization. 
The purpose of this chapter is to find evidence for important technological and 
geographical knowledge spillovers during German industrialization. Our research 
hypotheses are: 
1. Patent booms in leading technological sectors accelerated innovating activities in 
technologically related industries via knowledge spillovers. 
2. Knowledge spillovers between technologically related industries were 
considerably facilitated by geographical proximity. 
We organize the remaining chapter in three main sections. Section 2 analyzes the 
technological distribution of high-value patents over time. We will identify four 
successive patent waves in industrializing Germany during which knowledge spillovers 
occurred between technologically related industries. Section 3 discusses how 
technological change described by these patent waves affected the geographical 
distribution of innovative regions. It will turn out that the most innovative regions relied 
on diversified industry clusters in the fields of mechanical or electrical engineering or 
chemicals. Section 4 concludes the chapter.  
 
1.2 TECHNOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF HIGH-VALUE PATENTS OVER 
TIME 
 
Patents can generally be assigned to the industry in which they were developed or 
to the industry that will use or produce the resulting products and whose productivity may 
thereby increase.49 New dyes, for example, usually originated in chemical firms but were 
used by textile producers. The technological classes labelled to the patents by the German 
patent office rather corresponded to the industry that was supposed to use the respective 
invention. However, the correspondence between the technological class and the industry 
that might profit by the patent was far from perfect. A major shortcoming was that patents 
                                                          
47  Scherer (1982) finds that as many as 70 percent of inventions in a given industry are applied in other 
industries. See also Bairoch (1988). 
48  See Beer (1959). See also Streb (2003b), pp. 75-6. 
49  See Scherer (1982), pp. 228-9. 
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were assigned to only one technological class although they were often useful in several 
industries. New inventions with respect to steam engines, for example, were allocated to 
technological class 14 but probably increased the profits in a wide range of industries that 
used this kind of engine as a source for kinetic energy. Table 1.1 lists the 18 technological 
classes that contained the most high-value patents of all 89 classes in the period between 
1877 and 1918. 
Table 1.1 Ranking of technological classes 1877-1918 
 
Rank Class Number of high-
value patents 




1 21   Electrical engineering 3350 8.51% 8.51% 
2 12   Chemicals (without dyes) 2840 7.22% 15.73% 
3 22   Dyes 2206 5.61% 21.34% 
4 42   Scientific instruments 1584 4.03% 25.37% 
5 15   Printing 1429 3.63% 29.00% 
6 49   Metal processing 1202 3.06% 32.06% 
7 20   Railway installations 1146 2.91% 34.97% 
8 47   Machine parts 1137 2.89% 37.86% 
9 72   Firearms 1003 2.56% 40.42% 
10   8   Dyeing 928 2.36% 42.78% 
11 45   Agriculture 904 2.30% 45.08% 
12 52   Sewing 706 1.79% 46.87% 
13 80   Earthenware 675 1.72% 48.59% 
14 46   Internal combustion 
engines 
627 1.59% 50.18% 
15 30   Health care 615 1.56% 51.74% 
16 13   Steam boiler 605 1.54% 53.28% 
17 81   Transportation 601 1.53% 54.81% 
18 14   Steam engine 553 1.41% 56.22% 
 
This ranking could lead to the impression that during German industrialization 
technological progress mainly relied on electrical engineering, chemicals including dyes 
and scientific instruments which together included more than one quarter of all high-
value patents. Three arguments speak against this simple conclusion. First, we have 
already mentioned that industries like electrical engineering or chemicals generally seem 
to have a higher propensity to patent their inventions than, for example, the machine and 
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vehicle industry that above all tries to protect their inventions by keeping secret how to 
make them. Second, the technological classes of the German patent law considerably 
differed in the width of the technological field they covered. Patents of the fields of 
electrical engineering and chemicals were concentrated in classes 21 and 12 or 22 
respectively whereas patents with regard to mechanical engineering were spread over 
several classes like 47 (machine parts), 49 (metal processing), 14 (steam engine) or 63 
(vehicles). What is more “machinery patents” could also be found in less obvious classes 
like 45 (agriculture → agricultural machinery) or 86 (weaving → textile machines) to 
name just a few. This last finding also implies that it is not advisable to try to calculate 
the accurate number of “machinery patents” just by aggregating some technological 
classes like Hoffmann did for “metal working” on basis of all patents granted.50 Third, 
our sample is dominated by the many high-value patents of the pre-World War I boom 
during which electrical engineering patents especially flourished. As a result, electrical 
engineering has gained the leading position in table 1.1 even though this technological 
class was not dominating patenting activity in the decades before 1900. These three 
observations together lead to the conclusion that technological progress in the broad 
technological field of mechanical engineering played a much greater role during German 
industrialization than table 1.1 might suggest. 
We are able to solve most of these problems by analyzing the patenting activities 
in the 89 technological classes over time. It turns out that the relative number of high-
value patents of the technological classes presented in table 1.1 was not constant between 
1877 and 1918. In general, different technological classes boomed in different sub 
periods. Figure 1.1 visualizes this finding by showing the major patent booms between 
1877 and 1918. A major patent boom of a specific technological class is defined as the 
period in which this technological class held an annual rank no less than its average 
rank51 in every year and one of the three highest ranks in at least one year of this period. 
                                                          
50  See Hoffmann (1965), pp. 264-9. 
51  The average rank of a technological class is shown in table 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1 The major patent booms 1877-1918a 
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a Figure 1.1 doesn’t contain the less important technological classes 6 (brewery, rank 2 in year 1877, average rank 31), 36 (heating systems, rank 2 in 
1878, average rank 35), 68 (metal working, rank 1 in 1877, average rank 40), 76 (spinning, rank 3 in 1881, average rank 25) and 89 (sugar, rank 2 in 1879, 
average rank 44). 
b The highest rank of printing was 4. 





In figure 1.1, patent booms of specific technological classes were generally 
marked by grey bars. In years in which a technological class was ranked first, this bar is 
coloured black. We can discern four distinct waves of technological progress: 
1. the railway wave (1877-1886), 
2. the dye wave (1887-1896), 
3. the chemical wave (1897-1902), and finally 
4. the wave of electrical engineering (1903-1918). 
The railway wave was dominated by patents in the technological classes steam 
boiler (class 13), steam engine (class 14), railway installations (class 20) which mainly 
contained inventions concerning rail tracks, rail switches and signals, machine parts (class 
47) and metal processing (class 49). Traditionally, the railway industry is regarded as 
Germany’s leading sector in the middle of the 19th century that, by increasing demand for 
coal, iron and advanced engineering technology, caused the parallel growth of the 
German coal mining, iron and steal industry and mechanical engineering.52 Our finding 
supports the conjecture that the railway industry generated forward and backward 
linkages not only by selling or buying tangible goods and services but also played an 
important role as a focal point for the exchange of intangible new technological 
knowledge in the field of mechanical engineering indicated by the patent boom in most of 
the industries of the railway cluster between 1877 and 1886. 
The industries of the railway cluster kept to their above-average patenting 
activities until the beginning of the 20th century. This did not prevent, however, that the 
new industries of the second industrial revolution, namely chemicals and electrical 
engineering, took over the technological lead in the midst of the 1880s. According to 
Murmann’s co-evolutionary approach, the meteoric rise of the German dye industry was 
paradoxically caused both by the absence of a German patent law before 1877 and by its 
existence afterwards.53 The absence of patent protection led in the 1860s and 1870s to a 
much higher number of newly founded dye producers in Germany than in Britain or the 
United States where entry barriers were substantial because of an already existing patent 
law. The initially high number of German dye producers resulted in a fierce price 
competition in which only those firms that were able to cut costs considerably survived. 
After the establishment of the German patent law in 1877, the winners of this selection 
process gave up their traditional strategy of imitating new dyes of foreign inventors and 
                                                          
52  See Fremdling (1975), p. 5. 
53  See Murmann (2003), pp. 84-93. 
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instead used their increasing profits to build up industrial laboratories in which for the 
first time in economic history white-collar workers searched systematically and based on 
the division of labor for economically useful inventions.54 As a result, the German dye 
producers considerably accelerated the evolution of the synthetic dye technology by 
inventing famous dyes like Congo Red or Synthetic Indigo. They also succeeded in 
shaping their institutional environment by lobbying for the change of patent law in 1891 
explained above.  
Figure 1.2 Share of the high-value patents of classes 8 and 22 in all high-value 






































This fundamental change of innovating strategy first led to the dye wave (1887-
1896), in which patents with respect to new dyes (class 22) ranked first in every year. 
Figure 1.2 reveals that after some time lag the invention of new synthetic dyes also 
accelerated the development of new and complex chemical and mechanical dyeing 
procedures patented in technological class dyeing (class 8). In a next step, this new 
knowledge spilled over to the downstream textile industry. The main channel of this 
knowledge transfer was the customer consulting service of the German dye producers 
who regularly informed textile producers about both new dyes and new dyeing methods.55 
Wallusch, Streb and Yin (2003) observe a statistical bi-directional Granger causality 
                                                          
54  See Meyer-Thurow (1982). 
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between German net cloth exports and patents of technological classes dyes and dying, 
which suggests that during the German Empire the knowledge spillover between 
chemical and textile firms created an upward circle of endogenous growth. The increasing 
demand for synthetic dyes of the prospering textile firms initiated further R&D projects 
of chemical firms that led to new patents and via customer consulting to additional 
economic benefits of the German textile industry. This process, however, was not infinite 
but came to an end when the synthetic dyes technology was fully exploited. 
Dyestuffs remained the dominating business of the German chemical firms in the 
19th century.56 Nevertheless, the research laboratories also started to explore other new 
technological fields like inorganic acids, pharmaceuticals or synthetic fertilizers. The 
growing importance of these new products was revealed during the chemical wave (1897-
1902) when the technological field of chemicals without dyes (class 12) mostly gained 
rank 1 with regard to the number of high-value patents. As we have already mentioned, 
this development was considerably fostered by the change in the patent law in 1891. 
Surprisingly enough, the wave of electrical engineering (1903-1918) was not 
dominated by the two gigantic companies Siemens and AEG. In the period between 1901 
and 1916, for example, Siemens and AEG got only 10.7 percent and 7.9 percent 
respectively of 2,607 high-value patents in the technological class of electrical 
engineering (class 21), although the combined market share of these two giants was 
surely more than 20%. Our data set enables us to identify other important inventors that 
were for example Felten & Guilleaume AG in Cologne, Robert Bosch in Stuttgart, 
Hartmann & Braun AG in Frankfurt a/m, or Eisenbahn-Signalbau-Anstalt Max Jüdel & 
Co. AG in Braunschweig. In Berlin, several innovative firms like C. Lorenz Telephon- & 
Telegrafenwerke AG and Deutsche Telephonwerke GmbH used the opportunity offered 
by the new telephone technology to enter the market. These observations suggest that the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis that firm size is a necessary pre-condition for outstanding 
innovativeness might not have been generally true during German industrialization.57  
To test our hypothesis econometrically, we compare the ranking of the one 
hundred largest German firms of 1907 measured by employment58 with their ranking with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
55  See Beer (1959), p. 91. 
56  See Hippel (2002), p. 47. 
57 Following Schumpeter (1950, p. 135), Galbraith states: “Thus, in the modern industry shared by a few 
large firms, size and the rewards accruing to market power combine to ensure that resources for research 
and technical development will be available. ... The net of all this is that there must be some element of 
monopoly in an industry if it is to be progressive.” Galbraith (1957), p. 88. 
58 See Fiedler (1999), pp. 44-48. 
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respect to the number of high-value patents. It turns out that the Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient is not positive, but has the negative value –0.242. In the sample of 
the one hundred largest German firms of 1907, the smaller ones were rather the more 
innovative ones. This finding can be explained by the fact that this sample was dominated 
by the very large mining, metals and railway companies like Bergwerksgesellschaft 
Hibernia, Röchling’sche Eisen- und Stahlwerke or Preussisch-Hessische Staatseisenbahn 
that could not profit from the technological waves of the second industrial revolution and 
had therefore only a very small number of high-value patents.59 
A very interesting facet of the wave of electrical engineering is the patent boom of 
the technological class of scientific instruments (class 42) that started (similar to the 
timing of the patent booms in dyes and dyeing) with some time lag to the preceding boom 
in electrical engineering. Generally, the number of patents in the field of scientific 
instruments that are needed to develop innovations in most of the other technological 
fields can be interpreted as an excellent indicator for the innovative potential of an 
economy. In this respect, the high number of this kind of patents between 1910 and 1918 
might indicate that in this period the German industry was well-equipped to produce 
another generation of high-value patents. 
It has been widely assumed that the German industrialization took place in the 
transition period between two long Kondratieff cycles of which the first was dominated 
by the railway sector, the second by chemicals and electrical engineering.60 Our analysis 
confirms this view and reveals more details about the complexity of the technological 
development during these cycles. In each of the four technological waves depicted in 
figure 1.1, the outburst of innovative activities was not limited to the leading sector but 
occurred with some time lag in a couple of other industries which were technologically 
and economically linked to the original creator of the basic innovations. In this process, 
new knowledge spilled over both from the leading sectors to their customers and 
suppliers and back from the latter to the former. Firm size was not a necessary pre-
condition for successful patenting activities. This is especially true for the patent booms 
of dyes and electrical engineering that weren’t driven by already long-established firms 
but by newcomers that then grew because of their above-average innovativeness. 
                                                          
59 We will come back to the Schumpeterian hypothesis in the context of German industrialization in chapter 
2 and chapter 4. In chapter 2, we discover that firm size does not seem to have statistically significant 
impact on innovation in Prussian regions. In chapter 4, using a data set based on Kocka and Siegrist (1979), 
we will discuss the largest firms and their representation among the most innovative firms in Germany.  




1.3. GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PATENTS 
 
Map 1.1 shows that during German industrialization the high-value patents were 
not more or less uniformly distributed over the different German regions but were 
geographically clustered in a broad belt that reached from the districts neighboring the 
river Rhine in the West to Greater Berlin and Saxony in the center. 
 




















































































































Map 1.2 The geographical distribution of high-value patents per capita 1878-












































































































As a result of this calculation, especially some regions in the southwest like 
Neckarkreis or Mannheim improved their relative innovativeness while other regions like 
Potsdam or Dresden fell behind. We should keep it in mind that map 1.2 is also not a 
perfect representation for regions’ relative innovativeness because their number of 
residents increased with different growth rates during the period under consideration. 
However, since both maps show nearly the same geographical distribution of patenting 
activity, we are confident that in the following we can use the absolute number of high-
value patents to identify the development Germany’s most innovative regions correctly. 
The dominance of the Rhine region and Greater Berlin well goes with Sokoloff’s 
seminal finding that the patenting activities in early 19th century America were 
concentrated in metropolitan areas and along waterways (Sokoloff 1988). Sokoloff 
explains this geographical clustering of patents mainly by demand factors. He bases his 
argument on the assumption that the profitability of a patent was the higher the larger the 
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market where the respective innovation could be sold. Because of this correlation, 
Sokoloff concludes that firms which were either located near highly populated 
metropolitan areas or could transport their products at low costs along navigable 
waterways to distant markets faced considerably higher incentives to patent than firms in 
more remote areas. As a result, patents were concentrated in the former regions. Demand 
factors, however, also determine the original choice of location. That is why it is 
necessary to distinguish clearly between a firm’s choice of location and its decision to 
patent. 
Sokoloff is well aware of this problem and therefore controls for the division of 
the labour force between agriculture and manufacturing. It turns out that his estimated 
positive relationship between firms’ proximity to navigable waterways and the intensity 
to patent is robust to the inclusion of this variable supposed to measure the level of 
industrial activity in a region. Hence, in Sokoloff’s sample, demand factors really seem to 
influence the geographical distribution of patents independently from the original choice 
of location.  
The German case, however, suggests that, because of industries’ uneven 
geographical distribution, the aggregated level of industrial activity might not be the 
adequate variable to distinguish between the demand effects on the firms’ location and 
patenting decision respectively. Obviously, the broad west-east strip of German regions 
with an above-average number of high-value patents was also the favored location of 
those industries in which most of the high-value patents originated. Long before the 
German patent law of 1877 actually came into force, these industries’ original choice of 
location might have been influenced by a variety of factors like the expected market size 
or the availability of raw materials and intermediate products. Large chemical firms like 
BASF or Bayer, for example, preferred to settle at the banks of the river Rhine which was 
not only an important navigable waterway but was also used as a water source and to get 
rid of effluents. It is therefore conceivable that the great majority of all chemical firms 
located themselves along waterways. Consequently, waterway areas had an above-
average density of chemical firms and because of this industry’s high patenting activity 
also a higher number of patents than regions with a similar industrial activity level that 
were dominated by industries that patented less than the average. The same argument 
holds for mechanical and electrical engineering. Firms engaged in the field of mechanical 
engineering were especially concentrated in the geographical neighborhood of iron and 
steal producers, namely in the Greater Ruhr area, and near textile firms, namely in 
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Saxony.61 Berlin was the center of German electrical engineering. The fact that the 
German industries with an apparently above-average propensity to apply for high-value 
patents were geographically clustered might have led quite to a similar geographical 
distribution of high-value patents. To check the robustness of the relationship between 
firms’ proximity to metropolitan areas or mass transportation infrastructure and the 
intensity to patent proposed by Sokoloff, it would therefore be advisable not to control 
just for the general level of industrial activity but for the activity levels of different 
industries located in the regions under consideration. Using our patent sample, our 
research outcome in chapter 2 supports Sokoloff’s hypothesis by showing that railway 
density had a statistically significant impact on innovations in Prussian regions no matter 
patents with respect to chemicals and electrical engineering were excluded or not.62 
Following Feldman (1994), we employ a Chi-squared test on the independence of 
the location and technological class of the patents.63 In our contingency table of high-
value patents per region and per technological class, rows are German regions while 




where RiT and CTj are the row total (marginal sum) for ith row (region) and the 
column total (marginal sum) for jth column (technology class), and T is the total 
frequency calculated with marginal sums. Our contingency table has dimensions r*c 
(rows * columns). 
The Chi-squared test formula is  
 
                                                          
61  See Barth (1973), pp. 73-83. 
62  In chapter 2 of this dissertation, we will see that human capital formation, measured by the number of 
students of technical and commercial schools, also significantly influenced the geographical distribution of 
high-value patents in Prussia. 
63 As a matter of fact, there are several tests of independence although Chi-squared test is the most versatile 
one and is most widely used. The general rule of selection is that if the highest expected frequency (m) is 
larger than 10, Chi-squared test is used; if m is between 5 and 10, Yates’ correction for continuity is used; if 
m is smaller than 5, Fisher’s exact test is used. We choose Chi-squared test because our highest expected 
frequency (m) has always exceeded 10. The results of a chi-squared test do not solve problems, but they do 
point out whether we can proceed further. In our case, the answer is positive. For technical details, see R. 
Myers, R. Walpole, "Tests of hypotheses", in Myers and Walpole (1978), pp. 268 – 273.  
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where Oij is the observed frequency and Eij is the expected frequency as defined 
above. The degree of freedom is (r-1)*(c-1)=(85-1)*(89-1)=7392. 
The rationale behind this Chi-squared test is that if the probability of patenting in 
the technological class and the probability of patenting in the region are found to be not 
independent, then geography affects inventive activities. There is evidence that 
geography affects inventive activity. Our Chi-square statistic is very high (21435). As we 
have very high degree of freedom (7392), the p-values of the χ2 statistics are even less 
than 0.005. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that the probability of patenting in the 
technological class and the probability of patenting in the region are independent. The 
base for further inquiry is firmly established. 
The outcome reveals that the distribution of innovative activity is not random. 
With respect to the number of all high-value patents, the ranking of the most innovative 
German regions changed during the four waves of technological progress. Table 1.2 
allows us to distinguish regions with continuous, decreasing and increasing relative 
innovativeness. Berlin and Duesseldorf kept their leading position during the whole 
period under consideration but it is interesting to note that Duesseldorf, first, was able to 
catch up to Berlin with respect to the number of high-value patents during the dye period, 
and then, considerably fell behind in the period of electrical engineering. Wiesbaden and 
Palatinate also increased their innovativeness during the dye period while Potsdam 
developed its innovative potential mainly during the period of electrical engineering. 
Dresden and Leipzig that ranked three and four respectively during the railway period 
displayed decreasing relative innovativeness in the following waves of technological 
progress. 
Table 1.2 The most innovative regions during the four waves of technological 









Region Patent Share Region Patent Share Region Patent Share Region Patent Share 
Berlin 320 11,7% Berlin 512 10,7% Berlin 521 11,7% Berlin 3159 14,2%
Düsseldorf 155 5,6% Düsseldorf 512 10,7% Düsseldorf 414 9,3% Düsseldorf 1982 8,9% 
Dresden 105 3,8% Wiesbaden 300 6,2% Wiesbaden 241 5,4% Wiesbaden 1252 5,6% 
Leipzig 103 3,8% Palatinate 186 3,9% Dresden 124 2,8% Potsdam 935 4,2% 
Wiesbaden 91 3,3% Dresden 142 3,0% Palatinate 120 2,7% Palatinate 573 2,6% 
Arnsberg 78 2,8% Cologne 128 2,7% Arnsberg 101 2,3% Arnsberg 515 2,3% 
Cologne 74 2,7% Arnsberg 119 2,5% Cologne 98 2,2% Cologne 511 2,3% 
Magdeburg 72 2,6% Leipzig 102 2,1% Potsdam 96 2,2% Dresden 483 2,2% 
Hamburg 61 2,2% Chemnitz 95 2,0% Hamburg 95 2,1% Leipzig 456 2,0% 
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Karlsruhe 57 2,1% Hamburg 81 1,7% Leipzig 92 2,1% Neckar 401 1,8% 
 
To check if these changes in the ranking of the most innovative regions could be 
caused by the transition from one technological wave to the next, we calculated for every 
technological class an index of location quotient (LQ), where n denotes the number of 
patents, subscript i the region, subscript j the technological class, and nG the total number 










If LQij is equal 1, patents in technological class j are equally represented in the 
region i and in Germany. If LQij is larger than 1, region i specialized in technological 
class j. 
Table 1.3 presents for every region named in table 1.2 the five technological 
classes with the highest location index. In some regions, these technological classes 
formed a cluster of economically and technologically related industries that are named in 
the last column of table 1.3. Bold letters indicate clusters of three or more related 
industries; normal letters refer to clusters of two related industries. 
                                                          
64  See Feldman (1994). Some scholars refer to this LQ as “technological revealed comparative advantage” 
(e.g., Malerba et al. 1997; Archibugi and Pianta 1992).  
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Table 1.3 Technological revealed comparative advantages and innovative 
cluster 
 
Revealed Comparative Advantage Region 













































Arnsberg Pumps (59) 
11.3 






















Increasing relative innovativeness 







































Decreasing relative innovativeness 































































The striking result of this calculation is the fact that most of the regions with 
continuous innovativeness and all of the regions with increasing innovativeness possessed 
at least one innovative cluster while the regions with decreasing innovativeness generally 
did not. This observation is evidence for the hypothesis that inter-industry knowledge 
 31
 
spillovers between geographically concentrated firms were a major source for innovation 
activities. Berlin specialized in electrical engineering including signalling and alarm 
systems as well as lighting that perfectly explains its great innovative outcome during the 
wave of electrical engineering. Wiesbaden and Palatinate had technological revealed 
comparative advantages in chemicals and did especially well during the waves of dyes 
and chemicals. Regions like Duesseldorf or Potsdam heavily depended on mechanical 
engineering but were nevertheless able to keep or even improve their rank under the most 
innovative regions after the railway wave had ended. The development of the regions 
Cologne, Potsdam and Neckar suggests that in the early 20th century a fifth wave of 
technological progress with respect to vehicle construction and internal combustion 
engines started.65 
The fact that the German regions with a high number of high-value patents often 
specialized in particular technological fields does not imply that these regions displayed 
their innovativeness only in a few technological classes. Rather the opposite was true. As 
figure 1.3 shows, the German regions with a high number of high-value patents usually 
relied on a comparatively high diversity of technological classes measured by the 

















Again, n denotes the number of high-value patents summed up for the years 1877 
to 1918, i the region and j the technological class. Here, the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index 
would be 100 when a region patented in only one technological class and 1.1 when the 
patents of a region were equally distributed over the 89 technological classes used by the 
German patent office. 
 
                                                          
65  In the mid of the 1920s, the classes internal combustion engines (46) and vehicle construction (63) were 
ranked sixth and second respectively with respect to the number of patents applied for. See Wernekke 
(1927), p. 414. 
66 The HHI is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. 
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Our in-depth analysis of the high-value patents revealed that technological 
progress was not a continuous process but came in at least four different waves during the 
German industrialization. We were able to identify clearly the railway wave (1877-1886), 
the dye wave (1887-1896), the chemical wave (1897-1902) and the wave of electrical 
engineering (1901-1918). In addition, there might have been the beginning of the fifth 
wave with respect to vehicle construction not fully disclosed by our data. These 
successive waves of technological progress had a visible impact on the geographical 
distribution of high-value patents. Regions like Berlin, Wiesbaden or Palatinate that 
specialized in the new technologies of the second, third and fourth waves showed 
increasing innovativeness while other regions like Dresden and Leipzig that were not 
especially engaged in these technological fields fell behind. We found ample evidence 
that inter-industry knowledge spillovers between technologically, economically and 
geographically related industries were a major source for innovative activities during the 
German industrialization. In a first step, we discovered that most of the parallel patent 
booms of the successive waves of technological progress occurred in technologically 
closely related fields. This is, for example, true for steam engines, steam boilers, railway 
installations, metal processing and machine parts in the first wave, dyes and dyeing in the 
second wave, or scientific instruments and electrical engineering in the fourth wave. In a 
second step, we were able to show that these innovative, technologically related 
industries were often geographically clustered too. Nearly all regions that maintained or 
improved their above-average innovativeness over time had at least one innovative cluster 










Regions play a key role in innovative activities. Consequently, studying regional 
innovation system help us answer the big question “why are some regions innovative 
while other regions are bad innovators?” Using data on Prussian regions from 1877 to 
1914, this chapter examines the temporal-spatial patterns of Prussian patents. We observe 
the catch-up and convergence of patents across Prussian regions over time as lagging 
states of innovation enjoyed fast growth in patenting. As no region had been rising 
rapidly and persistently over time, we can perceive the catch-up as systematic rather than 
the isolated cases of a few regions. Then we move on to investigate the extent that various 
regional factors affect innovation. We find that both human capital and infrastructure 
have economically and statistically significant impact on innovation in Prussian regions. 
Furthermore, we exclude patents from special industries such as chemical and electrical 
industries and from special regions such as Berlin and run the regression again. The 
results remain robust. Our analysis of regional innovation systems surely has implications 




It is seemingly paradoxical that as international competition intensifies in an 
increasingly integrated world economy67, scholars have shown more interest and paid 
more attention to regional innovation systems (RIS)68, which can be defined as “the set of 
economic, political and institutional relationships occurring in a given geographic area 
which generates a collective learning process leading to the rapid diffusion of knowledge 
                                                          
67 Ohmae (1990) argues that globalization of economic activity is increasingly making national frontiers 
(and therefore the nation state as a unit of economic analysis, not to mention region) irrelevant.  
68 Cooke (1992) is one of the first works to discuss the concept of regional innovation systems (RIS). Cooke 
(1998, 2001) further elaborates this concept.  
 35
 
and best practice.”69 Innovation is an increasingly significant source of competitive 
advantage for firms, regions and nations. Porter (1998) argues that the enduring 
competitive advantage in a global economy is often heavily local, arising from a 
concentration of highly specialized regional factors. Figure 2.1 illustrates the importance 
of regional factors in the diamond model of Porter.  
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Source: Porter (1990) 
In particular, using the diamond model, Porter (1990, 1998) shows that the United 
States’ global lead in the competition of innovation was predicated on the existence of 
regional innovation systems. Innovation is crucial in our understanding regional 
prosperity (Malecki, 1990; Feldman and Florida, 1994). There are many reasons that 
compel scholars to focus on the regional level to study innovation: Spatial proximity 
facilitates the sharing of tacit knowledge and capacity for localized learning; firms 
clustered in a region share a common regional culture that facilitates learning; and 
localized learning is facilitated by a common set of regional institutions.  
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69 See Nauwelaers and Reid (1995) for elaborations of this definition. 
 
Regions surely play an important role in innovation.70 After all, as any other social 
and economic activities, innovation is place-based. It occurs in an institutional, political 
and social context. Regions are the sites of economic interaction. And regions are the loci 
of innovation.71 Successful clusters of innovative firms and industries have emerged in 
many regions around the world. And most studies on innovation in regions focus on only 
the successors, namely those places that qualify as “industrial districts”. Although these 
studies provide clues to understanding regional development, one must take into account 
that these studies are by no means conclusive and are largely based on a few successful 
regions.72 Yet not all regions are equally successful in generating innovation. Why are 
some regions highly innovative while other regions are bad innovators? Studying regional 
innovation system will help us answer this big question in the real world as well as in 
academia. We can compare innovative regions with non-innovative regions provided that 
they are comparable. Consequently, solid recommendations for innovation policy and 
regional policy can be proposed based on the analysis of regional innovation systems as 
some regional factors can well be changed by government policy.  
Although it is almost undeniable that regions are important for innovation, there is 
no consensus about what regional factors affect innovation significantly. The following 
regional factors are said to play some roles in creating innovation: regional areas of 
specialization, research infrastructure (higher education sector), specialized training 
institutions, industrial attraction and retention, government policy/support, physical 
infrastructure (transportation and communications), primary and secondary educational 
system, civic governance, culture (such as lifestyle assets).  
Despite the sheer size of literature on innovation, surprisingly, most studies on the 
geography of innovation so far are static in nature in that they do not sufficiently examine 
the evolution of spatial patterns of innovation and do not perform long-run inter-temporal 
comparisons.73 Today’s technology leaders could risk falling into laggards in future. 
During the 1970s, Route 128 in Boston was the undisputed center for electronic industry. 
                                                          
70 Storper (1995) emphasizes the important role that regions play in national technology policy.  
71 See Storper (1997) for elaborations of this argument. 
72 Cooke and Morgan (1998) is a typical study. It focuses on Baden-Wuerttemberg, the most innovation 
region in Germany. And it proposes that a strict reading of the literature would suggest that only three 
regions are true regional innovation systems: Silicon Valley in the USA, Emilia-Romagna in Italy and 
Baden-Wuerttemberg in Germany.  
73 Sokoloff (1988) is one of the earliest works to trace the temporal and spatial patterns of patents in US 
regions. He finds evidence of catching up in inventions. Using US data, Varga (1999) also finds out that 
patent laggards catch up with patent leaders. One recent study Powell et al. (1999) tracks the patents 
granted to 388 biotechnology firms and find out that firms with initially low patents tend to register more 
patents in succeeding periods.  
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By the late 1980s, Boston already lost its early lead. The center shifted to Silicon Valley 
in California. In this chapter, we are interested in the spatial distribution of patents and, 
furthermore, how the pattern evolves over time. Then we strive to measure the extent that 
these various factors affect innovation in Prussian regions. The rest of the chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 2 discusses units of analysis and measurement issues. 
Section 3 investigates how the geography of innovation evolves in Prussia and tries to 
identify whether there is catch-up of technologically backward regions. Section 4 
describes the data and explanatory variables. Section 5 presents the estimation results of 
our benchmark model. Section 6 modifies the model and presents the new estimation 
results. Section 7 concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2 UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
 
Although there is still no general understanding of how to define a region (Cooke 
et al., 2000), any study on regional innovation system should start by defining regions.74 
The diversity of the units of analysis employed in studies of innovative systems presents a 
major problem in constructing a conceptual framework of research. Some researchers 
suggest using cities as units of analysis.75 Meanwhile, some scholars favor using 
metropolitan regions.76 At a more aggregate level, administrative regions (such as states, 
provinces) are used as scale. Lundvall and Borras (1997) claim that the region is 
increasingly the level at which innovation is produced through regional networks of 
innovators, local clusters and the cross-fertilizing effects of research institutions. For 
instance, this is the case in the research on Belgian province of Wallonia (Capron and 
Cincera, 1999). The main concern of this kind of studies is on the understanding of the 
role institutions and policies in sustaining innovativeness and competitiveness. The 
rationale for adopting this unit of analysis is that regional units are constituted by specific 
institutional structures and cultural traditions that facilitate and regulate economic 
behavior and social activity (Wolfe and Gertler, 1998). Audretsch and Feldman (1996) 
argue that regions are the most relevant policy-making units in the promotion of 
innovation generating activities. Therefore, the innovative efforts of this geographic unit 
can display some of the features of a regional innovation system. This study uses regional 
                                                          
74 See Niosi (2000) for elaborations of this argument. 
75 See Crevoisier and Camagni (2001) and Simmie (2001). 
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units (Regierungsbezirk) as units of analysis as they fit our research purpose, namely 
which regional factors are associated with high innovative performance. We choose 
Prussia over German Empire for several reasons. Firstly, it is easier for data aggregation 
and compilation. Some regions in the German empire, such as Thuringen, are extremely 
fragmented and cause considerable troubles in data work. Secondly, the statistical 
yearbooks of Prussia normally provide more detailed information at regional level than 
the yearbooks of the German Empire. One example is the number of pupils in vocational 
schools. Thirdly, many non-Prussian states had quite different social and administrative 
contexts than their Prussian counterparts. For example, before the patent law was 
introduced in the whole German Empire in 1877, the patent system already existed in 
some parts of Prussia, although it was new to non-Prussian regions.77 People in Prussian 
regions were likely quite experienced with patenting activities. Thus, comparisons of 
Prussian regions and non-Prussian regions in the unified German empire are prone to 
mistakes. There are not many drawbacks for focusing on Prussian regions. We do lose 
some observations. Nevertheless, Prussia had 37 Regierungsbezirks78, sufficient for our 
search purpose. As a matter of fact, Prussian residents thoroughly garnered the majority 
of high-value patents granted by the patent office as figure 2.2 tells us. The share had 
been rather stable over time: about 60 %.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
76 Audretsch and Feldmann (1999) argue that metropolitan areas are the most important sites of innovation. 
Browner et al (1999) argues that metropolitan areas have high potential for innovation.  
77 See “Patentgesetz vom 25. Mai 1877”, Reichsgesetzblatt 1877, 501-510. For the genesis of the German 
patent law see Heggen, Alfred, 1977, Zur Vorgeschichte des Reichspatentgesetzes von 1877, Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, 322-327. 
78 In the statistical yearbook, data on Allenstein did not become available until 1905. Both Gumbinnen and 
Koenigsberg gave out some territories to form Allenstein.  
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Figure 2.2 Share of high value patents issued to Prussian residents from 1878 to 
1914 
























































Figure 2.3 Number of high-value patents issued to Prussian residents from 1878 
to 1914 
































































In figure 2.3, we observe that the high-value patents obtained by Prussian 
residents had been stagnant during the 1880s. The number increased relatively modestly 
during the 1900s. And then it rose drastically during the 1910s till the World War One. 
And it is not right to argue that this growth is largely due to the population growth. From 
1880 to 1914, the Prussian population rose from 26 million to 40 million. The growth rate 
of high-value patents is much higher than the growth rate of population.  
Figure 2.4 Number of high-value patents issued per million inhabitants in 









































































































We divide high-value patents by Prussian population (million residents) and make 
figure 2.4. The pattern captured in figure 2.4 is not much different from that shown in 
figure 2.3. 
 
2.3 EVOLUTION OF THE GEOGRAPHY OF INNOVATION 
 
We put the geographical distributions of patents across Prussian regions in map 
2.1. The map shows that the high-value patents were by no means uniformly distributed 
over various Prussian regions. Instead they were geographically clustered in a broad belt 
that ran from the districts close to the river Rhine in the West to Berlin in the center. This 
innovation belt corresponds to the industrial zones in Germany at that time well. Eastern 
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Prussia had scanty patents. The two extreme cases are Berlin (about 4,526 patents from 
1877 to 1914) and Allenstein (virtually no patents).  
























































































Table 2.1 The most innovative Prussian regions measured by patent counts  
(annual average in each sub-period) 
 
1878-1885 1886-1895 1896-1905 1906-1910 1911-1914 
Region Patent Region Patent Region Patent Region Patent Region Patent
Berlin 32.3 Berlin 48.5 Berlin 96.0 Berlin 219.6 Berlin 425.3 
Duesseldorf 17.3 Duesseldorf 46.7 Duesseldorf 72.5 Duesseldorf 114.2 Duesseldorf 253.5 
Wiesbaden 10.3 Wiesbaden 27.8 Wiesbaden 41.7 Wiesbaden 88 Wiesbaden 166.5 
Arnsberg 8.9 Cologne 12.4 Potsdam 18.9 Potsdam 62 Potsdam 132.3 
Cologne 8.4 Arnsberg 11.2 Arnsberg 17.9 Arnsberg 39 Cologne 65 
Magdeburg 8.3 Magdeburg 6.8 Cologne 17.7 Cologne 36.8 Arnsberg 64 
Merseburg 5.3 Potsdam 5.7 Hannover 12.4 Hannover 17.4 Hannover 40.8 
Aachen 4.8 Merseburg 4.2 Aachen 8.8 Aachen 16 Aachen 37 
Hannover 4.5 Aachen 4.0 Magdeburg 8.4 Kassel 13.8 Kassel 29.5 




The ranking of the most innovative Prussian regions, however, changed over time. 
Table 2.1 allows us to distinguish regions with continuous, decreasing and increasing 
relative innovativeness. We use annual average in each time period to render a 
comparison over sub-periods possible. Berlin, Duesseldorf, and Wiesbaden had always 
occupied the top three positions during the whole period under consideration. Yet it is 
interesting to note that Duesseldorf initially was able to catch up to Berlin with respect to 
the number of high-value patents, and then fell behind considerably. Potsdam initially did 
not enter the top ten rank. Yet later it developed its innovative capacity, perhaps due to 
the influx of mechanical engineering patents. Magdeburg made a strong debut. Yet it 
displayed relatively decreasing innovativeness later on, perhaps due to the fact that it did 
not fare well in electrical engineering, an industry that created increasingly large numbers 
of patents. 
We divide patent counts by population (per million residents) and make map 2.1. 



























































































In table 2.2, we rank Prussian regions in terms of patents per million inhabitants.  
Table 2.2 The most innovative Prussian regions measured by patents per million 
residents (annual average in each sub-period) 
 
1878-1885 1886-1895 1896-1905 1906-1910 1911-1914 
Region Patent Region Patent Region Patent Region Patent Region Patent 
Berlin 33.8 Wiesbaden 34.6 Berlin 53.8 Berlin 108 Berlin 205 
Wiesbaden 14.5 Berlin 33.5 Wiesbaden 43.5 Wiesbaden 79 Wiesbaden 137 
Osnabrueck 13.6 Duesseldorf 25.0 Duesseldorf 30.3 Duesseldorf 48 Duesseldorf 74 
Cologne 12.4 Cologne 15.7 Hannover 20.1 Cologne 32 Hannvoer 55 
Duesseldorf 11.3 Arnsberg 8.8 Cologne 18.4 Potsdam 27 Aachen 54 
Hannover 10.1 Hannover 7.5 Aachen 14.6 Hannover 25 Cologne 52 
Aachen 9.3 Aachen 7.2 Arnsberg 10.6 Aachen 24.6 Potsdam 46 
Magdeburg 9.1 Magdeburg 6.6 Potsdam 10.5 Arnsberg 18.4 Kassel 29 
Arnsberg 8.6 Erfurt 4.7 Erfurt 8.1 Kassel 14.4 Arnsberg 27 




Comparing table 2.1 with table 2.2, we observe that the ranking has not changed 
much after normalizing patents by population. Berlin region still stands out, even though 
it had around 1.8 million population. Berlin, Wiesbaden and Duesseldorf have constantly 
occupied the top three positions. A comparison of map 2.1 and map 2.2 confirms this 
observation.  
Following Feldman (1994), we employ a Chi-squared test of independence 
between the technological classes and regional locations of patents.79 There is evidence 
that geography affects inventive activity in all sub-periods. In table 2.3, the Chi-squared 
statistics are very high. As we have very high degree of freedom, the p-values of the χ2 
statistics are even less than 0.005. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that the probability 
of patenting in the technological class and the probability of patenting in the state are 
independent. Thus, we firmly established the base for further exploration. 
 
Table 2.3 Chi-square test of independence of region and technological class, 
using high-value patents per million inhabitants (1877-1914)  
Period Chi-square statistic P-value 
1877-1885 10414.2 0.000 
1886-1895 10943.8 0.000 
1896-1905 11554.3 0.000 
1906-1910 11896.8 0.000 
1911-1914 12434.5 0.000 
Degree of freedom (df) = (89-1) * (38-1) = 3256 
Table 2.4 ranks the top ten regions in terms of the growth rates for total patents. 
Table 2.5 takes population into consideration and ranks the top ten regions regarding the 
growth rates for patents per million residents. 
Table 2.4 Top regions in growth rates of annual total high-value patents (%) 
From 1878-1885 to 
1886-1895 
From 1886-1895 to 
1896-1905 
From 1896-1905 to 
1906-1910 
From 1906-1910 to 
1911-1914 
Region Growth rate Region Growth rate Region Growth rate Region Growth rate 
Danzig 380 Gumbinnen 900 Stralsund 500 Trier 366 
Munster 247 Aurich 400 Frankfurt 
a/o 
275 Munster 332 
Wiesbaden 171 Potsdam 232 Stettin 260 Hildesheim 275 
Duesseldorf 170 Hannover 226 Potsdam 228 Osnabrueck 263 
                                                          





140 Koeslin 200 Marienwied
er 
225 Minden 
Koeslin 140 Lueneberg 200 Liegnitz 214 Oppeln 205 
Minden Posen 
243 
127 183 Lueneberg 200 Koenisberg 181 
Frankfurt 
a/o 
120 Kassel 176 Schleswig 200 Stettin 178 
Schleswig 100 Aachen 120 Kassel 138 Posen 141 
Erfurt 78 Koblenz 120 Berlin 129 134 Hannover 
 
Some caution should be called for when we analyze this ranking in table 2.4. A 
low base for comparison may make some region’s growth rate appear very high although 
the patents added are modest. This is especially true for the early periods, when patents 
were not abundant for most regions. In general, patent-intensive regions do not fare well 
on this ranking, suggestive of catch-up of technologically backward regions. Yet no 
region occupies a high position in this ranking constantly over time. Thus, it is not 
possible to identify a technologically backward region that raised its innovativeness 
persistently. 
Table 2.5 Top regions in growth rates of annual total high-value patents per million 
residents (%) 
From 1878-1885 to 
1886-1895 
From 1886-1895 to 
1896-1905 
From 1896-1905 to 
1906-1910 










Danzig 357 Gumbinnen 888 Stralsund 486 Trier 330 
Munster 208 Aurich 359 Frankfurt a/o 266 Hildesheim 266 
Koeslin 143 Koeslin 192 Stettin 239 Munster 257 
Wiesbaden 138 Lueneberg 168 Marienwieder 209 Osnabrueck 236 
Marienwieder 135 Hannover 167 Liegnitz 201 Minden 223 
Duesseldorf 122 Posen 166 Lueneberg 172 Oppeln 181 
Frankfurt a/o 114 Kassel 162 Schleswig 167 Koenigsberg 175 
Minden 109 Potsdam 144 Potsdam 152 Stettin 173 
Schleswig 86 Koblenz 106 Kassel 117 Posen 128 
Erfurt 66 Aachen 103 Berlin 100 Danzig 122 
 
The caution mentioned above for table 2.4 also applies to the ranking contained in 
table 2.5. The rankings in table 2.4 and table 2.5 are fairly similar.  
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We would like to study the evolution of region’s innovative output over time. 
Figure 2.5 presents state’s rankings in patents per capita for several periods. The first 
panel depicts a state’s ranking in 1877-1885 against is ranking in 1886-1895; the second 
panel contains a state’s ranking in 1877-1885 against its ranking in 1896-1905; and so on. 
In these panels, points along a 45-degree line from the bottom left to the top right suggest 
no change in ranking. Points above a 45-degree line indicate a drop in ranking. Points 
below a 45-degree line suggest a rise in ranking. 
 











































































Rank 1878-1885: Ranking of high-values patents per million residents in 1878-1885,  
Rank 1886-1895: Ranking of high-values patents per million residents in 1886-1895,  
Rank 1896-1905: Ranking of high-values patents per million residents in 1896-1905,  
Rank 1906-1910: Ranking of high-values patents per million residents in 1906-1910,  
Rank 1911-1914: Ranking of high-values patents per million residents in 1911-1914. 
Convergence and divergence are enduringly interesting topics in the study of 
economic and social activities80. The information contained in tables 2.4 and 2.5 and 
figure 2.5 does seem to indicate patent catch-up by some lagging states of innovation. In 
tables 2.4 and 2.5, we see that the regions lagging in patenting activities top the list of 
growth rates of patents. In figure 2.5, we observe that a significant amount of spots are 
dispersed off the 45-degree line.  
To confirm this impression and to better understand the catch-up process, we 
construct a simple econometric model.  
Ln [Pat(later period)/Pat(1877-1885)i] = α + β Ln [Pat(1877-1885)i] + δ Ln (PatOther(1877-1885)] + εi  (1) 
                                                          
80 Gerschenkron (1962) argues for the advantage of backwardness, contending that backward states could 
use more updated technology to catch up leaders quickly. 
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where i indexes the region; Pat(later period)i is high-value patents per one million 
residents in state i in each of the four sub-periods following 1877-1885 (1886-1895, 
1896-1905, 1906-1910, 1911-1914); Pat(1877-1885)i is the number of high-value patents per 
one million residents in 1877-1885; and εi is an assumedly well-behaved error term. Thus, 
our dependent variable measures the growth rate of patents compared with the initial 
period 1877-1885.  
For independent variables, in addition to Pat(1877-1885)i, following Smith (1999), we 
include a measure of knowledge spillover because of the quasi public good nature of 
knowledge. Variable PatOther captures spillovers from neighboring regions as spillovers 
are often spatially bound. The variable is constructed using all high-value patents per 
million residents registered in bordering Prussian regions in 1877-1885.  
It is an interesting and open question about how long a patent can affect later 
patenting. Patent citations reflect knowledge transfers between generations of inventors. 
Caballero and Jaffe (1993) discover that citations fall off sharply a decade after the 
patent’s grant date. Yet Nicholas (2004) finds that forty-two (that equals 31.8 percent) of 
great inventor Edison’s 132 patents granted from 1910 to 1930 by the USPTO (United 
States Patent and Trademark Office) are cited in patents granted between 1976 and 2002. 
Of course this proportion might be inflated if patent examiners have a propensity to cite 
the classics without regard to true values. Nevertheless, according to Nicholas (2004), of 
the 19,948 patents granted to firms between 1920 and 1929 by the USPTO, 21 percent are 
cited in patents granted between 1976 and 2002. Of the 4,215 patents cited, 2,548 receive 
one citation while 1,667 receive two or more citations, with the maximum number of 
cites for a patent being 27. These numbers of citations over a long time period are really 
remarkable. We conclude that patents might have an influence that exceeds the ten-year 
limit suggested by Caballero and Jaffe (2003). Our regression might be able to give us 
additional hint about how long patents can impact later patenting activities. Table 2.6 
presents the empirical results of our regression using OLS method.  































R square 0.243 0.153 0.192 0.127 
number of 
observations 
36 36 36 36 
 
Note:  
1. Standard errors are given in parenthesis 
2. * means statistically significant at 10 % level, ** means statistically significant at 5 % 
level, and *** means statistically significant at 1 % level. 
 
We have to admit that this model is not perfect. In particular, over a long time as 
we have in this chapter, technological regimes might have experienced substantial 
changes, which are hard for us to detect and track. Nevertheless, the model is 
illuminating. The regression results are pretty consistent for the first three regressions: 
patents at the initial stage have negative impact on patenting in later periods, suggesting 
catch-up and regional convergence in inventive activities. These outcomes confirm our 
impression gained from the tables four and five and figure three. In the last regression, 
none of the explanatory variables has statistically significant impact. And the R square is 
very low. The reason is perhaps that the patents at the initial stage have impact on later 
sub-periods, but this effect does not last long enough to the very last sub-period in our 
study, at least not as long as Nicholas (2004) suggests, although we do not have patent 
citation data to support our argument more forcefully.  
 
2.4 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AS DETERMINANTS OF REGIONAL 
INNOVATION 
 
We go further to explore the determinants behind regional performance in 
patenting activities. Our dependent variable is innovation, measured by annual high-value 
patents of Prussian regions per million residents to normalize regional size. We use 
annual data to render a comparison over time convenient. The geographic distribution of 
patents is made according to the state residence of the first named register. Our 
explanatory variables are the factors that might have an impact on innovation at the 
regional level. We obtain these explanatory variables from statistical yearbooks of Prussia 
(Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer den Preussischen Staat). Actually these statistical yearbooks 
were not available every year before 1903. Between 1877 and 1903, only four yearbooks 
were published: 1883, 1888, 1893, and 1898. Facing this limitation and irregularity of 
data sources, we split our study period into five intervals: 1877-1885, 1886-1895, 1896-
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1905, 1906-1910, and 1911-1914. Using the mean number of patents for each interval 
reduces inter-annual variances in patent numbers, which is especially troublesome in 
areas that often receive only few patents in a given year. 
When we study regional variables, we need to control the regional size. A region 
with more people naturally tends to generate more patents. Thus, in this study wherever 
applicable, we use population (million residents) of various regions to divide various 
explanatory variables to control the size effect.  
Human capital is one significant regional factor that might be associated with 
innovative performance. Lucas (1988) suggests that the ability to development and 
implement new technology depends on the average level of human capital in the local 
economy. Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) demonstrate that more local skilled labor force 
produces greater innovation. We have data for the number of students in various Prussian 
regions. However, we have to be selective. Not all students are equally likely to conduct 
R&D (Research and Development) activities after their graduation. We have to choose 
the index that has systematic difference across regions. Prussia had a very good public 
school system. Almost all Prussian districts enjoyed high enrolment rates of primary 
schools. It does not make much sense to use overall number of students. Moreover, 
students from school of arts and music are very unlikely to engage in technologically 
innovative activities. With discretion, we use students of technical and commercial 
schools. After graduation, students from these two kinds of schools are most likely to 
generate new knowledge that could be patented. Furthermore, the numbers of students of 
these two kinds of schools demonstrate systematic difference across regions. Berlin and 
Duesseldorf are clearly leaders. We gather the numbers of students at technical and 
commercial schools. Map 2.3 demonstrates the regional distribution of human capital.  
Map 2.3 The geographic distribution of number of pupils in technical and 

























































































Technological discoveries are more likely to occur to those who are involved in an 
industry than to outsiders as insiders might be expected to be more knowledgeable about 
problems and opportunities in the industry and also better positioned to gain from their 
knowledge. This principle would lead one to expect that geographic distribution of 
innovations would correspond generally to the distribution of the industrial labor force.81 
We try to test this hypothesis. We use industrial labor force per million residents in each 
region as one explanatory variable. Duesseldorf leads this index, partially because it is 
where the industrial Ruhr area is located. 
After considering human capital, labor, we take physical capital formation into 
account. We use horsepower (both steam engine and electrical) per million residents as 
proxy for physical investment.82 
                                                          
81 A more sophisticated version of this argument is the theory of “learning by doing” associated with 
scholars such as Kenneth Arrow and Armen Alchian. See Arrow (1962b) and Alchian (1963).  
82 See Broadberry (1997) for using horsepower as a proxy for physical capital formation. In particular, it is 
reasonable to regress on horsepower when we also control for industrial employment and capital stock. The 
capital stock of joint stock firms is a proxy of large firm and capital of banks and other financial 
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Innovation is associated with finance. Arrow (1964) shows how well functioning 
financial markets can encourage risky undertakings by allowing that risk be spread across 
many investors. Lack of funding can constitute a serious hindrance for firm’s innovative 
efforts. And there might be regional home bias because it was much easier to monitor a 
firm nearby. Although it is not clear how efficiently capital allocated towards firms that 
have innovative opportunities, it is hardly to deny that availability of capital facilities 
firm’s innovative endeavors. We use the capital of joint stock firms (Deutsche Mark) per 
million residents as a measure of capital intensity. Berlin is the undisputed leader in this 
measure, followed by Duesseldorf and Cologne. This might be also interpreted as the 
complementariness between financial capital and innovation.  
The possible association between firm size and innovation is an interesting and 
controversial one. Schumpeter (1912) argues that small firms are best at innovating. 
Schumpeter (1942) reverses this opinion and argues that large monopolistic firms are the 
best innovators because they are able to fund research into innovations.83 Anselin, Varga, 
and Acs (1997) argue that small firms generate more inventions per dollar of research 
expenditure. Morck and Yeung (1999) find that measures of firm size, like total sales and 
the number of industries in which the firm operates, magnify the extra value each dollar 
of R&D adds to the firm’s share price. As we do not have data for market size, we cannot 
investigate the association between market structure and innovation. Yet we do have data 
to measure firm size. We use employee per firm as a proxy of firm size. Not surprisingly, 
Arnsberg, Aachen and Berlin rank high in this index as big firms made strong presence in 
these regions.  
Infrastructure is expected to affect innovation. Good infrastructure reduces 
transport and transaction costs. Infrastructure is very special in that government is often 
involved in the construction and maintenance of infrastructure as infrastructure often 
needs huge amounts of investment and often has the feature of public goods. 
Transportation and communications are both typical examples of infrastructure. Sokoloff 
(1988) examines the significant influence of transportation on patenting in the U.S. 
Railway was the most important means of transportation in Germany. We use railway 
density (kilometer per thousand square kilometers of territory) as one explanatory 
                                                                                                                                                                             
institutions, because joint stock firms were typically larger and financial institutions accounted for a large 
share, whereas horsepower is really a proxy for capital of all firms (including the smaller ones).  
83 A really interesting and comprehensive exposition of Schumpeterian thought is Scherer (1992). Cayseele 
(1998) performs a more recent review of contributions on the relationship between market structure and 
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variable. This variable varies over regions. Cologne, Duesseldorf and Wiesbaden rank 
high in this variable. Map 2.4 helps us visualize this regional distribution of railway 
density.  
Map 2.4 The railway density of Prussian regions 1878-1918 (kilometre per 























































































It is interesting to observe that the regional distributions of patents, human capital, 
and railway density are quite similar. Our subsequent regression outcomes would confirm 
this impression.  
There are certainly some other factors that might affect innovation. Some of these 
factors are social capital and culture.84 Yet some of these factors are hard to measure and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
innovation. For reasons to expect that large firms to have advantages in carrying out R&D, see Henderson 
and Cockburn (1996). 
84 It is possible that some cultures are more supportive of innovation than others. Chandler (1977, 1990) 
contends that the U.S. economy became more purposeful between 1870 and 1910, and that this greatly 
enhanced the success rate of innovations. Saxenian (1994) argues quite convincingly that the open, 




difficult to quantify while for other factors we do not have data available. We have to 
leave these factors in the residual. 
  
2.5 REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE BASIC MODEL 
 
Above we have explained our data and variable. We use OLS method to estimate 
the following equation85 
Ln (patents per million residents) = β0+ β1 Ln (number of industrial labor per 
million residents) + β2 Ln (firm size) + β3 Ln (horsepower per million residents) + β4 Ln 
(railway density) + β5 Ln (professional school students per million residents) + β6 Ln 
(incorporated capital per million residents) + ε      (2) 
 
Table 2.7 Estimation results: Determinants of annual high-value patents per 
million residents (in natural log form) 
 









































































incorporate data not data not 0.106 0.356* 0.611*** 
                                                          




capital  available available (0.179) (0.184) (0.206) 
R square 0.698 0.754 0.702 0.774 0.791 
Number of 
observations 
36 36 36 37 37 
 
Our regressions for various periods have fairly good fitness (Table 2.7). Our 
independent variables explain our dependent variable pretty well. 
Human capital (measured by pupils in vocational schools per million residents) 
stands out in the estimation. They always have positive impact on innovation. And its 
impact has been statistically significant through the whole period under our consideration. 
Infrastructure (measured by railway density) also calls for our attention. It has a positive 
effect on innovation. And its impact has been statistically significant most of the time. 
The effect of capital intensity is not very conclusive, partially because we do not 
have data for the whole period, although they have positive effect during the whole period 
when data are available. And from 1906 to 1914, for two sub-periods consecutively, the 
positive effect is statistically significant. One possible implication is that as time goes on, 
capital availability and intensity becomes more and more significant for innovative 
activities as inventive efforts demand more capital input.  
The impact of industrial employees has been positive through the whole period 
under our consideration. Yet the positive impact is statistically significant only for the 
first time period (1878-1885). A possible explanation is that as firms establish research 
labs using the trial and error method to conduct R&D more effectively, the benefit from 
general worker’s production on innovation becomes no longer significant.  
The association between firm size and innovation is not confirmed. The impact 
has never been statistically significant. This outcome indicates that the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis (which is drawn primarily from the American observation) that firm size is a 





The research results listed above are pretty encouraging and promising as well. 
Yet we can go further. Patents from chemical (technological class 12 and technological 
class 22) and electrical engineering (technological class 21) occupy a big share in our 
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high-value patent pool. In total, 23% of high-value patents (1877 to 1914) fall into these 
two industries. Figure 2.6 captures the change of this share over time.  





























































































We would like to exclude the chemical and electrical engineering from our 
regression. These industries have several special features. Firstly, they are highly 
concentrated geographically. The two most important electrical engineering firms, AEG 
and Siemens, were located in Berlin.86 In the period between 1901 and 1916, for instance, 
Siemens and AEG got as much as 19 % of 2,607 high-value patents in the technological 
class of electrical engineering. Chemical industry is very sensitive to geographic location. 
The industry had to be located near rivers to release wastes nearby during the production 
process and to use the transport advantage. Secondly, these industries have highly 
concentrated market structure. A handful of firms (such as BASF) produced most of the 
patents in these technological classes. Thirdly, big firms in these industries have research 
labs and hire technicians from anywhere. Regional factors do not tend to affect the 
innovativeness of these big firms as much as they influence the patenting activities of 
other industries that often had smaller firms. Given all the reasons listed above, including 
patents from chemical and electrical industries could distort the real picture.  
                                                          
86 Details are described in Hughes (1983).  
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Table 2.8 Numbers of patents in chemical and electrical industries and their 
relative shares in total patents by region (1877-1914 all years pooled) 
 
region chemical share (%) electrical share (%) 
Aachen 26 6.60 2 0.51
Allenstein 0 0 0 0
Arnsberg 31 3.81 28 3.44
Aurich 0 0 1 6.25
Breslau 12 5.45 0 0
Bromberg 0 0 0 0
Danzig 2 5.88 0 0
Duesseldorf 855 27.91 32 1.04
Erfurt 2 1.67 0 0
Frankfurt O 6 9.84 0 0
Gumbinnen 4 21.05 0 0
Hannover 21 4.69 25 5.58
Hildesheim 12 17.14 5 7.14
Kassel 11 3.90 8 2.84
Koblenz 11 12.94 0 0
Cologne 70 8.63 47 5.80
Koenigsberg 0 0 4 13.79
Koeslin 0 0 0 0
Liegnitz 4 2.44 1 0.61
Lueneburg 6 27.27 0 0
Magdeburg 21 5.74 0 0
Mariewerder 6 12.50 0 0
Merseburg 23 8.27 1 0.36
Minden 7 4.49 2 1.28
Muenster 15 18.07 0 0
Oppeln 10 4.90 11 5.39
Osnabrueck 0 0 0 0
Posen 1 1.59 0 0
Potsdam 100 8.85 137 12.12
Schleswig 2 0.82 15 6.17
Sigmaringen 0 0 0 0
Stade 0 0 0 0
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Berlin 346 7.67 1019 22.58
Stettin 4 4.94 0 0
Stralsund 0 0 0 0
Trier 1 1.06 1 1.06
Wiesbaden 983 52.18 142 7.54
In total 2592 16.23 1481 9.28
 
Table 2.8 shows the absolute numbers and relative shares of patents in chemical 
and electrical industries by region (1877-1914 all years pooled). Chemical patents stand 
out in the patent pools of Duesseldorf and Wiesbaden. Electrical patents are eminent in 
the patent pool of Berlin. To visualize the effect of chemical and electrical patents, we 
made a map of the geographical distribution of high-values patents after excluding 
chemical and electrical patents. 
We plot the geographical distributions of patents (excluding chemical and 
electrical patents) in map 2.5. 
Map 2.5 The geographical distribution of high-value patents 1878-1918 




























































































Map 2.6 gives us information about the geographical distributions of patents 
(excluding chemical and electrical patents) per million residents. 
Map 2.6 The geographical distribution of high-value patents per million 











































































































It is interesting to compare map 2.1 and map 2.5. There are similarities and 
differences between these two maps. The Rhein region is no longer so outstanding in 
patents, partially because the chemical industries are highly concentrated along the Rhein 
River. Berlin, Potsdam, and Duesseldorf remain salient in both maps. Compared with 
other regions, eastern Prussia still had little patents. 
We rank the regions by high-value patent counts after excluding patents from 
chemical and electrical industries. We use annual average in each sub-period to make 
inter-period comparison possible. 
 
Table 2.9 The most innovative regions in Prussia (excluding chemical and 
electrical patents) (annual average in each sub-period) 
 
1878-1885 1886-1895 1896-1905 1906-1910 1911-1914 
Region Patent Region Patent Region Patent Region Patent Region Patent 
Berlin 31.25 Berlin 36.6 Berlin 68.2 Berlin 143 Berlin 284 
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Duesseldorf 16.1 Duesseldorf 21.8 Duesseldorf 47.5 Duesseldorf 110.2 Duesseldorf 201 
Arnsberg 9 Cologne 10.9 Potsdam 16.3 Potsdam 49 Potsdam 100.5 
Cologne 8.4 Arnsberg 10.1 Arnsberg 16.2 Arnsberg 36 Wiesbaden 74 
Magdeburg 8.1 Wiesbaden 7.8 Cologne 15.3 Wiesbaden 34.4 Arnsberg 59.8 
Wiesbaden 5.9 Magdeburg 6.7 Wiesbaden 14.0 Cologne 32.6 Cologne 55.5 
Merseburg 5.0 Potsdam 5.6 Hannover 11.5 Hannover 16.2 Aachen 34.5 
Aachen 4.8 Merseburg 4.0 Magdeburg 8.2 Aachen 15 Hannover 33.25 
Hannover 4.5 Hannover 3.7 Aachen 7.9 Kassel 12.6 Kassel 28.2 
Osnabrueck 3.9 Aachen 3.6 Merseburg 6.1 Schleswig 10.8 Schleswig 23 
 
 
Table 2.1 (which ranks all high-value patents) and table 2.9 (which ranks only 
high-value patents excluding chemical and electrical industries) are quite similar. Yet the 
importance of Wiesbaden declines in table 2.9, partially because the exclusion of 
chemical industries. Table 2.10 ranks the most innovative regions in Prussia in terms of 
high-value patents (excluding chemical and electrical patents) per million residents.  
Table 2.10 The most innovative regions in Prussia in terms of patents per million 
residents (excluding chemical and electrical patents) (annual average in each sub-
period) 
 
1878-1885 1886-1895 1896-1905 1906-1910 1911-1914 
Region Patent Region Patent Region Patent Region Patent Region Patent 
Berlin 30 Berlin 25 Berlin 38 Berlin 70 Berlin 137 
Osnabrueck 14 Cologne 14 Duesseldorf 20 Duesseldorf 37 Wiesbaden 61 
Cologne 12 Duesseldorf 12 Hannover 19 Wiesbaden 31 Duesseldorf 59 
Duesseldorf 11 Wiesbaden 10 Wiesbaden 17 Cologne 29 Aachen 50 
Hannover 10 Arnberg 8 Cologne 16 Hannover 23.3 Hannover 44 
Aachen 9.3 Hannover 7.3 Aachen 13 Aachen 23.1 Cologne 40 
Magdeburg 8.9 Magdeburg 6.5 Arnsberg 10 Potsdam 21 Potsdam 35 
Arnsberg 8.8 Aachen 6.49 Potsdam 9 Arnsberg 17 Kassel 28 
Wiesbaden 8.3 Erfurt 4.5 Erfurt 8 Kassel 13 Arnsberg 25 




After controlling population, the importance of Potsdam in terms of patent count 
decreases, partly because of the large population (around two million) of Potsdam region. 
This case also applies to Schleswig, which had around 1.5 million residents.  
The similarity of table 2.1 and table 2.9 and the similarity between table 2.2 and 
table 2.10 to a certain degree dismiss the concern that chemical and electrical industries 
distort the picture greatly due to the special features of these two industries. Nevertheless, 
we run regression after excluding patents from chemical and electrical industries.  
 
Table 2.11 Estimation results: Determinants of annual high-value patents 
excluding chemical and electrical industries per million residents  
 





















































































R square 0.678 0.728 0.698 0.757 0.785 
Number of 
observations 




Our modified estimation still enjoys high degree of fitness. The results of this 
modified estimation are roughly the same as the results of the previous estimation. 
After this modification (excluding patents from chemical and electrical 
industries), we go even further. We would like to omit Berlin, Duesseldorf and 
Wiesbaden from our regression. These three regions had been occupying the top three 
positions that we consider. And these three regions are very special for various reasons. 
Berlin was the capital of the unified German empire. Duesseldorf region, as a major 
administrative center, is close to the industrial Ruhr area. Wiesbaden is a county where 
many chemical firms clustered. These three regions can be regarded as outliers due to 
their special situations and their predominance in claiming patents.  
We estimate the original benchmark model again after excluding these three 
special regions.  
Table 2.12 Estimation results: Determinants of high-value patents excluding 
Berlin, Duesseldorf and Wiesbaden 
 









































































incorporated Data not Data not 7.223E-02 0.334* 0.411* 
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capital  available available (0.156) (0.187) (0.208) 
R square 0.624 0.695 0.649 0.717 0.778 
Number of 
observations 
33 33 33 34 34 
 
Our modified estimation still enjoys high degree of fitness. The original 
regression results are quite robust. They do not experience dramatic changes after 
modifications. Human capital and infrastructure have positive and statistically significant 
effects throughout the whole period. The effects of firm size are mixed: sometimes 
positive while sometimes negative. Yet this point is not conclusive from the regressions 




Innovations are place-based. Regions play a key role in innovative activities. 
Consequently, studying regional innovation systems help us answer the big question 
“why are some regions innovative while other regions are bad innovators?” Using data on 
Prussian regions from 1877 to 1914, this empirical study investigates the extent that 
various regional factors affect innovation. We find that both human capital and 
infrastructure have economically and statistically significant impact on innovation in 
Prussian regions. Furthermore, these results are pretty robust. They remain true after we 
exclude patents from special industries such as chemical and electrical industries and 
after we omit patents from very special regions such as Berlin, Duesseldorf and 
Wiesbaden. Thus, the concern that patents from special industries and special regions 
should not be exaggerated, at least for the research purpose of this paper. Our analysis of 
regional innovation systems certainly has implications for innovation policy and regional 
policy. To facilitate innovation, it seems advisable that government should be committed 












Urban residents obtained most of the patents awarded in Germany from 1890 to 
1914. We investigate the question what kind of conditions fostered innovation in German 
cities. We gather data on urban conditions in 44 cities in Germany from 1890 to 1914. 
Using rank-size relationship equation, we find that big cities dominated patent awards, 
signifying that urbanization externalities facilitate invention. Then we take variables for 
human capital, employment, and diversity of industries (measured by Herfindahl index). 
We investigate these variables’ impact on innovation. We find out that besides 
population, both human capital and employment have an impact on patenting in German 
cities. Location in the traditional manufacturing belt also plays a role. Urban residents in 
the manufacturing belt were the most active inventors. Moreover, we find that industrial 




Innovation and cities are closely related. Most of innovative activities concentrate 
in cities. Conversely the formation and development of cities are closely dependent on 
innovative activities. And innovation is key to the success of cities. It facilitates city 
formation (Jacobs, 1969; Marshall, 1890; Arrow, 1962; and Romer, 1986) and regional 
industrial performance (Saxenian, 1994). Therefore, many researchers focus on the city as 
the key site of innovation processes. Crevoisier and Camagni (2001) and Simmie (2001), 
for example, argue that cities generate innovation because they act as arenas for the 
confluence of innovative factors. In particular, using city as unit of analysis has some 
additional advantages for our research. Firstly, it allows us to study the “geography of 
innovation”87 in Germany as a whole while many data were not available at regional level 
                                                          
87 This term is taken from Feldman’s work (Geography of innovation) published in 1994, which stands as 
one of the main reference in this field. 
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in Germany at this time period (1890-1914). Secondly, innovative activities are not 
evenly distributed in a region. For instance, the modestly high patenting in Bavaria was 
largely boosted by patents in Munich and Nuremberg rather than somewhere else (such as 
Wuerzburg) in the region.  
German cities differ sharply in their innovative abilities. Some cities are highly 
innovative while some cities are bad innovators. Our primary goal is to identify the 
factors that foster innovation in German cities and to estimate the impact of these factors.  
To be specific, the central questions of this chapter are the following. Firstly, what 
are the conditions that account for the uneven distribution of inventions in various cities? 
Secondly, do the conditions of big cities differ from those of small cities? Thirdly, do the 
conditions vary when we compare cities in the manufacturing belt with those in other 
regions in Germany? 
The rest of this chapter is divided into several parts. Section 2 explains the data 
used in this paper. Section 3 provides some descriptive statistics and employs the rank-
size equation to study the effect of city size on innovation. Section 4 describes the 
regression equations that relate patent counts to urban conditions. Section 5 presents the 




We use patent data as proxy of innovation. A patent is located to a specific city 
depending on the residence of the first inventor in the list of inventors. We get data of 
cities from the German statistical yearbook of cities (Statistisches Jahrbuch deutscher 
Städte) for the years from 1890 to 1914. The yearbook lists information of 44 German 
cities88. Eighteen of these cities had over 200,000 residents. They were Berlin, Bremen, 
Breslau, Chemnitz, Dortmund, Dresden, Duesseldorf, Essen, Frankfurt a/m, Hamburg, 
Hannover, Leipzig, Magdeburg, Mannheim, Munich, Nuremberg, Stettin, Stuttgart. These 
cities are classified as big cities in this chapter as we want to study the impact of urban 
size on innovation. The main manufacturing zone in Germany stretches from the districts 
neighboring the Rhine River in the West to Greater Berlin and Saxony in the center. The 
following cities were located in the manufacturing belt: Aachen, Barmen, Berlin, 
                                                          
88 As time went on, the yearbook had information for more cities. Yet to keep the research scope consistent, 
we focus on these 44 cities whose information had always been available in the yearbook. 
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Braunschweig, Cassel, Chemnitz, Dortmund, Dresden, Duesseldorf, Elberfeld, Erfurt, 
Essen, Frankfurt a/m, Halle, Hanover, Karlsruhe, Cologne, Krefeld, Leipzig, Magdeburg, 
Mainz, Mannheim, Stuttgart, Wiesbaden.  
As we intend to study the continuity and changes of the impact of urban 
conditions on innovation, we split the whole time period into five intervals: 1890-1894, 
1895-1899, 1900-1904, 1905-1909, and 1910-1914.89 As each interval contains five 
years, this division renders inter-temporal comparison convenient in our study.  
  
3.3 PATENTS IN URBAN HIERARCHY 
 
Patents were highly concentrated in German cities. Table 3.1 shows the absolute 
number of patents registered by patentees in the 44 German cities. It also lists the relative 
share of these patents among the total patents registered by Germans. From 1890 to 1914, 
more than half of domestic patents were claimed by patentees living in the 44 German 
cities, although these cities accounted for only about 15-20% of German population.  
Table 3.1 Population and high-value patents of the 44 cities and their respective 
shares in whole Germany 
 1890-1894 1895-1899 1900-1904 1905-1909 1910-1914
population in 44 
cities 
7790106 8678520 10640003 11830849 13275365 
share of national total 15.8% 16.6% 18.9% 20.0% 20.4% 
high-value patent 
counts in 44 cities 
1140 1202 1922 2864 5541 
share of national total 57% 60% 61% 58% 54% 
 
The population share had risen continuously. The share of patents rose initially, 
and then declined slightly. This concentration is a clear evidence of the relationship 
between invention and population that was established in the nineteenth century (Pred, 
1966; Feller, 1971; Higgs, 1971; Sokoloff, 1988).90 
Even among the 44 German cities, patents were by no means evenly distributed. 
Table 3.2 ranks the top ten most innovative cities at various time periods.  
                                                          
89 Some variables are averaged over shorter intervals due to the unavailability of the whole series. 
90 This relationship was substantiated by Ullman (1958) and Thompson (1962) for the 1950s.  
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Table 3.2 The top ten most innovative cities by high-value patent counts 
1890-1894 1895-1899 1900-1904 1905-1909 1910-1914 
city patent city patent city patent city patent city patent 
Berlin 271 Berlin 339 Berlin 517 Berlin 842 Berlin 1744 











88 Elberfeld 121 Elberfeld 169 Elberfeld 277 
Chemnitz 55 Leipzig 52 Dresden 110 Dresden 153 Duesseldorf 247 
Dresden 50 Hamburg 50 Hamburg 97 Essen 141 Leipzig 236 
Leipzig 41 Dresden 44 Leipzig 90 Hamburg 109 Hamburg 220 
Hamburg 39 Duesseldof 42 Hannover 71 Cologne 101 Dresden 195 
Cologne 35 Hannover 34 Nuremberg 67 Stuttgart 98 Stuttgart 188 
Munich 28 Magdeburg 32 Cologne 62 Duesseldorf 94 Munich 168 
Duesseldorf 28 Chemnitz 31 Essen 58 Leipzig 90 Cologne 167 
 
In table 3.2, Berlin, Frankfurt a/m and Elberfeld had always occupied the top three 
position. Chemnitz made a strong debut. Yet it fell out of top ten as time went on. 
However, using patent data from all industries can be misleading. Chemical (including 
dyes) and electrical industries are very special as patenting is concerned. One such 
example is Elberfeld, whose patents were predominantly from the chemical industry 
(including dyes). So we tabulate this table again after excluding patents from chemical 
(including dyes) and electrical industries.  
Table 3.3 Most innovative cities by high-value patent counts (excluding patents 
from chemical, dyes and electrical industries) 
1890-1894 1895-1899 1900-1904 1905-1909 1910-1914 
city patent city patent city patent city patent city patent
Berlin 202 Berlin 241 Berlin 331 Berlin 523 Berlin 1127 
Chemnitz 49 Dresden 47 Dresden 105 Essen 138 Duesseldorf 237 
Dresden 45 Hamburg 46 Hamburg 87 Dresden 125 Frankfurt 
a/m 
235 
Frankfurt 42 Leipzig 46 Leipzig 82 Frankfurt 
a/m 
108 Leipzig 203 
Hamburg 36 Duesseldorf 40 Frankfurt 
a/m 
68 Hamburg 94 Hamburg 183 
Cologne 34 Frankfurt a/m 30 Cologne 58 Duesseldorf 87 Cologne 172 
Leipzig 31 Braunschweig 29 Hannover 57 Leipzig 86 Dresden 171 
Brauschweig 28 Hannover 28 Essen 56 Stuttgart 84 Stuttgart 171 
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Magdenburg 26 Magdeburg 28 Stuttgart 50 Koeln 81 Essen 142 
Duesseldorf 25 Chemnitz 27 Duesseldorf 48 Munich 75 Nuremberg 132 
 
Some cities are affected by the exclusion of chemical and electrical patents 
seriously. On this list, Elberfeld loses its eminent position. The importance of Frankfurt 
a/m also declines as its patents are heavily dominated by chemical industry. The patents 
held by Berlin residents also drops quite sharply, partly because a high share of Berlin 
patents come from electrical industries. Nevertheless, Berlin solidly holds the first 
position thoroughly. In contrast, Metz, Wuerzburg, Frankfurt a/o had been laggards 
persistently.  
Table 3.4 ranks the top ten cities by population in each time period. The order had 
not changed much over time. Berlin, Hamburg and Munich had constantly occupied the 
top three positions.  
Table 3.4 Top ten cities ranked by population 
1890-1894 1895-1899 1900-1904 1905-1909 1910-1914 
Berlin Berlin Berlin Berlin Berlin 
Hamburg Hamburg Hamburg Hamburg Hamburg 
Leipzig Munich Munich Munich Munich 
Munich Leipzig Dresden Dresden Leipzig 
Breslau Breslau Leipzig Leipzig Dresden 
Cologne Dresden Breslau Breslau Cologne 
Dresden Cologne Cologne Cologne Breslau 
Magdeburg Frankfurt a/m Frankfurt a/m Frankfurt a/m Frankfurt a/m 
Frankfurt a/m Hannover Nuremberg Nuremberg Duesseldorf 
Hannover Magdeburg Hannover Hannover Nuremberg 
 
To control the factor of urban size, we divide patent counts by population (one 
million residents) and tabulate the high-value patent ranking table again.  
Table 3.5 Most innovative cities by high-value patent counts per one 
million residents (excluding patents from chemical, dyes and electrical 
industries) 
1890-1894 1895-1899 1900-1904 1905-1909 1910-1914 
city patent city patent city patent city patent city patent
Chemnitz 350 Essen 266 Essen 302 Essen 557 Aachen 707 
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Braunschweig 266 Braunschweig 244 Braunschweig 274 Braunschweig 400 Braunschweig 698 
Frankfurt a/m 227 Duesseldorf 217 Stuttgart 258 Duesseldorf 325 Duesseldorf 585 
Dortmund 194 Erfurt 177 Hannover 228 Stuttgart 317 Stuttgart 558 
Duesseldorf 172 Aachen 169 Frankfurt a/m 218 Frankfurt a/m 305 Berlin 544 
Dresden 158 Chemnitz 161 Dresden 212 Aachen 302 Frankfurt a/m 532 
Erfurt 154 Erbelfeld 154 Duesseldorf 205 Mannheim 296 Mannheim 485 
Luebeck 152 Berlin 140 Aachen 190 Luebeck 252 Essen 447 
Stuttgart 140 Dresden 135 Mannheim 179 Berlin 248 Elbelfeld 429 
Essen 138 Magdeburg 129 Chemnitz 174 Dresden 233 Luebeck 423 
 
The ranking becomes quite different after we control for population. For instance, 
Berlin is no longer number one in terms of patents per million residents. Hamburg 
disappears from the list. Braunschweig (whose population was about 130,000) had 
occupied the second position in all time periods.  
The finding that patent awards concentrate in big cities is a commonplace feature 
of urban systems. Most urban-size distributions (of population and of patenting) are 
sharply positively skewed to the right. That is, there are few large cities but many small 
cities so that the number of cities in each size class increases as city size decreases. The 
following histograms assure us that the German urban system confirms this rule. We use 
histogram as it is a powerful tool to graphically summarize and display the distribution of 
data. 
Figure 3.1 Histogram of patents per million residents in 44 German cities 
(1890-1914 yearly average) 































We construct a histogram by segmenting the range of the data (in our case patents 
per million residents) into equal sized bins. In this histogram, the vertical Y-axis is 
labeled with the number of counts for each bin, and the horizontal X-axis of the 
histogram is labeled with the range of our variable (patents per million residents).  
The distribution is skewed to the right. We take natural log of patents per million 
residents and draw the histogram again.  
Figure 3.2 Histogram of patents per million residents in 44 German cities 
in natural log form (1890-1914 yearly average) 



























After taking natural logs, the distribution of patents per million residents is closer 
to normal distribution.  
The distribution of population follows a similar pattern.  































Located at the right end of the chart, Berlin and Hamburg stand out with their 
large populations. We take natural log of population.  
Figure 3.4 Histogram of population in 44 German cities in natural log form 





























Now, the distribution of population is more or less close to normal distribution. As 
German cities have highly unevenly distributed population and patents, we use natural log 
form of population and patents in our regressions. 
Rank-size rule is a powerful tool to study urban distribution. The theory was 
originally developed by Zipf (1949).91 It can be employed to investigate the relationship 
between the ranks of cities and their populations. A standard formula is 
Popr=Pop1/PopRankq        (1) 
We take natural log on both sides of the equation to get the linear form 
Ln Popr=Ln Pop1 + (–q) LnPopRank      (2) 
In these two equations, Popr is the population size of a given city, Pop1 is a 
constant approximately equal to the population size of the biggest city, PopRank is the 
rank of population in a given city, and (–q) is a parameter to be estimated. The rank-size 
theory suggests a linear sloping relationship between cities in a geographical area. 
According to this theory, there is one largest city and the rest cities will be strictly 
proportionally smaller than the largest city. If q = 1, the rank-size rule stands valid and 
the size of some city equals the division of the largest city by the rank of the city in 
question. For instance, if the largest city has a population of 100,000 people, the second 
largest city will have a population of 50,000 (100,000/2) people, the third largest city will 
have a population of 33,333 (100,000/3) people and so on. 
Berry (1961, 1964) theoretically interpreted the rank-size distribution as the 
outcome of a stochastic process in which multiple forces cause an urban system to reach 
an equilibrium set of city sizes. It is also the most probable distribution representing 
maximum entropy in steady-state equilibrium in theory. It is ideal because it shows the 
highest level of economic development, an equal distribution of wealth, and is important 
for implicating planning. However, in the real world, q is unlikely to be equal to unity as 
the most probable distribution may be neither observed nor optimal (Richardson, 1972). 
If q > 1, the largest cities dominate the system. That is, large cities are larger than they 
should be designated by rank-size relationship and they usurp much of the population of 
the following cities. Dynamic increasing returns that are external both to firms and 
industries concentrate invention, high-technology industries, and well-educated labor in 
the largest urban centers. Although the fundamental causes for their initial advantage are 
often small and difficult to identify and measure, they create enduring conditions favoring 
                                                          
91 For a good survey on this rank-size rule, see Carroll (1982). 
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agglomeration and large-city dominance (David and Rosenblum, 1990). The United 
States urban system (dominated by mega cities, especially in the manufacturing belt) falls 
into this category. Values of q < 1 are urban distributions that contain many substantial 
intermediate cities, as the case of Germany. The great number of smaller towns, very 
often competing with each other economically, is one of the major characteristics of 
Germany’s urban landscape. 
Substituting the number of high-value patents Pat awarded to residents of a city 
for population in Equation (2) gives us the rank-size relationship for patents 
Ln Patr=Ln Pat1 + (–q) LnPatRank      (3) 
In this equation (3), Patr is the high-value patent counts of a given city, Pat1 is a 
constant approximately equal to the patent count of the most innovative city, PatRank is 
the rank of high-value patent counts in a given city, and (–q) is a parameter to be 
estimated. 
Thus, we can use equation (2) and equation (3) to compare the distributions of 
population and patents. Figure 3.5 and 3.6, two scattergrams, show the rank-size 
distributions of 44 German cities using population and patents as measures of urban size 
respectively.  
Figure 3.5 Urban-size distribution of all German cities by population in natural 



















Figure 3.6 Urban-size distribution of all German cities by high-value patent 





















A notable feature of the patent distribution is that many cities obtained very few 
patents. In contrast, all 44 cities in our study had population greater than 50,000 residents. 
Moreover, when we compare figure 3.5 with figure 3.6, we find that the gradient of the 
patent distribution is generally steeper than that of population. This is especially true 
among the small cities located at the right end of the charts. And this implies that patents 
were more concentrated than population in the urban hierarchy.  
Tables 3.6-3.10 show our estimates of q for various types of cities—all cities, 18 
big cities (over 20,000 residents), 26 small cities, 24 cities in the manufacturing belt, and 
20 cities outside the manufacturing belt in each time period under our study. Separate 
rankings were calculated for population and high-value patents of each category.  
Table 3.6 Regression results for urban size and rank relationships (using patent 













LnPat LnPatRank 0.383 -1.199*** 0.08 0.832 44 all cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.337 -0.779*** 0.02 0.981 44 
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LnPat LnPatRank -0.214 -0.968*** 0.08 0.899 18 large cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.194 -0.929*** 0.04 0.975 18 
LnPat LnPatRank 0.618 -1.059*** 0.09 0.841 26 small cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -8.979E-
02 
-0.459*** 0.02 0.965 26 
LnPat LnPatRank -4.983E-
02 
-1.072*** 0.07 0.911 24 cities in 
manufacturing 
zone LnPop LnPopRank -0.570 -0.828*** 0.04 0.950 24 
LnPat LnPatRank 0.673 -1.252*** 0.11 0.875 20 cities in non-
manufacturing 
zone 
LnPop LnPopRank 7.659E-02 -0.820*** 0.03 0.970 20 
Note: * means statistically significant at 10 % level, ** means statistically significant at 5 % 
level, and *** means statistically significant at 1 % level. 
Table 3.7 Regression results for urban size and rank relationships (using patent 













LnPat LnPatRank 0.348 -1.223*** 0.10 0.793 44 all cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.257 -0.788*** 0.02 0.982 44 
LnPat LnPatRank -0.288 -0.974*** 0.13 0.778 18 large cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.183 -0.888*** 0.04 0.971 18 
LnPat LnPatRank 0.906 -1.089*** 0.11 0.802 26 small cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.137 -0.458*** 0.02 0.957 26 
LnPat LnPatRank -0.328 -0.940*** 0.08 0.858 24 cities in 
manufacturing 
zone 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.489 -0.833*** 0.04 0.959 24 
LnPat LnPatRank 0.460 -1.300*** 0.10 0.904 20 cities in non-
manufacturing 
zone 
LnPop LnPopRank 0.107 -0.830*** 0.04 0.967 20 
 
Table 3.8 Regression results for urban size and rank relationships (using patent 













LnPat LnPatRank 0.493 -1.187*** 0.07 0.867 44 all cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.143 -0.798*** 0.02 0.962 44 
LnPat LnPatRank -3.680E-02 -0.971*** 0.12 0.792 18 large cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.229 -0.792*** 0.04 0.968 18 
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LnPat LnPatRank 0.339 -0.907*** 0.08 0.855 26 small cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.118 -0.481*** 0.03 0.896 26 
LnPat LnPatRank 1.909E-02 -1.208*** 0.09 0.895 24 cities in 
manufacturing 
zone 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.417 -0.823*** 0.04 0.960 24 
LnPat LnPatRank 0.282 -1.194*** 0.07 0.947 20 cities in non-
manufacturing 
zone 
LnPop LnPopRank 0.258 -0.882*** 0.04 0.966 20 
 
Table 3.9 Regression results for urban size and rank relationships (using 













LnPat LnPatRank 0.660 -1.343*** 0.11 0.783 44 all cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.117 -0.795*** 0.03 0.939 44 
LnPat LnPatRank -2.652E-02 -1.073*** 0.12 0.839 18 large cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.266 -0.746*** 0.04 0.961 18 
LnPat LnPatRank 0.796 -1.180*** 0.14 0.739 26 small cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.120 -0.490*** 0.04 0.868 26 
LnPat LnPatRank 9.463E-02 -1.147*** 0.10 0.861 24 cities in 
manufacturing 
zone 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.410 -0.800*** 0.04 0.954 24 
LnPat LnPatRank 0.752 -1.410*** 0.16 0.811 20 cities in non-
manufacturing 
zone 
LnPop LnPopRank 0.261 -0.900*** 0.05 0.954 20 
 
Table 3.10 Regression results for urban size and rank relationships (using 













LnPat LnPatRank 0.527 -1.320*** 0.10 0.815 44 all cities 
LnPop LnPopRank 8.204E-2 -0.817*** 0.03 0.944 44 
LnPat LnPatRank -0.221 -1.004*** 0.11 0.845 18 large cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.178 -0.701*** 0.03 0.978 18 
LnPat LnPatRank 0.763 -1.188*** 0.10 0.857 26 small cities 
LnPop LnPopRank -0.155 -0.509*** 0.04 0.863 26 










LnPop LnPopRank -0.236 -0.811*** 0.04 0.960 24 at atRank 0.737 1 377 11 894 0
LnPop LnPopRank 0.245 -0.930*** 0.05 0.953 20 
 
For various sub-periods from 1890 to 1914, the patent gradient of all cities was 
roughly between –1.2 and –1.3. And the population gradient of all cities was about –0.8. 
Compared with gradients of all cities, the patent and population gradients of small cities 
were notably gentler. The patent gradient of small cities was about from –0.9 to –1.1. The 
population gradient of small cities was very low in absolute value, roughly between –0.45 
to –0.5. The population gradient of big cities was about between –0.7 and –0.9. These 
gradients confirm the more uneven concentration of population in big cities compared 
with small cities. Moreover, the patent gradient of small cities is steeper than the patent 
gradient in big cities. This means that the sharp dwindling of inventive activity in small 
cities leading to a dearth of patents awarded to residents of most minor cities. 
Furthermore, rank-size relationships also vary by region. The manufacturing belt had a 
somewhat shallower patent gradient (largely between –1.0 to –1.1) compared with the 
non-manufacturing belt (roughly from –1.2 to –1.4), showing greater patent concentration 
in cities beyond the traditional German manufacturing belt. 
 
3.4 MODEL FOR LOCATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF URBAN INNOVATION 
 
The above revealing investigation informs us about patenting in German urban 
hierarchy. It also tells us that location in manufacturing zone have impact on innovation 
in German cities. What other factors affect innovation in cities? In this section, we try to 
identify some key factors and estimate their effects on innovation in cities.   
Kuznets (1960) and Pred (1966) underline the role of urban externalities in 
innovation. They argue that abundant supplies of inventors, more interaction among 
inventors (and ordinary people as potential inventors), larger numbers of corporations 
focusing on invention, and flexible social structures allowing unconventional thinking 
precipitate the increasing returns of large urban centers in knowledge generation. Malecki 
(1980) notes that big cities are also important during new firm formation because spin-
offs more easily grow from dependence on parent corporations to become technological 
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innovators. These diverse forces are cumulative. They enable technological progress to 
build on past advance. Following this approach, we first estimate the relationship between 
population and innovation 
LnPati = α + β LnPopi + εi         (4) 
where 
LnPati = The natural logarithm of the total number of high-value patents granted 
to residents of city i in each period from 1890 to 1914 
LnPopi = The natural logarithm of the mean population of city i in each period 
from 1890–1914 
α and β = scalar regression coefficients to be estimated 
εi = an error term for city i 
Using the total number of patents for each of the five periods from 1890 to 1914 
reduces inter-annual variances in patent numbers, which is especially troublesome in 
cities that often receive few patents in a given year.92 Underlying the functional form of 
Equation (4) is the following logic. The sizes of the coefficients on LnPopi are elasticities 
of patent awards with respect to population. If β≥ 1, then the locations of patents 
distribute in increasing or constant proportions as urban population increases. If 0< β < 1, 
the proportion of patents in city i decreases as population increases. Negative values of β 
would mean an inverse relationship between patents and population.93 
Although helpful, Equation (4) is too simplistic. It suffers from omitted variable 
bias. We should construct a second regression equation that would identify additional 
determinants of patent distribution and study the influence of their inclusion on the size of 
regression coefficients.  
We should use our discretion to choose additional variables carefully. Almost no 
serious economists would doubt that human capital (an important component of R&D 
input) has great impact on innovation. We use data for school enrollment as proxy for 
human capital. Not all schools are equally important in stimulating technological 
innovation. We choose technical schools and commercial schools. Students from these 
two kinds of students are more likely to engage in technological innovation. As we should 
                                                          
92 Kelley (1972) estimates a similar model in his temporal analysis of the American interstate distribution of 
patents in the period 1870–1920. 
93 Kelley (1972) speculates that the benefits of population, while positive in the past, have probably 
diminished over time and are possibly insignificant today. 
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control population, we use the share of pupils from these schools in the total population 
of a city as an explanatory variable.94  
Number of industrial workers should also have impact on innovation. 
Technological discoveries are more likely to occur to those who are involved in an 
industry than to outsiders as insiders are normally more knowledgeable about problems 
and opportunities in the industry and have a better position to gain from their knowledge. 
We try to test the hypothesis whether geographic distribution of innovations would 
correspond generally to the distribution of the labor force. We use the share of industrial 
labor force among the total population in each city as one explanatory variable. 
There is a large literature on the tendency of innovative firms to spontaneously 
form geographical clusters. If so, concentrated pools of skilled labor would seem to 
underlie cluster formation. Jacob (1969) argues that the most important spillovers occur 
across industries, not between firms in a single industry. This theory appears strongly 
supported by empirical studies. Rosenberg (1963) discusses how the use of machine tools 
spread from industry to industry, and Scherer (1982) finds that 70 percent of inventions in 
a given industry are applied in other industries. This theory stresses the importance of the 
cross-industry transfer of ideas, and implies that one-industry clusters like Silicon Valley 
and Detroit are less stable than more diversified clusters, like Chicago, New York, or 
London. This suggests that highly focused centers of excellence might produce only 
limited innovation while cities with diverse industries are more stable in generating 
innovation.  
We strive to shed some light on the debate about one industry cluster (like Detroit) 
vs. diversified cluster (like London). Our proxy is Herfindahl index, which is an indicator 
of clustering and agglomeration. It is defined as the sum of the squares of the 
employment shares of each individual industry. As such, it can range from 0 to 10000, 
moving from a very large amount of industries to a single dominant industry. Decreases 
in the Herfindahl index generally indicate decrease in concentration, whereas increases 
imply the opposite. 
Finally, we include whether a city is located in the manufacturing belt as a dummy 
variable as we learnt from the previous section that this location factor is significantly 
related to innovation.  
                                                          
94 See chapter 2 of this dissertation for justifications of using number of students of these two kinds of 
schools as proxy for human capital. Germany enjoyed high literacy rate and had quite good system of 
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Ultimately, we construct the equation 
InPati = α + β1LnPopi + β2HCi + β3Employi + β4Herfindahli + β5Mi + εi    (5) 
where 
InPati, LnPopi, α, εi are defined as previously. 
Employi = The proportion of city i’s industrial employment in the city’s total population 
in each time period 
HCi = The proportion of city i’s population that was in technical and commercial schools 
in each time period 
Herfindahli = The Herfindahl index of all industries in a city in each time period 
Mi = A dummy variable with unity values for cities located in the manufacturing belt 
β1, β2, β3, β4, β5 = The coefficients to be estimated in regression. 
 
3.5 RESULTS OF REGRESSION 
 
The regression results of Equation (4) for all, big, small cities and for cities in 
manufacturing areas and non-manufacturing areas using OLS estimation method for each 
time period are shown in tables 3.11-3.15.  
 
Table 3.11 Regression results for patent and city size relationship 
Dependent variable: LnPat 
1890-1894 
 


























R square 0.556 0.548 0.299 0.695 0.550 
Number of 
observations 
44 18 26 24 20 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             




Table 3.12 Regression results for patent and city size relationship 
1895-1899 


























R square 0.556 0.522 0.275 0.780 0.591 
Number of 
observations 
44 18 26 24 20 
 
Table 3.13 Regression results for patent and city size relationship 
1900-1904 


























R square 0.620 0.422 0.332 0.821 0.578 
Number of 
observations 
44 18 26 24 20 
 
Table 3.14 Regression results for patent and city size relationship 
1905-1909 


























R square 0.582 0.424 0.336 0.728 0.514 





Table 3.15 Regression results for patent and city size relationship 
1910-1914 



























R square 0.664 0.533 0.405 0.766 0.663 
Number of 
observations 
44 18 26 24 20 
 
The regression fitness and the significance of the models are consistently high. 
The R-square values approximately ranged from 0.5 to 0.8 except for small cities. The 
low R square values for small cities show substantial variation unexplained by 
population, perhaps partially because compared with big cities, small cities suffer more 
from omitted variable bias in this simplified regression. Other urban conditions are at 
work in small cities beyond population size. The estimates of the regression coefficients 
of LnPop for all cities ranged from 1.2 to 1.4. The estimates of the regression coefficients 
for small cities were larger in general, roughly ranging from 1.3 to 1.5.   
Table 3.16 to table 3.20 show the regression results for Equation (5) using OLS 
estimation methods for each time period from 1890 to 1904.  
Table 3.16 Regression results for patents and urban conditions relationships 
Dependent variable: LnPat (1890-1894) 



































































R square 0.829 0.864 0.761 0.749 0.822 
Number of 
observations 
44 18 26 24 20 
 
Table 3.17 Regression results for patents and urban conditions relationships 
Dependent variable: LnPat (1895-1899) 

































































R square 0.884 0.940 0.828 0.884 0.836 
Number of 
observations 
44 18 26 24 20 
 
Table 3.18 Regression results for patents and urban conditions relationships 
Dependent variable: LnPat (1900-1904) 



































































R square 0.872 0.872 0.770 0.870 0.843 
Number of 
observations 
44 18 26 24 20 
 
Table 3.19 Regression results for patents and urban conditions relationships 
Dependent variable: LnPat (1905-1909) 

































































R square 0.832 0.878 0.768 0.798 0.849 
Number of 
observations 
44 18 26 24 20 
 
Table 3.20 Regression results for patents and urban conditions relationships 
Dependent variable: LnPat (1910-1914) 


































































R square 0.847 0.865 0.720 0.823 0.839 
Number of 
observations 
44 18 26 24 20 
 
For the regression including all cities, following the inclusion of three additional 
independent variables (share of school pupil, employment share and Herfindahl index), 
the goodness-of-fit rose from about 0.6 to 0.8. The size of the regression coefficients of 
LnPop of all categories in Equation (5) declined when compared with the results of 
Equation (4). This decline shows that the combined influence of human capital, labor 
force, and industrial diversity account for a sizable portion of the high concentration of 
patenting activities. The variables measuring population, human capital, employment, 
Herfindahl index of diversity, and location in manufacturing zone are significant, mostly 
at 5 % probability level. The effects are all positive, with Herfindahl index as the only 
exception, signifying that diversified industry structure is conducive to innovation.  
The coefficient of InPop for big cities is larger than for small cities (except the 
first sub-period). And the coefficient of LnPop for cities in the manufacturing zone is 
larger than for cities in the non-manufacturing zone. 
We find that the impact of human capital has been always statistically significant 
for small cities, while it is not always the case with big cities. The reason might be that 
big cities attracted a lot of brainpower and did not have to rely totally on local schooling. 
The coefficients of human capital are always larger for cities located in the non-
manufacturing zone than the cities in the manufacturing zone.   
 88
 
In terms of Herfindahl index, their role has been always statistically significant for 




Innovation and cities are closely related. Using the patent data, we analyze the 
patterns of innovation in German cities from 1890 to 1914. Urban residents obtained most 
of the patents granted in Germany from 1890 to 1914. In this chapter, we stress the 
increasing returns to city size in technological innovation. Big cities hosted abundant 
interacting inventors, firms focused on innovation, social norms and structures that favor 
creative thinking, and industrial systems that encourage formation of dynamic firms. 
Examining the sources of increasing returns to urban size is key to our understanding the 
geographical conditions of invention. 
Although the existence of many small towns is a major feature of German urban 
landscape, regression results confirm that big cities dominated technological innovation 
from 1890 to 1914. Innovation in Germany was characterized by polarized developments 
to the advantage of big cities such as Berlin, Duesseldorf, and Dresden. The gradient of 
the size distribution of cities is substantially steeper when we use high-value patents to 
measure city size compared with we use population to measure city size. Moreover, that 
difference is more pronounced in small cities than in big cities. The patent gradient is 
steepest outside the traditional manufacturing belt. Abundant human capital and industrial 
labor partly explains the inventiveness of urban residents. Regional location also plays a 
role. Urban residents in the manufacturing belt were the most industrious inventors. 
Residents of cities beyond the manufacturing belt obtained few patents.  
After taking human capital, employment, and industrial diversity into account, we 
use regressions to explain the distribution of patents in German cities quite successfully. 
Human capital and industrial labor had significant, positive effects on innovation. Using 
Herfindahl index as a measure of diversity, we learn that cities with diverse industries are 





Clusters, externalities and innovation: new evidence from firms 
in Baden, Germany 






Do firms in clusters tend to innovate more? An important tradition of work has 
given a positive answer to this question and attributed the reason to knowledge spillovers 
(intra-industry and inter-industry) enjoyed by firms within clusters as a factor promoting 
innovation. This chapter revisits these issues through an original database including 
information on patents and firms in the German state of Baden. Using negative binomial 
regressions, the analysis shows that both intra-industry and inter-industry externalities 
have a positive effect on the innovative activity of small and large firms. In contrast, 
regional human capital formation is important only for small firms, a result consistent 






Innovation is a broad concept, embracing three main areas: products, production 
processes and organizational set-ups (Dosi, 1988).96 This chapter focuses on firms’ 
innovative activity concerning the first two areas and follows the definition of innovation 
as research, development, imitation and adoption of new products and new production 
processes (Dosi, 1988).97 This approach is consistent with an important stream of 
historical and theoretical works that regard innovation, in the form of technological 
                                                          
95 See also Baten, Spadavecchia, Yin, and Streb (2004) on these issues.  
96 The similarity between the various types of innovation identified by Dosi and those that had been 
previously identified by Schumpeter is clear, see Schumpeter (1942), pp.65-66; on this point see also 
Nelson and Winter (1982), pp. 276-278. 
97 This choice is also dictated by the usage of patents as a proxy for innovation. New organizational set-ups 
would not be patented and therefore their determinants cannot be analyzed in this paper. However, it is 
acknowledged the importance of new organizations in promoting knowledge transfer across firms’ 
boundaries, as showed in previous studies. See Streb (2003). 
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progress, as a fundamental determinant of economic growth.98 Moreover, it is consistent 
with Schumpeter (1942), who focuses on the “introduction of new methods of production 
and new commodities” in his discussion of innovation, in turn as a part of monopolistic 
practices (Schumpeter, 1942, pp. 81-106).  
This chapter assesses the impact of various determinants of innovation, with 
particular attention to the impact of clustering of firms and externalities generated in this 
pattern of business organization. An important tradition beginning with Marshall (1890) 
has stressed external economies arising from geographical concentrations of similar 
industries. This chapter tests whether such externalities played a positive role in 
promoting innovation, thus placing itself at the crossroad of two major historical and 
economic topics. Marshall had the economic situation around 1900 in mind when he 
wrote his famous work, which has high explanatory power for today’s world, as many 
studies found. Augmenting our knowledge about the time-variance or time-invariance of 
the relationships is obviously a very important aim. 
The analysis is performed using an original dataset including information on 
patents granted and firms located in the state of Baden between 1895 and 1913, which at 
the time occupied a middling economic position in Germany. The dataset was constructed 
using two main sources: German factory inspections lists and the Annual Patent 
Directory published by the German Patent Office in Berlin.  
This chapter is organized in seven sections. The following section analyzes the 
theories behind the determinants of innovation, the impact of which is discussed in this 
chapter. Section 3 discusses some methodological issues. Section 4 presents the data used 
in the analysis, explains how various sources were combined and the methodology 
adopted to overcome the shortcomings related to using patents as a proxy for innovation. 
Section 5 discusses the model adopted in the econometric analysis, whereas section 6 
presents and interprets the results of the econometric analysis. Section 7 concludes the 
chapter discussing the policy implications of the findings. 
 
4.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
  
                                                          
98 Works on innovation, technological change in particular, and its impact on growth are numerous.  Among 
theoretical works it seems important to mention seminal works in endogenous growth theory such as Lucas 
(1988) and Romer (1990). Among historical works, see Landes (1969) and Mokyr (1990). 
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The concept of innovation adopted in this chapter stresses the implementation of 
“new knowledge” either in the production process or in the form of new products, which 
in turn is very likely to imply changes in the production process. From this fundamental 
feature of innovation derive various theoretical approaches. This section addresses two in 
particular: knowledge externalities and technological regimes. 
Knowledge externalities. If innovation entails the implementation of new 
knowledge, which according to Winter (1984) is the single most important input in the 
production of innovations, factors facilitating the generation and diffusion of such 
knowledge should have a positive effect on the rate of innovation. In this approach, 
externalities and knowledge spillovers in particular play an important role in fostering 
innovative activities, as maintained by a stream of research in economics of technology, 
new growth economics and economic geography (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; 
Krugman, 1991; Porter, 1998). Most of these studies share the assumption that new 
technological knowledge is at least partly informal, uncodified and tacit, and thus can 
flow more easily over short rather than long distances (Pavitt, 1984). 
Since the second half of the 19th century, Marshall had explained the advantages 
that similar firms enjoy by concentrating in the same neighborhood, and called them 
external economies. He claimed that external economies arise mainly from the 
development of subsidiary industries and the concentration of a specialized labor force. 
This brings about a rapid diffusion of innovations as ideas are readily discussed and 
developed. Porter (1998) pointed out that firms within clusters of different though 
technologically related industries, learn more quickly about evolving technology not only 
through frequent contacts with suppliers and other firms located in the cluster, but also 
through frequent contacts with customers, which provide an ever more sophisticated 
demand. All these factors provide conditions particularly appropriate to foster innovation 
and are strengthened by the competition among firms. 
Contemporary works have brought forward the concept of Marshallian external 
economies. In contemporary economic geography, Krugman (1991) has pointed out that 
economic activities and production tend to concentrate within clusters. Externalities 
enjoyed in these clusters yield increasing returns to scale, which are geographically bound 
(Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986 and 1990). 
While it is widely agreed that clusters foster knowledge externalities, more 
controversial is the path of diffusion of such knowledge. Marshall, Arrow (1962) and 
Romer (1986) (hereinafter abbreviated as M-A-R) support that knowledge spillovers take 
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place among firms in the same industry, thus fostering the growth of that industry and 
region. On the contrary, Jacobs (1970) believes that the most important knowledge 
spillovers take place across various industries. Therefore, according to the M-A-R 
approach, knowledge externalities should be more pronounced in specialized industrial 
areas, whereas according to Jacobs such dynamic externalities will take place particularly 
in highly diversified industrial regions (Glaeser et al., 1992). Jacobs’s argument has 
received further support by studies confirming the significance of inter-industry 
technology flows and pointing out that technological solutions are often transposed from 
the sector where it was originally envisaged and applied in a variety of industries 
(Bairoch, 1988; Scherer, 1984). 
While the stream of literature following from Marshall, Arrow, Romer and Jacobs 
concentrate on positive externalities, other works point out the limits to the positive 
feedback process generated within clusters. Such limits are related to congestion and 
competition effects that might overcome the benefits as clusters grow (Brezis and 
Krugman, 1993). Costs of labor, land and facilities, together with pressure on 
infrastructure might discourage employers and employees to concentrate within crowded 
clusters, as exemplified by contemporary developments in Silicon Valley (Morck and 
Yeung, 2001). Moreover, knowledge externalities might be perceived as a leakage of 
information, which would erode the appropriability of the innovation. Patent licensing 
contracts can ensure the patenting firm a significant share of competitors’ profit. 
However, due to imperfect contracts and reverse engineering99, this solution can be 
impractical (Caves, 1982). Therefore, the most innovative and best performing firms 
might be the most likely to move out of the cluster (Shaver and Flyer, 2000). 
Recent works have set forth to test empirically whether firms within clusters are 
more innovative than firms located elsewhere. Baptista and Swann (1998) indicate on the 
basis of a dataset of 248 firms that cluster specialization has a moderate positive effect on 
innovative activity of firms within the same sector. On the contrary, employment in other 
industries has a negative although not significant effect. Therefore, such results suggest 
externalities of a M-A-R type, whereas the authors infer that employment in other 
industries could be a source of weak congestion effects. However, the authors admit that 
the use of aggregated two-digit industries might conceal important results, as inter-
                                                          
99 Reverse engineering is the process of taking something (a device, an electrical component, a software 
program, etc.) apart and analyzing its workings in detail, usually with the intention to construct a new 
 93
 
industry externalities might take place among technologically close industries that would 
be combined in the two-digit industries. 
This line of investigation is brought forward by Breaudry and Breschi (2003), 
using a very large dataset for 1990-98 from the UK and Italy. Their analysis shows that 
the concentration of innovative firms in the same industry fosters firms’ innovative 
activity rather than the cluster itself. On the contrary, the presence in the region of 
innovative firms in other industries has a negative and significant coefficient in the case 
of the UK. 
Technological regimes. Technology plays an important role in firm strategy. 
Porter (1980) provides a framework that models an industry as being influenced by five 
forces: the entry of competitors, the threat of substitutes, the bargaining power of buyers, 
the bargaining power of suppliers, and rivalry among the existing players.100 A firm 
seeking to develop an edge over rival firms can use this model to better understand the 
industry context in which the firm operates and to develop competitive strategies 
accordingly. As shown in figure 4.1, the model is particularly powerful in thinking about 
firm’s outside-in strategy. Technological innovation is behind every force in the five-
force model.  
 
Figure 4.1 Outside-in business strategy within the five-force framework 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
device or program that does the same thing without actually copying anything from the original. Reverse 
engineering is commonly done to avoid patent law.  
100 Government could be added as a sixth factor. 
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The neo-schumpeterian model developed by Nelson and Winter (1982) puts 
innovation at the center stage of industry evolution. The model proposes that the 
competitive advantage of firms is based on their innovative capacity; the selection of 
firms is determined by their innovative capacity; and hence innovative behavior of firms 
determines the structure of the industry and its evolution. 
Christensen (1997) studies the big question “Why new technology causes great 
companies to fail.” Echoing Schumpeter, Christensen introduced the concept “disruptive 
innovation.” He argues that new disruptive technology brings new risks to established 
entities and lowers the barrier of market entry for new comers.  
The argument of increasing returns to scale does place large, established firms in a 
better position to innovate as compared to small firms. However, a different line of 
reasoning confers a comparative advantage in innovation to small firms. Christensen 
(1997) suggests that established firms might become bureaucratic and resistant to change; 
familiarity with established products and processes might even make management slow to 
see the advantages to be gained from new products or processes. Winter (1984) argues 
that innovation in new entrants or established firms emanate from different economic and 
technological conditions or “technological regimes”. In particular “an entrepreneurial 
regime is one which is favorable to innovative entry and unfavorable to innovative 
activity by established firms; a routinized regime is one in which the conditions are the 
other way around” (Winter, 1984, p. 297). 
The concept of “technological regimes” summarizes the main economic 
characteristics of technology and of the learning processes involved in the innovative 
activity. The characteristics are: technological opportunities or the likelihood of 
innovating for any given amount of money invested in research; appropriability of 
innovations or the extent to which it is possible to protect innovations from imitation; 
cumulativeness of technical advances, meaning the extent to which an innovation might 
generate a stream of subsequent innovations; the properties of the technological 
knowledge on which the firms’ innovative activity is based. These may differ 
considerably across technologies presenting various degrees of specificity, tacitness, 
complexity and independence (Breschi et al., 2000; Winter, 1987). Winter differentiates 
between two major types of technological knowledge: R&D, which is a type of 
knowledge available only to the firm that produces it; the second source of knowledge is 
represented by the firm’s external environment. In turn, this can be represented by other 
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firms involved in similar activities or by the external environment apart from those, such 
as prior education and experience of firms’ personnel (Winter, 1984, pp.292-293).  
Figure 4.2 below displays the main features of an “entrepreneurial regime” as 
compared to a “routinized regime”. 
 
Figure 4.2 Factors favoring innovation in new entrant and established firms 
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An entrepreneurial regime is characterized by high technological opportunities, 
which makes it easier for new firms to come up with innovations that established firms 
have not yet implemented (Breschi et al.). Especially important for our study is the 
difference between the sources of technological knowledge in the two regimes. In 
particular, Winter (1984) claims the small-firm innovative advantage is roughly 
correlated to the wide base of the external knowledge environment, from which 
innovative ideas might derive. This understanding is confirmed by studies showing that 
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university R&D plays a more decisive role in the innovation activity of small firms, 
whereas corporate R&D plays a relatively more important role in large firms’ innovative 
output (Acs et al., 1994; Acs and Audretsch, 1988). Moreover, the routinized regime is 
characterized by a high degree of appropriability and low degree of comprehensiveness of 
innovation. In the routinized regime, the “key innovation” ought to be complemented by 
other elements to constitute a functioning routine. This is not the case in an 
“entrepreneurial” regime, in which the innovation is itself the new technique; the 
founding of a new industry is often the result of an entrepreneurial innovation. As the 
industry matures, the founder might reach a position that new entrants cannot challenge. 
In this case, the industry will be dominated by a small number of large and old firms. The 
opposite occurs if early entrants find it difficult to push forward their initial innovative 
achievements. The new possibilities will then be captured by new entrants. Established 
firms hold a position of advantage in those industries where conditions are such that 
innovators can appropriate substantial returns, due to a mix of secrecy, patent protection 
and difficulty of imitation. However, even in a “routinized regime” a new entrepreneur 
could enter the industry for a component that could be isolated (Winter, 1984, pp. 296 
and 306-317).  
In conclusion, large and small firms respond to different economic and 
technological conditions. This implies for our analysis in the following that we will 
separate out the large firms and test potential influences on their patenting behavior 
separately.  
 
4.3 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
 
This chapter revisits theoretical issues concerning clusters and innovation on the 
basis of an original dataset including information on patents and firms trading in the 
German state of Baden between 1878 and 1913. Therefore, this dataset is very close 
chronologically to the initial formulation of such theories by Marshall and Schumpeter. 
The previous section showed these theories have been brought forward by contemporary 
work, and their application to historical cases has proven most fruitful. Broadberry and 
Marrison (2002), expanding upon the distinction between M-A-R and Jacobs 
externalities, as explained by Glaeser et al. and Henderson et al. (1995), shed new light on 
the decline of the Lancashire cotton industry in the first half of the 20th century. 
Murmann (2003) developed a coevolutionary approach, a further development of 
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evolutionary economics, to explain how the German dye industry was able to gain market 
dominance in the second half of the 19th century and retain it until the First World War. 
Moreover, focusing on a dataset of firms trading in the period of the German industrial 
take-off, this study might shed new lights on the Glaeser et al.’s approach and findings. 
Their study pointed out that Jacobs’ externalities were more important to industry growth 
than M-A-R externalities. However, the authors suggest that the latter might matter more 
when industries grow, a point that admittedly they could not test.  
The results of the analysis of our data set are compared with the behavior of 
innovating firms at the end of the 20th century. This comparison is established on 
grounds that the differences between the two systems of innovation, separated by roughly 
one century, are not as large as they may seem. R&D and patenting activities had nearly 
the same meaning for the innovating firms in the late 19th century as for their 
counterparts hundred years later. This is proven by developments in industry following 
the approval of the first German patent law in 1877. German firms not only invented 
industrial R&D departments, in which for the first time in economic history scientists 
tried to discover profitable inventions systematically and based on the division of labor 
between researchers, but also consciously deployed patents as a means to appropriate the 
profits from their product and process innovations (Homburg, 1992; Liebenau 1988; 
Meyer-Thurow 1982). The industrial leaders already well understood that they could use 
a patent also to prevent sales of competitors’ innovations. In 1911, for example, Siemens’ 
existing patent stock enabled the German firm to hinder General Electric from 
competitively entering the German market with an innovative light bulb containing a 
wolfram filament that was superior to Siemens’ standard tantalum light bulb. Siemens 
forced the American firm into a cartel agreement about exchanging patents and allocating 
sales territories (Erker, 1990). When such a peaceful compromise was not possible firms 
were suing each other in patent courts. The obviously modern attitude towards innovating 
and patenting activities is revealed by a statement by Carl Duisberg, a former chief 
executive of Bayer corporation: “On March 17, 1885, we filed a patent for all dyestuffs 
based on tetrazo-bonds of the isomers of tolidine ... Given the prevailing patent laws, it 
was necessary to be the first one to file. We could not waste any time. It was possible that 
AGFA had also found these reactions in the meantime and filed for a patent. For this 
reason it was standard procedure when one discovered a new reaction to write it down 
with all its theoretical possibilities in the form of a patent application and mail it the same 
day for submission to the patent office in Berlin.” (cited after Murmann, 2003, p. 134). 
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  Mainly large firms in the chemical and electrical engineering industries of the 
German Empire heavily invested in the “industrialization” of their innovation processes. 
In 1889, for example, the already mentioned Carl Duisberg, convinced the top 
management of Bayer to spend half a million marks to build a new research laboratory 
(Murmann, p. 151). However, the new knowledge often spilled-over to the small and 
medium-sized firms of the downstream industries thereby enabling the latter to make 
economically useful discoveries on their own.101 That is one of the reasons why large 
company size was neither a necessary nor a sufficient pre-condition for innovativeness in 
the German empire. The following table 4.1 shows that the sample of the 100 largest 
German firms of the year 1907 contains only 26 firms that were also among the 100 most 
innovative ones in the German Empire.  
 
Table 4.1 The largest 100 firms and their presentation among the 100 most 
innovative firms in Germany, 1877-1914. 
Industry Largest 100 firms (1907)a Also 100 most innovative 
firms b 
Mining 23 0 (0%) 
Stone and related mineral 
products 
3 0 (0%) 
Metals 31 8 (26%) 
Machines 13 9 (69%) 
Electrical Engineering 4 4 (100%) 
Chemicals 17 5 (29%) 
Textiles 3 0 (0%) 
Paper 2 0 (0%) 
Foodstuffs 4 0 (0%) 
TOTAL 100 26 (26%) 
                                                          




Source: a Kocka and Siegrist (1979), pp. 55-122. b based on our patent data set for the whole 
German Empire, 1878-1914. 
Key: figure in brackets refer to the number of firms in column 3 as a percentage of the number in 
column 2 for each industry. 
 
Especially the many large, but technologically matured firms of the mining and 
metals sector were not or under-represented in the latter group. Firm size played some 
role when the complexity of a new technological wave required the building up of R&D 
departments. We find, for example, the four largest firms in the field of electrical 
engineering in both rankings. However, the fact that the list of the most innovative firms 
additionally includes twelve other firms that were engaged in electrical engineering 
supports the view that during the early stage of this technological wave smaller firms 
were able to contribute considerably to the production of new knowledge. Firm size only 
mattered when the growing technological complexity of an industry’s innovation process 
required the building up of large R&D departments that could only be financed by large 
firms. As already discussed above this was especially true for the industries of the so-
called second Industrial Revolution, namely chemicals and electrical engineering. Table 
4.1 also suggests that the innovativeness of machinery firms, that dominated patenting 




In the following, we will address those theoretical issues using a dataset of 2407 
firms from the southwestern German state of Baden, a separate arch-dukedom within the 
German Empire. Baden has often served as a sample region for Germany, starting with 
Hoffmann (1965), who used Baden's trade tax statistics to estimate German physical 
capital formation, due to the availability of accurate statistics. The state was formed in the 
early 19th century from a variety of territories. Two-thirds of the population were 
Catholic, while the ruling family was Protestant, thus the government was particularly 
interested in monitoring this state. Moreover, Baden provides a particularly good sample 
for the whole of Germany as it occupies a middle position among German states in terms 
of GDP per capita. In the period under consideration, Baden was in between the fastest 
industrializing states (such as Saxony, Berlin or Rhineland-Westfalia), and the 
agricultural states in the South East and East. However, Baden displayed an upper middle 
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position in nominal and real wages, and a leading position in human capital formation 
(Baten, 2004). Today, Baden’s economy is characterized by a concentration in capital 
goods production well above the national average - particularly in the regions (Bezirke) of 
Karlsruhe and Mannheim. On the contrary, in the period of our analysis the industrial 
structure of our Baden sample is similar to a random sample of German firms (table 4.2). 
The main difference is that Baden had many more firms in metal processing (especially 
jewellery, concentrated in the city of Pforzheim), and more firms in the food and tobacco 
sector (an especially large number of cigar-makers in Baden). On the contrary, there were 
fewer firms in textiles, apparel, and stone (especially brick) processing, whereas all other 
industries were similarly represented in Baden and Germany. 
Table 4.2 Firms in Baden and Germany (industry percentage) 
Industry Baden Germany 
Stone 10.4 15.5 
Metal processing 22.5 11.1 
Machinery/Instruments 9.6 11.6 
Chemicals 1.4 1.9 
Textiles 6.6 11.8 
Paper 4.5 3.7 
Leather 2.0 2.3 
Wood 10.8 11.9 
Food processing 21.8 13.6 
Apparel 5.1 8.5 
Printing 4.4 4.5 
Other 3.6 3.7 
 
Baden: Firms with 10+ workers in 1906, Germany: firms with 11+ workers in 1907. Source: 
Verzeichnis (1906); Source: Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, volume 213-1, pp. 42-43. 
 
The main dataset is a census of firms with 10 or more employees that was taken in 
the state of Baden in 1906. The source is one of the few that lists all individual firms, and 
excludes only the smallest artisan firms. Our “industrial” size segment of firms 
employing 10 or more workers contains 2407 manufacturing firms, after excluding 
branches and subsidiaries. From our patent data set, the patents that were registered by 
residents in Baden were singled out and matched with the patenting company or 
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entrepreneur. Our procedure resulted in 378 important patents that could be matched with 
the population of 2,407 relevant firms located in the same state Baden.  
After matching firms and patents, as expected some companies displayed a large 
number of patents, whereas most of the firms had no patents at all (henceforth these are 
described as non-innovative firms). Table 4.3 below displays the top 25 firms in terms of 
number of patents. Among the firms with many patents, machinery and chemical firms 
are clearly well represented. This is not surprising considering that these industries were 
historically and still are the so-called “net donors” of innovations that are often applied in 
other industries. The skewed distribution of patents among firms and industries and the 
large number of non-innovative firms means that any regression model that attempts to 
explain patent numbers per firm should be a count data model (such as the negative 
binomial model).102 Moreover, it is obvious that we will need to control industry effects 
when analyzing the propensity to patent across firms. 
 
Table 4.3 Top 25 patenting firms in Baden 
Pat.a Firm name Yearb Place Workersc Industry 
43 Lanz, Heinr. 1859 Mannheim 1924 Agricultural 
machinery 
27 Schnabel & Henning 1869 Bruchsal 737 Machinery 
18 Bopp & Reuther 1872 Mannheim 815 Machinery, 
metal foundry 
16 Geiger'sche Fabrik 1891 Karlsruhe 80 Bureau 
equipment 
14 Bad. Maschinenfabrik 
AG, vorm. Sebold, H 
1854 Durlach 480 Machinery 
13 Kromer, Theodor 1868 Freiburg 93 Locks 
12 Verein Chem. Fabriken 1854 Mannheim 802 Chemicals 
9 Metallschlauchfabrik 
Pforzheim 
1899 Pforzheim 90 Iron and steel 
                                                          
102 For detailed technical discussion about using the negative binomial model, see Hausman et al. (1984); 
Crepon and Duguet (1997); and Greene (1997). 
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8 Eisenwerke Gaggenau n.a. Gaggenau 1044 Iron and steel 
8 Boehringer, C.F. & 
Söhne 
1859 Mannheim 452 Chemicals 
7 Severische 
Patenteverwertungsges. 
n.a. Achern 0 Glass 
7 Junker, Karl & Ruh, 
August 
1868 Karlsruhe 615 Sewing 
machines and 
ovens 
7 Dt. Woernerwerke Gmbh n.a. Mannheim 0 Machinery 
7 Mohr & Federhoff 1820 Mannheim 435 Elevators and 
other 
Machinery 
6 Fahr, J. G. 1870 Gottmadin-
gen 
150 Machinery 
6 Ungerer, Karl Friedr. 1895 Pforzheim 17 Machinery 
6 Schiesser, Jacques 1876 Radolfzell 545 Apparel 
6 Spinnerei & Weberei 
Steinen 
1836 Steinen 519 Cotton 
spinning & 
weaving 
5 Maschfabrik vorm. 
Gritzner AG 
1872 Durlach 2880 Machinery 
5 Eirich, G. 1863 Hardheim 18 Machinery 
5 Deutsche 
Metallpatronenfabrik 
1873 Karlsruhe 1696 Munition 
5 Stotz & Cie, 
Elektrizitaetsges. mbh 
1891 Mannheim 93 Installation of 
electrical light 
& power 




5 Unionwerke AG 1891 Mannheim 304 Machinery 
 




Our model specification is 
INNOV = β0 + β1CIEEMP + β2OWNINN + β3OWNNOINN + β4OTHINN+ 
β5OTHNOINN + β6PATPREV + β7EMPHEF + β8GCNOC + β9Tech_SCHOOL + 
β10Railway + β11Tax + β12Wage + β13Age + IndustryDummy         (1) 
Now we discuss the variables in this model one by one. Baptista and Swann found 
a positive effect of own industry employment in the same region (which they use as 
variable OWNEMP). Firms with higher values of this variable had a higher propensity to 
patent. However, Beaudry and Breschi rejected this result recently with a sample of 
British and Italian firms. The total number of workers in the own industry (and cluster) 
did not increase patent numbers. In contrast, the number of workers in innovative firms 
only within the same industry and cluster (OWNINN) did have a positive effect, while the 
employment in non-innovative firms (OWNNOINN) led only to negative congestion 
externalities. In the empirical analysis, we will focus on the number of patents per firm in 
1907-13 as the dependent variable to be explained. The variables OWNINN and 
OWNNOINN will also be included as explanatory variables. They are constant for the 
firms of the same industry in the same region. We list those M-A-R-type externalities in 
the upper quarter of figure 4.2. The plus and minus signs indicate which influence we 
expect on patenting propensity. A third M-A-R variable, EmpHerf, is the Herfindahl 
index of industry employment within a region. M-A-R theory leads to a positive 
expectation from this variable. The rounded corners in figure 4.3 indicate that this 
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table 4.5, assuming the value of 1 for those districts with access to a major railway 
line);103 (2) regional human capital formation (tech_ SCHOOL in table 4.5) expressed as 
number of pupils in technical and commercial schools per population; and (3) regional 
taxation. Taxes reduce the expected returns of successful patents and hence decrease a 
firm’s propensity to apply for and to renew a patent, given the costs of patenting. 
Regional taxation has been proxied with a dummy variable (TAXHIGH in table 4.5) 
assuming the value of one if the average regional taxation was above the national 
average. Those important regional variables have not been considered by earlier studies. 
We decided not to model the other direction of causality, for example, the influence of 
patenting of individual firms on regional labor costs, because the influence of one 
individual firm is reasonably small. Finally, on the left side we list three firm-specific 
variables: firstly the dummy variable PATPREV that indicates whether a firm had a 
patent already in the period 1878-1906 (that is, before 1907-13, see also Beaudry and 
Breschi, 2003). The age (in logarithms) of the firm might proxy the experience of the 
firms, or the routine that might even act as a disincentive for new patents.  
Finally, we will test the effect of firm size on patenting, given that we expect 
different behavior from small and large firms based on Winter’s theories. We measure 
firm size (CIEEMP) by the average number of employees in our Baden sample. 
Concerning this point, it seems important to clarify how the size of firms in the Baden 
sample compares with that of contemporary Britain and Italy, used in Beaudry and 
Breschi (2003), in order to establish whether our results can be biased by a smaller weight 
of large firms. 
Table 4.4 Number of enterprises by employment size, manufacturing industries 
and construction, Baden 1906, the UK and Italy 1996. 
SIC Industry Country 10 - 19 20 - 49 50 - 199 200-999 1000+ Total 
DA 
Food, 
beverages, etc.a Baden 22.1 40.9 35.2 1.7 0.0 804 
j 35.0 28.2 22.6 11.9 2.3 3,317 
  Italy 59.1 28.4 9.9 2.3 0.3 6,645 
DB Textile 294 Baden 34.0 21.1 26.9 17.3 0.7 
  UK 
                                                          
103 On the influence of means of transportation on patenting in the U.S. see Sokoloff (1988). Sokoloff 
focused in particular on navigable inland waterways. We could not control for access to the river Rhine as 
the RHINE variable would have a very strong collinearity with the RAILWAY variable. The main railway 
lines were built parallel to the Rhine, through the same districts, only a short distance away.  
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  UK 43.4 31.1 19.2 5.9 0.5 4,634 
  Italy 17,273 60.4 29.4 8.8 1.4 0.1 
DC Leather Baden 33.9 37.1 22.6 4.8 1.6 62 
  UK 40.6 30.3 22.9 6.2 0.0 498 
  Italy 61.2 30.8 7.4 0.6 0.0 6,688 
DD 
Wood and 
wood products Baden 42.9 34.1 21.8 1.2 0.0 170 
  UK 57.4 29.3 11.9 1.4 0.0 1,830 
  Italy 68.8 24.9 5.9 0.4 0.0 3,285 
DE 
Pulp, paper, 
etc.b Baden 25.3 37.4 29.7 6.6 1.1 91 
  UK 47.8 30.6 16.2 5.0 0.4 6,708 
 Italy 60.3 28.1 9.5 1.9 5,193 
DF Coke, etc.c Baden k ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 
  UK 0.0 22.5 43.7 28.2 71 5.6 
 Italy 46.4 30.9 13.5 2.4 
DG 
Chemicals, etc. 
d Baden 32.6 26.1 0.0 19.6 21.7 46 
  UK 29.4 28.3 25.7 13.8 2.8 1,597 
 Italy 38.3 31.1 21.1 7.9 2,009 
DH 
Rubber and 
plastic prod. Baden k ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 
UK 37.6 32.3 22.5 7.1 0.6 3,042 
  Italy 52.9 33.5 11.9 1.6 0.2 4,533 
DI 
Other non-
metallic etc. e Baden 39.9 36.7 20.6 2.8 0.0 316 
   UK 40.8 28.6 22.5 6.7 1.4 1,545 
   Italy 56.8 29.7 11.0 2.2 0.2 4,943 
DJ 
Basic metals, 
etc. f Baden 39.3 26.8 28.0 4.8 1.2 168 
  UK 48.3 32.4 15.8 3.2 0.3 9,177 
 0.2 





  Italy 63.6 27.3 7.9 1.1 0.1 18,115 
DK Machinery etc.g Baden 30.9 23.7 32.0 11.3 2.1 194 
  UK 39.3 33.4 19.9 6.6 0.8 5,251 
  Italy 50.3 32.2 14.3 2.9 0.3 9,752 
DL 
Electrical and 
optical h Baden k ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 
  UK 36.3 30.7 23.2 8.6 1.1 4,336 
  Italy 54.2 30.6 11.8 2.9 0.5 6,732 
DM Transport 
equipment Baden 
k ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 
  UK 31.9 26.9 24.5 13.6 3.2 1,754 
  Italy 40.2 32.4 20.1 5.8 1.5 1,872 
DN Others I Baden 35.3 42.6 19.5 2.6 0.0 620 
  UK 48.6 29.5 17.3 4.7 0.0 3,151 
  Italy 62.7 27.9 8.5 0.9 0.0 7,188 
Construction Baden 49.1 33.0 12.5 5.4 0.0 112 
  UK 97.2 1.9 0.8 0.2 0.0 180,470 
  Italy 72.2 22.8 4.4 0.6 0.0 21,198 
F 
 
Keys: a= Food, beverages and tobacco; b= Pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and 
printing; c= Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; d= chemicals, chemical products 
and man-made fibers; e= Other non-metallic mineral products; f= Basic metals and fabricated 
metal products; g= Machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified; h= Electrical and optical 
equipment; i = Manufacture not elsewhere classified. 
 
Notes: j= Food and beverages only. Data on the size distribution of firms in the tobacco industry 
was not available; k = information has not been reported, as only few firms in the Baden sample 
belong to this industry. 
 
Sources: Unpublished Factory Inspection Lists, Baden, 1906 – see text; Office for National 
Statistics (ONS), Production and Construction Inquiries - Summary Volume, Newport, 1998; 
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (Istat), Censimento dell’Industria e Commercio, Rome, 1996. 
 
The distribution of firms by size, in terms of employment, shows that the Baden 
dataset includes a large percentage of firms in the three largest size classes (above 50 
employees), which represent the large firm sub-sample in the following econometric 
analysis. The higher percentage of firms employing more than 50 workers is particularly 
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evident in the cases of textiles, engineering and construction. Moreover, the percentage of 
Baden firms belonging to the smallest size class is consistently lower than in its 
counterparts. This does not mean that Baden around 1900 had larger firms than Italy and 
the UK in the 1990s on average. The lower average of Baden is caused by the very many 
craftsmen-type “firms” with less than 10 employees. But in the size segment that we 
consider here, Baden’s firms were certainly not smaller. 
We sum up the differences between our analysis and previous studies. First and 
foremost, we focus on human capital formation, as it is reasonable to expect that this 
factor plays an important role. In particular, technological and commercial knowledge 
should increase the propensity to innovate, holding all other factors constant. We measure 
this factor with the number of pupils in advanced technical and commercial schools in 
Baden divided by population.104 Second, applying for a patent and renewing it for ten 
years normally means that the actor has a substantial profit expectation, after deducting 
all costs of the production process and the economic environment. We expect that high 
regional taxation, for example, would discourage an entrepreneur or a firm from applying 
for a patent.  
Analyzing the influence of railway infrastructure is also interesting. On the one 
hand, good marketing possibilities and easy shipment of raw materials increase profit 
expectations. On the other hand, after urbanization and all the other related variables are 
controlled for, it might be that firms close to the main railway lines have comparative 
advantage in bulky, perhaps simple products, whereas remote firms, such as in the Black 




This section discusses the results of our econometric analysis. It is structured in 
two sub-sections. The first examines the major explanatory variables in a descriptive and 
visual way. The second section presents and interprets the results of our multiple negative 
binomial regression. 
                                                          
 
4.6.1 Descriptive results  
104 See chapter 2 for the reasons behind selecting technological and commercial schools. 
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This sub-section examines graphically five of the major explanatory variables: 
firm size (CIEEMP), urbanization rate (GCONC), own-industry/cluster employment in 
innovative firms (OWNINN), own-industry/cluster employment in non-innovative firms 
(OWNNOINN), and regional human capital formation (tech_ SCHOOL).105 In order to 
assess the effect of firm size on patenting activity, we divided the whole sample into four 
groups ranked by firm size (figure 4.4). Each quartile represents some 700 firms. Clearly, 
in those descriptive statistics we are not controlling for industry composition and the 
other variables. We find that especially the largest segment had a much higher propensity 
to patent. Among the largest firms, 0.2 patents per firm were observable.  
Figure 4.4 Patents per firm: lowest to highest quarter of firm size (unadjusted) 




















The descriptive plot for the effect of urbanization looks similar (GCONC, figure 
4.5). The 575 firms in districts with the highest urbanization ratio had clearly a higher 
propensity to patent, whereas the three lower quarters had low numbers of patents per 
                                                          
105 In order to remove industry fixed effect, we also experimented with using the residuals (after regressing 
patents per firm on industry dummies), but the results were very similar. 
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firm. Again, this result will hold unless we find, in the subsequent multiple regressions, 
any other variables in the background that might make this relationship spurious. 
 












































The number of workers in innovative firms of the same 2-digit industry and the 
same region might have a positive influence on patenting propensities (figure 4.6). The 
highest segment of this explanatory variable had a higher number of patents per firm, 
whereas the lowest segment clearly had a lower patent number (the middle parts might 
not be significantly different). 
 
Figure 4.6 Patents per firm: lowest to highest quarter of own-industry/cluster 


















































Figure 4.7 Patents per firm: lowest to highest quarters of own-industry/cluster 










































The distribution of patents per firm over the four quarters of employment in non-
innovative firms, of the same industry and same region, is also very interesting (figure 
4.7). The highest quarter had clearly a lower patent rate per firm than the middle quarters, 
as Beaudry and Breschi would have expected. However, the lowest quarter had again 




Finally, the number of students in technical and commercial schools displayed a 
higher number of patents per firm particularly in segment 3, not in the highest quarter 
(figure 4.8). The two lower quarters were less patent intensive.  
Figure 4.8 Patents per firm: lowest to highest quarters of regional number of 
students (technical schools) 
 





































Summing up, the descriptive statistics (using error bar plots of confidence 
intervals) of five of the most important explanatory variables confirm in general our 
expectations about their influence on patenting activity.  
 
4.6.2 Multiple Negative Binomial Regression 
This sub-section discusses the results of the econometric analysis. Table 4.5 below 
compares the results of our “historical” Baden sample with a similar analysis performed 
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by Beaudry and Breschi for the 1990s, the results of which are reported in columns 2 and 
3. Columns 4 and 5 display the results of our regressions including industry dummies to 
control for differences in the propensity to patent between various industries, whereas the 
results in column 6 do not control for such differences.  
Table 4.5 Multiple negative binomial regression 
Dependent variable: firms’ patenting activity 
Country/sample United 
Kingdom 







































































































































Observations 26,055 37,724 2,407 717 2,407 







Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Symbols *, **, *** besides parameter estimates indicate, 
respectively, statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Test for column 3: alpha=7.51 SE(alpha) 1.72; Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) =  
218.82 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
Test for column 4: alpha=6.15 SE(alpha)=1.57; Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) =  
168.23 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
Test for column 5: alpha=17.4 SE(alpha)= 4.08; Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) =  
304.85  Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 
While Beaudry and Breschi found a positive effect of the number of workers in 
innovative firms only within the same industry and cluster (OWNINN), and a negative 
effect of the employment in non-innovative firms (OWNNOINN), this cannot be said on 
the basis of our results. In the case of Baden 1907-13 those variables did not have a 
significant influence, and their coefficients were signed as expected, but very small. One 
possibility to interpret this is concluding that this relationship might have been less 
pronounced in the early 20th century, compared with Beaudry and Breschi’s results. But 
we also have to note that our number of observations is smaller. Furthermore, it might be 
the case that innovations of lower importance (that were not prolonged for 10 years)—
including imitating patents—were stronger influenced by OWNINN, while our 10-year 
patents were not. 
We conclude that the influence of these variables OWNINN and OWNNOINN is 
not generally valid to the extent that it would show up in smaller samples (as ours) from 
other periods and regions. This contrasts with the results for firm size. Larger firms were 
granted more patents in Italy and the UK during the 1990s, and this holds as well for 
southwestern Germany during the 1900s. While this would have been expected (given 
that large firms have more employees who could produce innovations), the differences in 
coefficient size are interesting. In our regressions, the coefficient is even considerably 
larger than the coefficient in the 1990s study. This could either be caused by (a) a 
stronger concentration of important patents on large firms, or (b) by the fact that we 
included many more small firms, or (c) perhaps by omitted variables. When we restrict 
our analysis to only the larger firms (those with 50< workers), the coefficient remains 
virtually unchanged, so (b) is not a likely candidate for explanatory power. Of course, the 
possibility that the different results between our and previous studies might be due to 
omitted variables cannot be ruled out, although our model takes into account more 
variables than previous empirical studies did. We find that size is also an important 
determinant of ten-year-surviving patents registered by Baden residents.  
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The higher propensity of large firms to innovate, and therefore to patent, might 
also have various other explanations. These can be summarized in the Schumpeterian 
argument that large firms with market predominance are in a better position to undertake 
innovative activity. This requires high fixed costs and can therefore be undertaken by 
firms holding comparable financial resources. Small firms might make themselves more 
vulnerable if they were to invest a high portion of their profits in innovating. Moreover, 
increasing returns to scale associated with innovation, particularly innovation yielding 
cost reductions of a given percentage, result in higher profit margins for larger firms than 
for smaller firms (Acs and Audretsch, 1990, pp. 39-40).  
Previous patenting is clearly another crucial characteristic for innovative firms. 
We confirm earlier studies such as Baptista and Swann, Beaudry and Breschi as well as 
others in this point. Flaig and Stadler (1998) discussed this effect as “intertemporal 
spillovers”. Beaudry and Breschi distinguished further between the rapidly discounted 
stock of patents KSTOCKFI (discount rate 0.3) and the previous patenting dummy 
variable PATPREV as we employ it as well. Thus the difference is whether a firm 
patented at all (PATPREV), and the number of discounted earlier patents that proxies its 
propensity toward repeated patenting. They interpreted the positive coefficient for 
KSTOCKFI and the negative one for PATPREV as evidence that not only previous 
patenting, but more importantly recent and repeated previous patenting plays a major 
role, whereas controlling for this, just one patent could have an adverse effect. We cannot 
test this, because we had extreme multicollinearity between PATPREV and KSTOCKFI. 
In our case, the concentration of a region on one or few industries EMPHERF had 
a significant positive effect (again, holding other factors constant). This stresses the 
importance of M-A-R within-industry externalities for our region and period, which is 
very close to Marshall’s. It is possible that this variable might contain some measurement 
error in its specification, especially as it refers only to eleven different regions within 
Baden (in order to keep the smaller industries at a meaningful size). However, we also 
experimented with EMPHERF on the level of 52 Amtsbezirke (smaller districts), and it 
remained robust, positive and significant. On the other hand, Jacobs externalities were 
also visible in Baden, as the positive coefficient for urbanization GCONC indicates.  
Another variable that was not taken into account in some previous studies was 
innovation-specific human capital. We find that the number of pupils in commercial and 
technical schools (secondary and tertiary level, in the 52 districts) per population has a 
strong and significantly positive effect when using the whole sample, whereas the 
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variable is not significant when restricting the analysis to large firms. This finding points 
toward the argument supported by Winter, and following studies, according to which 
innovative advantage of small firms is associated with a wider knowledge base. This 
finding also indicates the importance of government investment in this type of schools, 
which have a positive impact on patents, and via positive knowledge externalities, on 
economic growth in the better-equipped regions. 
In contrast, taxation (TAXHIGH) does not turn out to be significant. The taxes 
were generally quite moderate in Germany around 1900, and the regional differences 
relate only to municipal taxes that account typically for half or less of the tax burden for 
firms. One cost variable that does matter is WAGE. In turn high wages can be interpreted 
as congestion costs and therefore our result points out a negative impact of such costs. In 
chapter 2, we have found out that railway density is closely related to regional innovation. 
In this chapter, the slightly puzzling result of RAILWAY being significantly negative in 
Baden region might be explained by the bulkiness being a comparative advantage that is 
normally not associated with highly innovative products. In Baden around 1900, there 
were highly innovative regions in the Black Forest without railway access, whereas less 
innovative textile industry and cigar-making firms were situated in large numbers near 
major railway lines. 
AGE did not have a significant influence on patenting, which might offer support 
to the argument set forth by Winter whereby innovations that pertain to “an 
entrepreneurial regime” are favorable to innovative entries, whereas those pertaining to a 
“routinized regime” are favorable to established firms.106 
 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This chapter offers several contributions. One of its major merits lies in the 
original dataset on which it is based. The dataset helps overcome what Kuznets (1962) 
considered one of the greatest obstacles to understanding the role of innovation in 
economic processes, i.e. the lack of measures of inputs and outputs of inventive activity 
(Kuznets, 1962, pp. 31-41; Acs and Audretsch, 1990, p. 37). This dataset is even more 
                                                          
106 Some of the outcomes of our research on firms in Baden do not necessarily confirm the results of our 
study of Prussian regions in chapter 2. For example, in this chapter, we find that result of railway is 
significantly negative in Baden region. Several factors might cause these discrepancies. Firstly, in this 
chapter we use patents by firms while in chapter 2 we use patents by regions. Secondly, in this chapter, we 
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important as it allows us to study a state like Baden, which in the period under analysis 
presented an industrial structure similar to the German average, and therefore offers 
insights into a fundamental determinant of economic growth in one of the world’s largest 
economies. 
This study is one of the few based on firm-level data (most work on patents uses 
regional units) and offers a contribution to various controversial issues concerning the 
determinants of innovation, as well as pointing out factors that had been overlooked by 
previous empirical studies. We find evidence of not only a positive impact of externalities 
of the M-A-R type as well as the Jacobs type, but also of “inter-temporal spillovers” 
measured by previous patenting. However, the stronger impact of M-A-R externalities 
confirms Glaeser et al. (1992) suggestion that intra-industry externalities might matter 
more in periods of fast industry growth. This study points out that clusters might also 
yield a negative impact on the innovative activity of firms, due to congestion costs of 
which high wages are an important example. Moreover, our results do not confirm a 
positive association between innovative activity and proximity to means of transport, as 
suggested by Sokoloff (1988).  
On the contrary, we find a positive impact played by human capital formation, 
particularly on smaller firms in our sample, consistently with Winter’s theory of 
“technological regimes”. This result has important implications for European countries 
seeking to regain international competitiveness in manufacturing,
debate on the right means to re-vitalize the German innovation potential in particular. 
Firstly, the excellent state of the technical and commercial schools of 19
significantly increased firms’ successful patenting activities. This suggests that the 
overdue upgrading of the current German higher education system would improve the 
overall productivity of the economy, and more specifically would increase the output of 
investment in research and development. Secondly, small and medium-sized firms seem 
to profit more from knowledge spillovers from technical and commercial schools or 
universities than big business does. This implies that public spending in favor of these 
institutions can also be regarded as an effective competitive policy that would help the 
former to stand up to the latter in Schumpeterian competition. 
                                                                                                                                                                            




limit our scope to Baden region while in chapter 2, we use all regions in Prussia. Indeed, as we have argued, 
Baden is representative of Prussia. Yet still, Baden might possess some specific regional features.  










It has been argued that distance plays a role in knowledge spillovers as knowledge 
(especially tacit knowledge) is often accessible mostly via direct interaction among 
people. This chapter estimates the spillover effect on innovation across 37 Prussian 
regions and how this effect evolves over time from 1877 to 1914. Patents registered by 
patentees in Prussian regions are used as proxy for innovation. Firstly, we study the 
spillover effect of human capital on innovation. Number of students in technical and 
commercial schools is used as proxy for human capital. We find that: (1). Human capital 
at one region has great impact on innovation in the same region, (2). Across regions, 
human capital has various spillover effects on innovation in other regions, (3). In general, 
the effect of human capital spillovers diminishes over distance. Normally, spillovers 
become insignificant over around 265 kilometers. Furthermore, we try to control the 
impact of production. This modification does not change the regression results greatly. 
Then we control for some special industries (chemical and electrical). The results remain 
rather robust in general. We modify the model to study the inter-firm spillover, which is 
the spillover effect of patents in one region on patents in other regions, as patents can 




Innovation has been constantly regarded as key to economic growth in most 
endogenous growth models (Solow 1957; Romer 1986, 1990; Verspagen, 1992; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1994). The theory of endogenous economic growth is based on 
the very premise that accumulated knowledge will eventually find its way to productive 
applications, and hence lead to economic growth. Nevertheless, the mechanism behinds 
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innovation remains elusive, despite some scholarly aspiration (for example, Rosenberg 
1982, 1994) to open the black box of innovation. Innovation, as output, is largely the 
outcome of Research and Development (R&D), as input. Human capital is one important 
factor of R&D input. Human capital is the knowledge and skills that humans carry around 
in their heads. And human capital makes people valuable to an economy. The concept of 
human capital was advanced by Becker (1962), who regards human capital as a critical 
input to production as well as innovation.108 Moreover, human capital and knowledge in 
general have externalities.109 They can travel over distance and exert impact on 
innovation in other regions. Thus, in the spatial perspective, local development of new 
ideas depends on the innovative efforts conducted locally and also on the ability to 
exploit external ideas through information spillovers.110 Griliches (1992) defines 
knowledge spillovers as working on similar things and hence benefiting much from each 
other’s research. Lucas (1988) proposes that knowledge spillover externalities are the 
premier driving force behind economic growth. Griliches and Hjorth-Andersen (1992) 
argue that spillovers account for up to half of the growth in output-per-employee and 
about 75 percent of the measured total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the US. 
Although evidence favors the existence of knowledge externalities, its 
effectiveness has been found to dissipate with distance.111 Grossman and Helpman (1992) 
argue that geography plays a role in knowledge creation and spillovers. Here, it is useful 
to distinguish information from knowledge. Information can be easily codified and 
transmitted at low cost (especially low marginal cost). A piece of information does not 
become knowledge until someone is able to understand it, to combine it with other 
                                                          
108 There is a clear association between a country’s stock of human capital (usually measured by the 
educational attainment of its population) and per capita national income. Mankiw (1995) finds out that the 
average citizen of a high-income nation is better educated than the average citizen of a low-income nation. 
One explanation of this phenomenon is that educated people make a nation prosperous. However, 
conversely, another explanation might be that rich nations have higher expenditure on education. Barro 
(1991) and Barro and Lee (1996) address this issue by showing that a nation’s economic growth is 
significantly related to its pre-existing stock of human capital, measured by the level of educational 
attainment of its citizens. This outcome is consistent with the notion that a higher level of human capital 
causes per capita GDP to grow faster. Fagerberg (1994) surveys empirical studies on the importance of 
technology gaps for differences in economic growth across countries. He observes a consistent pattern that 
lagging countries can converge toward higher income countries, but only if they possess the social 
capability (a large number of people capable of managing the necessary resources, including investment, 
education, and R&D). He argues that investment in education is an important complement to economic 
growth. 
109 Arrow (1962a) shed light on the particular characteristics of the knowledge good and on the idea that 
knowledge spills over.  
110 For elaborations of this argument, see Martin and Ottaviano (2001), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Coe 
and Helpman (1995). 
111 One representative study is Antonelli (1999). 
 120
 
knowledge, to use it and to stock it. The case with knowledge is more complicated. While 
some knowledge can be codified, a substantial portion of knowledge cannot be easily 
codified so that its cost of transmission rises as distances grows. This is why 
technological knowledge is often localized: it is the result of a learning process, which is 
specific for each innovator (Antonelli 1999). Polanyi (1967) has been known as the first 
one to suggest that a major part of human knowledge is difficult to explain with words 
(“tacit knowledge”). To be exact, he defined tacit knowledge as the knowledge that 
dwells in a comprehensive cognisance of the human mind and body. He argued that tacit 
knowledge is related to the context in which it is presented and the individual’s own 
interpretation of it. Thus, this individual interpretation gives tacit knowledge a 
personalized quality that needs to be articulated in order to be communicated (One of 
Polanyi’s famous aphorisms is: “We know much more than we can tell.”). In contrast to 
tacit knowledge, Polanyi (1967) defined explicit knowledge as the codified knowledge 
that is transmitted using orderly formal languages, which are fairly comprehensible. 
Polynyi’s idea has been further modified and developed by other scholars subsequently. 
In discussing their model of organizational knowledge creation, Nonaka et al. (1994) 
called the process of transforming tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge 
“externalization.” They also defined the process of turning explicit knowledge into tacit 
knowledge “internalization.” Foray and Lundvall (1996) even argue that a large part of 
technological innovation represents an effort to codify tacit knowledge. Castillo (2002) 
strives to consolidate and synthesize the broad spectrum of literature on tacit knowledge 
by presenting a four-fold topology of the concept. He sorted the various ideas on tacit 
knowledge into four dimensions (non-epistle, socio-cultural, semantic, and sagacious). 
Castillo’s (2002) categorization of tacit knowledge and Nonaka’s (1994) concepts of 
knowledge creation help us understand the mechanisms of knowledge transfer and 
distinguish tacit knowledge from explicit knowledge.  
The notion tacit knowledge carries great significance for knowledge management 
and organization science. Tacit knowledge is fundamental to the core competencies of 
individuals, organizations, and regions. The classical examples of tacit knowledge are 
typically individual practical skills (such as biking and swimming) that cannot be made 
explicit and that cannot be transmitted through, for instance, telecommunication 
networks. But it is important to note that there are other kinds of tacit knowledge that are 
more at the core of economic dynamics. Managers use experience-based tacit knowledge 
when taking complex decisions, and scientists use personal and tacit knowledge in their 
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research. In both cases, it is mainly a question of interpreting complex sets of information 
and seeing patterns.  
While both the practical and analytically oriented tacit knowledge is impossible to 
codify and to transfer through telecommunication media, it can be learned through 
experience. It is typically learned in an interaction with other people, through a master-
apprentice or collegial relationship. This also implies that tacit knowledge can be shared 
through a process of interaction and cooperation. Interactive learning is a key to shared 
tacit knowledge and this implies, of course, that the social context is important for this 
kind of learning.  
Tacit knowledge is not to be found only at the level of the individual. An 
organization, with its specific routines, norms of behavior, etc., can be regarded as a unit 
that carries with it knowledge, a substantial part of which is tacit. Management may have 
an incentive to codify the knowledge that constitutes the organization, for instance, in 
order to make it less vulnerable to the risk that key persons leave the organization. But 
normally they will realize that it can only be done successfully when the firm operates in 
a simple and static environment. Yet in reality, virtually everything in an organization 
experiences constant changes.  
Industrial networks and inter-firm cooperation may also be seen as repositories of 
tacit knowledge embedded into common procedures and codes, not reflected in formal 
contracts or any other written documents. Some of these procedures might be possible to 
codify while others would lose their meaningfulness if they were written down (getting 
together for a chat may be a fundamental element in bringing people from different 
organizations together for interactive learning). This is a problem similar to the formation 
of trust in a market economy. Arrow has made the point that trust cannot be bought and if 
you could buy trust, it would have no value whatsoever (Arrow 1971). This implies that 
the broader context (the presence and form in society of social capital) will affect the 
learning process. In a community or society that is extremely individualistic or where the 
loyalties are narrowly confined to the very small circle, it might be especially difficult to 
engage in interactive learning.  
The diverging stories of the Route 128 area in Massachusetts and Silicon Valley in 
California (narrated in Saxenian, 1994) vividly illustrate the importance of social capital. 
In the Route 128 area, suits were the only proper attire during business hours for the 
professionals. Employees socialized only within the company and social contacts with 
people outside of the company were viewed with suspicion as potential leaks of trade 
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secrets. In contrast, in the Silicon Valley, dress codes were looser and communities of 
friendships existed across company lines. The sense of community that existed among the 
technical people of the Silicon Valley was not just a pleasant social phenomenon. It 
enabled Silicon Valley firms to solve technical problems more easily and rapidly than 
technical people who were limited to contacts with other employees of their own 
company. This flexibility and adaptability in the long run gave Silicon Valley an 
adaptability and flexibility that was more important to the survival of the industry than 
any possible loss of trade secrets. At Palo Alto area, people think of themselves as 
working for Silicon Valley rather than a particular company. At national level, the case of 
Russia demonstrates the importance of social capital. Russia has one of the highest 
literary rates among world nations.112 Yet the present state of the Russian economy 
illustrates that physical facilities and human capital have little value if not based on social 
capital (such as trust), which guarantees that one society moves forwards smoothly. 
Russia needs to build social capital in civil society, such as institutionally supported trust 
relationships.113 
Institutions and individuals interested in knowledge creation and innovation strive 
to acquire knowledge, be it tacit or explicit, within a social context. Yet we should note 
that distinct types of knowledge differs in its accessibility. Accessibility is related to an 
individual’s knowledge creation process, and access to knowledge of other people affects 
one’s own knowledge.  
Tacit knowledge is not easily accessible to others. There are different reasons why 
knowledge can be inaccessible. It could be because the knowledge has not been expressed 
by the holder (non-epistle), or because the knowledge is dispersed in the surrounding 
social culture, or is semantic to a particular group while incomprehensible to outsiders, or 
because it is a personal insight or mental model that enables a person to understand and 
absorb other knowledge (sagacious). Figure 5.1 uses flow chart to help us visualize the 
accessibility of tacit and explicit knowledge.  
 
Figure 5.1 Knowledge accessibility of tacit and explicit knowledge 
                                                          
112 The world factbook 2004.  
113 For the importance of social capital in post-Soviet transition, see Rose (1999), Marsh (2000), Gibson 




Source: Fallah and Ibrahim (2004) 
 
In figure 5.1, the area contained in the dotted lines identifies the types of 
knowledge that is best acquired through direct interaction. All inventions and new ideas 
start as tacit knowledge residing in somebody’s mind. Often, the fastest, easiest, least 
expensive, accurate and, sometimes, the only way to access that knowledge are through 
direct (often face-to-face) interaction. Therefore, opportunities for direct interaction 
among people are most easily facilitated when they work and live close together. 
It is important to distinguish knowledge spillover from knowledge transfer. 
Spillovers are the unintentional transmission of knowledge to others. In contrast, if 
knowledge is exchanged with the intended people or organizations, the case is knowledge 
transfer. Figure 5.2 depicts the flow of knowledge from the holder to receivers via 










Source: Fallah and Ibrahim (2004) 
 
Technology surely has impact on knowledge accessibility. New information and 
telecommunication technologies such as video conference and Internet facilitate remote 
interactions among people. However, the effectiveness of such communication 
technologies should not be exaggerated. As Feldman and Audretsch (1999) point out, 
advances in communication technologies may lower the cost of transmitting information, 
but the transmission of complex and non-codified knowledge still increases with distance. 
In other words, returns to knowledge may be spatially bound; hence inventions tend to 
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cluster spatially.114 Glaeser et al (1992) and Henderson (1997) have underlined the 
importance of geographic proximity for sharing innovative efforts across cities. However, 
the effect of these spillovers across regions deserves further careful study. How important 
are spillovers of ideas and knowledge? And how far can spillovers travel? This chapter 
tries to answer these questions. These questions are important as it can well be argued 
that the engines of national economic performance are sub-national districts that are 
characterized by strong ties between regional actors (Storper 1995; Scott 1993). 
Krugman (1991) argues provocatively that economists should not waste their time 
in attempting to measure knowledge spillovers as knowledge spillovers are invisible, they 
do not leave paper trial by which they can be measured and tracked. Nevertheless, several 
approaches have been considered to track knowledge spillovers. Jaffe, Trajtenberg and 
Henderson (1993) point out that knowledge flows do sometimes leave a paper trail, in 
particular, in the form of patent citations. They find evidence of the localization of 
citations, that is, patents cite other patents that originate in the same city with greater 
frequency.  
The most important empirical approach to analyze the process of innovation 
creation is the knowledge production function, originally formalized by Griliches (1979) 
and Pakes and Griliches (1984). Griliches (1979) introduced the econometric model to 
measure the effect of R&D investment on technology stock and economic growth. Jaffe 
(1986) built on this model, considering that the total relevant productivity of other firms 
influence innovation of a particular firm. Jaffe (1989) then used the same model to 
measure geographical spillovers between neighboring firms and universities using 
American states as geographical units. Anselin et al. (1997, 2000) used the same model in 
similar studies, but used U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) instead. Smith 
(1999) studied inter-state knowledge spillovers within the United States.115 To sum up, 
empirical estimations of the model of the knowledge production function have been 
carried out for different levels of aggregation with a common result of a positive and 
significant effect of research spillovers on innovation activity. However, most of these 
studies are applied to the US case, such as the ones by Acs et al. (1994), Jaffe (1989), 
Jaffe et al. (1993), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Anselin et al. (1997). At the level of 
regions in various European countries, previous attempts are those by Maurseth and 
                                                          
114 This contrasts with immediate knowledge diffusion, an assumption made by the neoclassical growth 
model. Immediate knowledge diffusion implies that technology gaps between regions do not exist.  
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Verspagen (1999) and by Bottazzi and Peri (2003). Among the studies applied to areas 
within a single European country, we find the works by Autant-Bernard (2003) for the 
French departments, Fischer and Varga (2003) for Austrian political districts, Andersson 
and Ejermo (2003) for Swedish regions. All these studies have successfully detected the 
knowledge spillover.  
This chapter analyzes the importance of geographic proximity in the diffusion of 
knowledge in 37 Prussian regions from 1877 to 1914. The rest of the chapter is organized 
as follows. Section 2 discusses the model. Section 3 describes data and variables. Section 
4 presents the estimation outcomes; we modify the basic model and present the 
corresponding research outcomes. In section 5, we explore another type of spillover, 
namely inter-firm spillover. Section 6 concludes the chapter.  
5.2 BASIC MODEL 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
The famous Cobb-Douglas function is the most widely used production 
function.116 It can be modified to study the creation of ideas. Based on the Cobb-Douglas 
function, Romer (1990) and Jones (1995) proposed an innovation function, namely the 
production function of new knowledge. Bottazzi and Peri (2003) generalized and 
modified the function. This paper basically adopted the innovation function used by 
Bottazzi and Peri (2003).  
The very idea of this innovation function used in Bottazzi and Peri (2003) is 
simple. Innovation in one region is associated with local human capital and the spillovers 
of human capital in other regions. The basic concept can be expressed as follows. 
Innovation = β0 + β1*Local human capital + β2*Spillovers of human capital in 
close regions + β3*Spillovers of human capital in distant regions + Residual                (1) 
To be exact, we split distant regions into several intervals. We get the following 
equation117 
Ln(Patent)i = β0 + β1Ln(Human Capital)i + β[dist0, dist1)[m´i1Ln(Human Capital)] + 
β[dist1, dist2)[m´i2Ln(Human Capital)] + β[dist2, dist3)[m´i3Ln(Human Capital)] + β[dist3, dist4) 
[m´i4Ln(Human Capital)] +…+ β[distn, distk)[m´ikLn(Human Capital)] + εi             (2) 
 
115 For a comprehensive and updated review on knowledge production and spillovers within the 
geographical space, see Audretsch and Feldman (2003). 
116 For historical origin and later development of the function, see Douglas (1976). 
117 The step-by-step procedure to reach equation (2) is explained in detail in Bottazzi and Peri (2002). 
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Here, the dependent variable is proxied by the average number of patents per 
capita in one region in its natural log form. As for the independent variables, the input of 
innovative activities, human capital (abbreviated as HC), is measured by the share of 
vocational school (commercial and technical school) pupils of total population in its 
natural log form in the local region. Then we introduce factors connected with human 
capital in other regions. These regressors are constructed as follows: Row vector m´i is an 
37*1 row vector whose jth entry is zero if distance is not within the range k, while it is 
(1/nik) if that distance is within the range k. Ln(Human Capital) is a 1*37 column vector 
whose i entry is ln(Human Capital)i. The product of these two vectors gives the average 
ln(Human Capital) for regions in the kth distance interval from region i. εi is assumed to 
be a well-behaved random i.i.d. error capturing other unobservable determinants of 
innovative output. In this equation, β1, β[dist0, dist1), β[dist1, dist2), β[dist2, dist3)…, β[distn, distk) all 
measure elasticity. Coefficient β1 shows the impact of local human capital on innovation, 
and β[dist0, dist1), β[dist1, dist2), …, β[distn, distk) capture the effect of human capital in other 
regions (up to 2000 kilometers) on innovation due to spillovers. 
The effect of human capital spillovers changes over distance. We divide the 
distances between regions into five bands in kilometers: (0-265), (265-420), (420-610), 
(610-840), and (840-2000). We base this division on two criterions: (1). Every band 
contains at least one pair of regions, and (2). Each band contains approximately the same 
number of pairs. Prussia had 37 districts. Accordingly, there are 37*(37-1)=1332 
distances. There are about 266 (1332/5) distances in each band.118 
We express the function (2) listed above mathematically as follows. 
Ln(Patent)i = β0 + β1Ln(HC)i + β2[m´i[1-265)Ln(HC)] + β3[m´i[265-420)Ln(HC)] + 
β4[m´i[420-610)Ln(HC)] + β5[m´i[610-840)Ln(HC)] + β6[m´i[840-2000)Ln(HC)] + εi (3) 
We would expect the following outcomes. 
1. local human capital should have great impact on innovation.  
2. human capital in other regions should have some, if little, impact. 
3. the impact of human capital in other regions might diminish over distance if 
tacit knowledge plays a role. If it is too far away, spillovers are insignificant.  
We will see whether the outcomes meet our expectations. Before we estimate this 
model, we describe the data used in this empirical study. 
 
                                                          





Various geographic and administrative units of analysis have been used to study 
innovation. As regions are connected within themselves, they serve our research objective 
well. In this paper, we use Prussian regions as unit of analysis mainly because of the 
available data are split are regional level. Prussia had 37 regions (called Regierungsbezirk 
in German). We need to control the impact of regional size on economic variables. It is 
quite natural that large regions have more patents and schools pupils than small regions. 
Because Prussian regions differ substantially in size, we use regional population to 
standardize all variables to eliminate the possible cause of distortion due to the issue of 
regional size. 
R&D is input that might lead to innovation output. R&D data are available on a 
broad scale only after the World War Two. It is impossible for us to obtain R&D data for 
the time period studied in this research. However, we can use other measures. Schooling 
is one important component of R&D input and it is an interesting determinant of patents 
by itself. Human capital can be measured by the educational achievements of its 
population. With discretion, we use students of technical and commercial schools.119 We 
gather the numbers of students at technical and commercial schools. Then, we divide the 
numbers by population. Afterwards, we take natural log. 
Of course, we would like to extend the current research to Germany as a whole. 
However, data for technical schools and commercial schools at district level are absent or 
not homogenous in German statistical yearbooks. Hence we concentrate are Prussia. We 
divide the years from 1877 to 1914 into the following time periods: 1877-1885, 1886-
1895, 1896-1905, 1906-1910, and 1911-1914.120 We would like to compare the spillover 
effects over various periods. Using the mean number of patents for each interval reduces 
inter-annual variances in patent numbers, which is especially troublesome in areas that 
often receive only few patents in a given year. 
The distance between regions is a complicated issue. There are two measures. The 
first one is border-to-border distance. Two regions that have a common border are 
assigned zero as distance. Regions without a border are assigned a distance measured 
between their closest borders. Bottazzi and Peri (2003) adopted this approach. The second 
approach is point-to-point distance. We use this approach. Prussia has 37 administrative 
                                                          
119 See chapter 1 for reasons behind this selection.  
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districts. We locate the largest city of these districts. Then, we take the distance between 
these cities.121 A table of regions and their central cities is in the appendix one.  
 
5.4 REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
We use OLS method to estimate equation (3). The regression results for various 
time periods are in the appendix two.  
We put the final regression outcomes of various periods into one table to render a 
comparison over time possible.  
Table 5.1 Regression results of spillover 







































































R Square 0.655 0.677 0.466 0.751 0.806 
Number of 
observations 
37 37 37 37 37 
 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable: Ln(annual patents which survived for more than ten years) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
120 Some variables are averaged over shorter intervals due to the unavailability of the whole series.  
121 Data for such distances between these cities are largely available. Der grosse ADAC-Generalatlas has 
information for distances between 100 German major places. Deutscher Generalatlas: Masstab 1:200000, 
published by West Germany, also includes the distances between major cities in West Germany. We mostly 
rely on these two data. However, the past one hundred years witnessed the rise and fall of German cities. 
Many economic centers in Prussia become unimportant now. Moreover, many places are relocated to other 
countries. We measure some distances that are not readily available. 
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2. Standard errors are given in parenthesis under coefficients 
3. * means statistically significant at 10 % level, ** means statistically significant at 5 % level, 
and *** means statistically significant at 1 % level. 
 
The estimations yield high degree of explanatory power. Our regression outcomes 
are rather similar to those of Bottazzi and Peri (2003), which are contained in table 5.2. 
However, some caution should be called for in this comparison as we have rather 
different model specifications. 
Table 5.2 Regression results of Bottazzi and Peri (2003) 
 Dependent variable: Ln (yearly patent applications) 
 Basic specifications using 
R&D employment (private 
and public) 
Basic specifications using 


























R Square 0.87 0.89 
Number of observations 86 86 
 
According to our research results, local human capital has great impact on 
innovation. Human capital in regions no farther than 265 kilometers away has impact on 
local innovation. According to our study, adding 10 % students in technical and 
commercial schools in a Prussian region would increase the output of new ideas in other 
regions within 265 km by as much as 4-9 %, while it would increase the innovation of the 
own region often by 4-10 %. The magnitude of the elasticities is rather remarkable. We 
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have to admit that there are some omitted variables that are correlated with schooling and 
account for a share of the impact. In the time period under the study of Bottazzi and Peri 
(2003), aided by modern technology (especially technology in transport and 
telecommunications), ideas can spread more easily today. The contemporary proponent of 
New Economy such as Paul Krugman even talks about “death of distance”.122 However, 
we should also note that around 1900, Prussia was a society of high regional mobility. 
Migration (especially young people migrating from eastern Prussia to western Prussia to 
work) occurred frequently. In this social context, this high diffusion effects are more 
plausible. We find that human capital in other regions farther than 265 kilometers away 
has little impact on local innovation. This outcome well demonstrates that across 
distance, spillovers are bound by physical distance and can not travel infinitely. And these 
results are relatively robust when we add in independent variables one by one. 
We now modify the basic model. Part of the correlation we have found between 
human capital and patents and between other regions’ patents and local patents could be 
spurious and due to omission of relevant variables. There are many factors that affect 
innovation. Production is such a factor. Technological discoveries are more likely to 
occur to those who work in an industry than to outsiders, because insiders should possess 
more knowledge about problems and opportunities in the industry and are also better 
positioned to benefit from their knowledge. We use horsepower (both steam engine and 
electrical) as a measure of physical capital formation, which is closely associated with 
production. Another complementary proxy for production in a region is its industrial 
labor force. For this region, we include industrial labor force per population as an 
explanatory variable. We run the regressions above again after adding these two 
explanatory variables. 
Table 5.3 Regression results of spillover after controlling production 























-4.172E-02 -0.214 -0.418 -0.285 5.764E-02 M´[265-420) 
                                                          
122 The Economist, September 30-October 6, 1995. Paul Krugman believes that knowledge spills over 
unlimitedly across geographic distances.  
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R Square 0.856 0.756 0.800 0.832 0.827 
Number of 
observations 
37 37 37 37 37 
 
After controlling production, our regression outcomes remain largely the same. 
However, the coefficients of spillover become smaller as we now control for production. 
It means that previously, we had contributed some undue effect to spillover due to 
omitted variable bias. Nevertheless, the effects are clearly visible from our regression and 
tend to grow over time. 
Above, we considered aggregate patenting from all industries. Yet patents are not 
homogenous across industries. Therefore we should control for the fact that different 
industries have different properties concerning patents. Both chemical (including dyes) 
and electrical industries are very special industries. And these two industries are very 
active in registering patents. They occupy more than 20% patents in our patent pool from 
1877 to 1914. We exclude patents from these two industries and run the regression again.  
Table 5.4 Regression results of spillover  
(excluding patents from chemical and electrical industries) 











M´[1-265) 0.215** 0.369* 0.322* 0.319* 0.663* 
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R Square 0.864 0.756 0.838 0.854 0.841 
Number of 
observations 
37 37 37 37 37 
 
Omitting patents from chemical and electrical industries do not change the picture 
drastically. The concern that patents from these two industries would distort the picture 
should not be exaggerated. After the exclusion, local human capital and human capital in 
other regions still have positive and statistically significant impact on local innovation. 
However, we do observe some differences. The effects of spillover are in general smaller 
then the effects when we use patents from all industries. This means that for chemical and 
electrical industries, the human capital generated in the technical and commercial schools 
is probably even more important. This outcome is not surprising. It is well expected that 
students from vocational schools entered firms that registered a lot of patents (in our case, 
mostly the firms in chemical and electrical industries). In contrast, firms in older 
technological activity did not benefit so much from human capital spillovers compared 
with firms in chemical and electrical industries. Their patenting activities were stimulated 




5.5 SPILLOVERS BETWEEN FIRMS  
 
Firms are the main unit of production and innovation in a market-based economy. 
Above, we have investigated the spillover of knowledge from schools to firms by using 
the number of technological and commercial school pupils as a proxy for human capital. 
We now experiment with another human capital proxy. There are also inter-firm 
spillovers.123 Jaffe (1986) found that a significant fraction of the total flow of spillovers 
that affect a firm’s research productivity originates from other firms. Patents can serve as 
both input and output of innovation. One firm’s patents can be used by other firms to 
generate more patentable ideas. If a firm has an innovative labor force, another firm 
might hire its staff. Therefore, knowledge spillovers can easily move across firms and 
inter-firm spillovers may well be geographically mediated. To explore this inter-firm 
spillover as a logical extension of the inquiry concerning spillover, we slightly modify the 
model used in section 2.  
Ln(Patent)i = β0 + β1Ln(HC)i + β2[m´i[1-265)Ln(Patent)] + β3[m´i[265-420)Ln(Patent)] 
+ β4[m´i[420-610)Ln(Patent)] + β5[m´i[610-840)Ln(Patent)] + β6[m´i[840-2000)Ln(Patent)] + εi  (4) 
Here, the only modification is that we substitute patents for human capital in other 
regions in function (3). The estimation outcomes for various periods are as follows.  
Table 5.5 Regression results of inter-firm spillover 



























































M´[840-2000) -2.399E-02 0.127 0.208 -0.203 -0.440 
                                                          
123 Several representative works focusing on inter company spillovers are Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson 
(1993), Audretsch and Feldman (1999), Verspagen and Schoenmakers (2000). 
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R Square 0.872 0.797 0.836 0.878 0.833 
Number of 
observations 
37 37 37 37 37 
 
We do detect that patents in other regions have positive and statistically 
significant externalities on local patenting. And the effects tended to grow over time and 
reached its peak at the end of the period. To control for the special features of chemical 
and electrical industries concerning patenting, we exclude patents from these industries 
and run the regression again.  
Table 5.6 Regression results of inter-firm spillover 
(excluding patents from chemical and electrical industries) 

























































































(0.181) (0.271) (0.000) (0.236) 
R Square 0.862 0.781 0.835 0.806 
Number of 
observations 
37 37 37 37 
 
Our results remain rather robust. Omitting patents from chemical and electrical 
industries does not affect the previous regression outcomes greatly. After the exclusion, 
local human capital and patents registered by patentees in other regions still have positive 
and statistically significant impact on local innovation. And the effects also grow over 
time. The effects of spillover are in general smaller then the effects when we use patents 
from all industries. This means that chemical and electrical industries are better at 




In this chapter, we estimate the spillover effects on patents across Prussian regions 
from 1877 to 1914. In terms of the spillovers of human capital, we found that the 
spillovers are very localized and exist only within a distance of 265 kilometers. However, 
the size of these spillovers is substantial. Adding 10% students in commercial and 
technical schools in a region would increase the output of new ideas in other regions 
within 265 km by as much as 4-9 %, while it would increase the innovation of the own 
region often by 4-10 %. The development of telecommunications increasingly facilitates 
the diffusions of ideas and knowledge over short distances. Yet this does not mean the 
“death of distance”; the opposite is true, as we can see that the spillovers rarely exist over 
265 kilometers anyway. We modify this basic model to control for production and special 
industries. The regression outcomes remain rather robust. After investigating this 
spillover from schools to firms, we examine inter-firm spillovers. Again, we find that 
spillovers are rather confined in nearby regions no farther than 265 kilometers. And this 
outcome is also fairly robust amid modifications to control for production and patents 





Prussian regions and their central cities 
No. region center No. region center No. region center 
1 Aachen Aachen 14 Kassel Kassel 27 Osnabrueck Osnabrueck 
2 Allenstein Arys 15 Koblenz Koblenz 28 Posen Posen 
3 Arnsberg Dortmund 16 Cologne Cologne 29 Potsdam Potsdam 
4 Aurich Emden 17 Koenigsberg Koenigsberg 30 Schleswig Kiel 
5 Breslau Breslau 18 Koeslin Koeslin 31 Sigmaringen Sigmaringen 
6 Bromberg Bromberg 19 Liegnitz Goerlitz 32 Stade Bremervoerde
7 Danzig Danzig 20 Lueneburg Lueneburg 33 Berlin Berlin 
8 Duesseldorf Duesseldorf 21 Magdeburg Magdeburg 34 Stettin Stettin 





23 Merseburg Halle 36 Trier Trier 
11 Gumbinnen Gumbinnen 24 Minden Bielefeld 37 Wiesbaden Frankfurt a/m 
12 Hannover Hannover 25 Muenster Muenster    






Regression results of spillover over various periods 
(1). 1877-1885 




















































     5.377E-02 
(0.150) 
R Square 0.577 0.617 0.620 0.644 0.655 0.655 
Number of 
observations 
37 37 37 37 37 37 
 
(2). 1886-1895 
Variables I II III IV V VI 




















































     0.175 
(0.259) 
R Square 0.623 0.635 0.658 0.668 0.672 0.677 
Number of 
observations 
37 37 37 37 37 37 
 
(3). 1896-1905 
Variables I II III IV V VI 


















































     8.063E-02 
(0.410) 
R Square 0.271 0.299 0.331 0.432 0.465 0.466 
Number of 
observations 
37 37 37 37 37 37 
 
(4). 1896-1910 



































M´[420-610)    0.704 0.519 0.690 
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ln(HC) (0.455) (0.502) (0.529) 
M´[610-840) 
ln(HC) 






     -0.338 
(0.334) 
R Square 0.647 0.700 0.716 0.736 0.742 0.751 
Number of 
observations 
37 37 37 37 37 37 
 
(5). 1911-1914 
Variables I II III IV V VI 




















































     -0.419 
(0.315) 
R Square 0.704 0.770 0.774 0.795 0.796 0.806 
37 37 37 37 37 37 Number of 
observations 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable: Ln(annual patents which survived for more than ten years) 
2. Standard errors are given in parenthesis under coefficients 
3. * means statistically significant at 10 % level, ** means statistically significant at 5 % level, 





What Impact the Survival Rates of German and Foreign 
Patents (1879-1900)? 





                                                          
The major objective of this chapter is to answer the question: To what extent do 
patentee’s nationality and legal status (firm or person) and patent’s technology field 
impact the patent survivals versus the patent renewals in Germany at the end of the 19th 
century. In order to conduct the empirical analysis, we constructed a data base of patent 
survival from the Verzeichnis der im Vorjahre erteilten Patente published by the German 
Patent Office. The data set consists of 2,563 foreign and domestic patents that were 
registered in Germany from 1879 to 1885. We employ a Cox proportional hazard 
regression to predict the renewal chances of newly granted patents between foreign and 
German patentees. 
The main finding suggests that patent renewal rates differ significantly across 
different technology fields and countries of origin. Additionally, patents registered by 
German patentees tend to die sooner than foreign patents, while the differences among 
the foreign countries included in the analysis are not significant. The various technology 
fields show different impact on the patent renewal rate. In comparison to the patents from 
the instrument industry, which serve as a reference group in our analysis, those patents in 
dyes, chemical, and electrical industries tend to have higher propensity of being renewed. 
Moreover, the patents registered by individuals tend to survive the patents registered by 
firms although this difference is not statistically significant. Finally, our empirical 
outcomes will enable the use of attaching weights to patents, and on the other side of 
producing weighted patent count indices, which are more precise measures of innovative 
output than raw patent counts. 
 





Given the essential position that patent systems have in encouraging invention and 
innovation, information about the factors driving the renewal process is fundamental in 
order to understand how valuable a particular patent right is. On the other side, patent 
rights are not frequently traded, and even if they are, information about their pricing value 
is not easily available to the public. In this context, as direct information about the patent 
value is sparse, economists have turned to other sources of information, while examining 
their actual contribution to the economic development. For instance, significant evidence 
on the importance of patent protection comes from survey data (Taylor and Silberston, 
1973; Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner, 1981; Levin et al., 1987).  
Additionally, most patent systems require holders, individuals and firms, of 
patents to pay a renewal fee at a specific interval (often one year) to keep their patent 
rights in force. If the required fee is not paid in any one year, the patent will be 
permanently cancelled. Assuming that renewal decisions follow economic criteria, the 
decision-making process, therefore, will be tied to the value of the patent right. In other 
words, patentees will renew their protection rights only if the value of asserting them an 
additional year exceeds the cost of renewal. Observations on the proportion of survival 
versus renewal rates at different patent’s age will thus contain information on the 
distribution of the holding values of particular patent and on the evolution of this 
distribution over the life span of the patent. For instance, based on historical data for the 
period 1852-1876, Sullivan (1994) estimated the value of patent rights in Britain and 
Ireland and compared them with similar empirical results of Schankerman and Pakes 
(1986) for the period 1950-76 in United Kingdom, France and Germany. As far as we are 
concerned historical evidence for Germany is not existent, so the main motivation of this 
chapter is to provide historical facts about the value of intellectual property rights based 
on survival analysis. 
Additional objective of this chapter is to explore the potential error in simple 
patent counts as measurement of invention. Using patents as an indicator of innovation 
has fascinated many economists in their attempts to understand the determinants of 
inventive behavior, largely due to its availability (Sullivan, 1989, 1993). However, their 
efforts are hindered by various shortcomings of patents. One considerable drawback is the 
fact that inventions being patented differ to the highest degree in their quality. The patent 
count as measure has been used both as an indicator of the output value of patentable 
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ideas (and more generally of the value of inventive output as a whole), and on the other 
side as an indicator of the proprietary rights value created by the patent laws (Scherer 
1980). Pure patent counts, in this sense, will allocate the same weight to every patent, no 
matter whether it has high or a low economic value for the patentee or for the society. 
Employing the number of patents as an indicator for new technological knowledge 
suitable to foster economic growth will lead to a potentially very large measurement 
error. To decrease this measurement error it is necessary to distinguish patents with a high 
from those with a low economic value.  
As patent counts are very imperfect measures of innovative output, this chapter 
discusses how additional data (the number of years a patent survived) can be used to 
improve the quality of patent count data. A patent holder was supposed to decide to 
renew the patent only when the costs of doing so were lower than the expected future 
return of the patent. Following this contemporary assumption about the behavior of a 
patentee we will use information on the actual life span of a patent as an indicator for its 
private economic value.125 In this sense, patents that had survived longer time are 
regarded as high value patents.  
Analyzing patent renewal rate yields several benefits to innovation research. 
Firstly, it allows us to attach weights to patents and produce weighted patent count 
indices, which are more precise measures of innovative output than raw patent counts. 
Thus, the outcome of this research may well prove to be invaluable to future works, 
especially for studies based on German historical data. The second reason of interest in 
renewal data is the direct reflection of the incentive underlying the application and 
renewal process. Patents represent the legal right to exclude others from using the 
invention. As a result, the private value of a patent will be determined by the difference in 
the returns that would accrue to the innovation with and without patent protection. Since 
it is the value that determines both application and renewal decisions, application and 
renewal data contain information on the value of proprietary rights created by the patent 
laws, that is on the value of patent protection.  
Economist’s interest in patent renewal data goes back at least to Nordhaus’ thesis 
(1969). Pakes and Schankerman (1984) stimulated broader interest in patent renewals by 
showing how to apply these data to uncover characteristics of the value of patent 
protection. Pakes (1986) goes further in his analysis and allows a patentee to be uncertain 
                                                          




about the sequence of returns that would be earned were the patent to be kept in force. 
This additional detail facilitates us to obtain a deeper understanding about the nature of 
the innovative process.  
In this sense, the current chapter is based on patent renewal rates. It intends to do 
preparation for subsequent works on the value of patent protection, as initial descriptive 
statistics have shown great diversity in the life spans of patents. Why do some patents die 
young while others live longer? What factors are behind the heterogeneity of patent 
mortality versus renewal? Applying Cox regression techniques to perform survival 
analysis, this chapter strives to shed light to the above-stated inquiry. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the renewal 
decision of a patentee and shows under which circumstances the different life spans of 
patents can be used to identify the high-value patents of the German industrialization. 
Section 3 describes the renewal data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 introduces the 
econometric method. Section 5 presents the estimates, and Section 6 concludes the 
chapter.  
 
6.2 DECISION OF PATENTEE TO RENEW A PATENT 
 
Under the patent law of the German Empire, patentees had to decide annually if 
they were going to renew their patent for another year or not. The outcome of this 
decision depended on the patentee’s expectations about the future returns and costs of 
holding the patent. The latter were determined by the renewal fees demanded by the 
patent office and therefore most of the time certainly foreseeable. In contrast, the future 
returns of a patent were highly uncertain. They could arise from two major sources. On 
the one hand, patentees could use a patent to increase their profits by selling their 
innovation as a temporary monopolist or by licensing another producer to do so. On the 
other hand, patentees could also use their patent to prevent sales of competitors’ 
innovations that had the potential to decrease the market share of their own already 
established products. In 1911, for example, Siemens succeeded in developing the first 
light bulb with a metallic filament based on tantalum. Two years later Siemens was 
granted the two long-lived German patents no. 153328 and 154527 that proved to be the 
base from which the German firm gained the leading role in the world market. The sales 
of tantalum light bulbs gradually increased from 240,000 units at the beginning to almost 
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10 millions units in 1912. Even after General Electric discovered the superior wolfram 
light bulb the tantalum light bulb patents did not loose their high economic value since 
Siemens was able to barter them for the very valuable patents of General Electric. The 
American firm was forced to accept this patent exchange by Siemens’ threat to use its 
own patents to hinder General Electric’s entry into the German market.126 
We assume that the patent holders renewed their patent if and only if the present 
value of the expected future returns exceeded the present value of the future costs either 
for the remaining maximum life span of the patent or for at least one shorter sub period. 
This condition is satisfied when the following inequality holds for at least one 









−− ∑∑ },15,...,1{},15,...,1{)1()1()(  
E(Rt) denotes the expected returns in year t, Ct the costs in year t, T the remaining 
life span of the patent, t the first year of the remaining life span and r the interest rate 
used to discount the future values. 
 


























                                                          
126  See Erker (1990), p. 75-77. 
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Figure 6.1 shows for every year the respective present value127 of the historical 
renewal costs (PVC) and the expected returns of two hypothetic patents, one with 
increasing returns (PVIR) and another one with decreasing returns (PVDR) over time. In 
year 1, the present values of the returns of both patents are higher than the present value 
of their costs. That is why the inventor applies for both patents. In the following years the 
patent holder always renews the patent with increasing returns since the curve 
representing the discounted returns stays above the curve of the present values of the 
costs for the whole maximum life span of the patent. In the case of the patent with 
decreasing returns, however, the patent holder decides at the beginning of year 4 not to 
prolong this patent because in this year the present value of the expected returns has sunk 
under the discounted value of the renewal fees. In general, patent holders renew their 
patent until the year when the present value of the expected future returns is lower than 
the present value of the remaining renewal fees. They never apply for patents whose 
discounted expected returns are already lower than the present value of their costs in the 
first year. 
Since patents can generate increasing or decreasing revenues over time it is 
unavoidable to compare the expected present values of future costs and revenues for both 
the maximum life span and all shorter sub periods. Let’s first consider the case of a patent 
that produces very high returns in the last years of its maximum life span but very low 
returns in the years before. As a result, the present value of the expected net revenues of 
the maximum life span might be positive but the ones of shorter sub periods might be 
negative. That is why patent holders who base their renewal decision only on their 
expectations about the next year could make the mistake to give up an apparently 
worthless patent which would be in fact very profitable in the future. In the case of a 
patent with decreasing returns over time, the opposite is true because this kind of patent 
might have a negative present value of expected net revenues for its maximum life span 
but a positive one for shorter sub periods. 
A long life span of a historical patent undoubtedly indicates its comparatively high 
private economic value. This conclusion, however, does not imply that all high-value 
patents had a long life span. There might have been patents with fast decreasing returns 
over time that were given up after just a few years but nevertheless yielded high returns to 
the patent holder in their comparatively short life span. That is why the criterion life span 
                                                          
127  In this example, we used an interest rate of five percent to discount the future values. 
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that systematically sorts out all short-lived patents is not a perfect measure to identify 
high-value patents.128 However, using the life span of patents to distinguish low-value 
from high-value patents is a reasonably working procedure because it identifies all high-
value patents with increasing returns and all long-lived high-value patents with 
decreasing returns. This method is additionally justified by the fact that the distribution of 
life spans of patents is highly skewed to the right. 
Figure 6.1 implicitly assumes that the inventor’s prior expectations about the 
future returns of his patents built up at the beginning of year 1 of the life span are 
accurate and do not need to be corrected at any point in time. This assumption is rather 
unrealistic. In an early stage of an innovation process, inventors are often highly uncertain 
whether or not their idea can be profitably exploited in the future. The low renewal fees at 
the beginning of a patent’s life allows the inventors to use the patent as a comparatively 
cheap option that protects their new knowledge and gives them the time to learn more 
about the technological and economic prospects of their invention. Figure 6.2 shows a 
possible outcome of this learning process. 






















In year 1, the inventor speculates that the present values of the expected returns of 
the potential patent are correctly described by the curve PVIR. That is why he applies for 
                                                          
128  The extent of this selection bias depends on the actual share of patents with fast decreasing returns in 
the population of all high-value patents. Schankerman and Pakes assume decreasing returns for all patents 
to make their math works. See Schankerman and Pakes (1986), p. 1054. 
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the patent. In the following years, he gathers more information that finally forces him to 
correct his expectations down to PVIR*. As a result, he doesn’t renew the patent in year 
4. 
Pakes (1986) states, first, that this learning process of the patent holders is 
concentrated in the early years of a patent’s life span, and second, that most of these 
options turn out to be worthless. These assumptions were supported by our finding that 
about seventy percent of all German patents granted between 1891 and 1907 were already 
cancelled after just five years. After the fifth year the speed of patent cancellation was 
decelerating. About 10 percent of all patents were still in force after 10 years, 4.7 percent 
of all patents reached the maximum age of fifteen years. 
 



















a This calculation is based on information on the patent cohorts 1891-1907. See Blatt für 
Patent-, Muster- und Zeichenwesen (1914), p. 84. 
 
A basic question of the life span approach is how many years a patent had to be in 
force to be interpreted as a high-value patent. Schankerman and Pakes, who also used 
survival rates as an indicator for high-value patents, came to the result that most of the 
value of the patent stock built up in the post World War II period in Britain, France and 
 149
 
Western Germany was concentrated in the upper five percent of the long-lived patents.129 
Following this hint had meant in our case to select only those patents that reached the 
maximum life span of 15 years. To decrease the potential selection bias caused by high-
value patents with decreasing returns we instead chose to follow Sullivan, who explored 
British and Irish patents of the second half of the 19th century, and to interpret the upper 
10 percent of the long-lived patents as the high-value patents of our total patent 
population.130 Exploiting the information given by the survival rate of figure 6.3, we 
therefore selected all patents that survived at least ten years.131 This selection process 
resulted in a sample of 39,343 patents that we interpret as the high-value patents of the 
German Empire in the following. Figure 6.4 shows how many patents and high-value 
patents respectively were annually granted between 1877 and 1918. 
 

























                                                          
The number of patents granted annually quickly rose to about 4,000 after 
establishing the German patent law and kept this level until the late 1880s. The patent 
rush of the 1890s was probably triggered by a change in patent law that especially 
improved the patent protection of chemical inventions. The patent law of 1877 had 
129  See Schankerman and Pakes (1986), p. 1067. 
130  See Sullivan (1994), p. 49. 
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determined that chemical firms could only patent new processes but not the new products 
made by these processes. As a result, foreign chemical firms were able to circumvent this 
kind of patent protection by producing the new products with the new processes abroad 
and selling them then in the German market. To impede such behavior the new German 
patent law of 1891132 stipulated that patents granted for new chemical processes also 
protected the products produced by these processes.133 Thereafter the number of patents 
in the technological fields of chemicals increased considerably. The growing number of 
patents was probably also caused by the fact that the new German patent law of 1891 
improved the efficiency of the patent office by making the technicians, who decided 
about the novelty of patent application, and had until now only worked as a side job for 
the patent office, to full-time and life-long employees.134 At the beginning of the 20th 
century the number of patents granted per year for the first time exceeded 10,000. The 
patent boom of the pre-World War I years coincided with the rise of the electrical 
engineering industry that in these years became a major focal point of patenting activity. 
The average share of high-value patents in the total of all patents granted between 
1877 and 1918 was 11.14 percent. As we can see in table 6.1, the actual annual share, 
however, was not constant over time. Rather, the annual share of high-value patents 
slowly increased between 1877 and 1893 from 5.3 percent to 10 percent, stagnated in the 
following 15 years, and skyrocketed then up to more than 23 percent on the eve of World 
War I. 
 
Table 6.1 The share of high-value patents in all patents granted per year 
Year Share Year Share Year Share 
1877 5.3 % 1891 8.8 % 1905 11.1 % 
1878 7.1 % 1892 9.5 % 1906 10.6 % 
1879 6.2 % 1893 10.0 % 1907 10.7 % 
1880 7.5 % 1894 9.7 % 1908 11.7 % 
1881 6.8 % 1895 9.9 % 1909 13.5 % 
1882 7.5 % 1896 10.2 % 1910 16.2 % 
1883 6.7 % 1897 10.4 % 1911 21.4 % 
                                                                                                                                                                             
131  We hadn’t the personnel to find out for each of more than 300,000 patents the individual life span. 
132  See Patentgesetz vom 7. April 1891, Reichsgesetzblatt (1891), pp. 79-90, especially § 4. 
133  See Bruchhausen (1977). See also Fleischer (1984), pp. 164-7. 
134  See Kaiserliches Patentamt, Geschäftsthätigkeit, p. 158. 
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1884 7.4 % 1898 9.2 % 1912 22.7 % 
1885 7.9 % 1899 8.7 % 1913 22.8 % 
1886 7.4 % 1900 9.0 % 1914 23.2 % 
1887 8.9 % 1901 9.0 % 1915 23.1 % 
1888 8.0 % 1902 9.3 % 1916 19.1 % 
1889 8.2% 1903 9.4 % 1917 14.1 % 
1890 8.0 % 1904 9.8 % 1918 12.6 % 
 
                                                          
How can the slow rise in the share of high-value patents between 1877 and 1893 
be explained? It is conceivable that the contemporary inventors, who weren’t familiar 
with the newly introduced patent law at the beginning, step by step improved their 
capabilities to judge the future economic prospects of their inventions correctly. As a 
result of this individual learning process the share of low-value patents actually applied 
for would have decreased automatically. An alternative explanation, however, is based on 
the patent office’s observation that the relation of firms’ professional research workers 
and private amateurish inventors who more likely applied for low-value patents wasn’t 
the same in every technological class.135 Classes like hat making (41), haberdashery (44) 
or harnesses (56) were rather dominated by over-optimistic amateurs, and had therefore a 
below-average lifespan of patents. Most inventions of technological classes with an 
above-average life span of patents like dyes (22) or chemicals (12) were developed by 
industrial R&D departments. Since, as we will show below, the share of the latter classes 
in the total number of patents considerably increased in the 1880s the growing share of 
high-value patents was probably caused by the relatively decreasing inventing activity of 
amateurish inventors. 
The uncertainty of inventors, however, cannot be totally reduced. Mokyr points 
out: “After all, technological change ventures into the unknown, not into the uncertain. 
The risk cannot be diversified away.”136 That is why firms were still forced to invest in 
some patents that finally turned out to be worthless to preserve a reasonably high 
probability to get one of the rare high-value patents. The stable share of high-value 
patents in the patent population of about 10 percent in the 1890s and early 1900s might 
imply that the patenting firms had found an appropriate compromise between the goals 
avoiding costs for low-value patents and keeping the chance to get a high-value patent. 
135  See Kaiserliches Patentamt, Geschäftsthätigkeit, pp. 205-207. 
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This success rate of ten percent is, of course, not an independent empirical fact but 
resulted from our decision to define high-value patents as those patents that lasted at least 
ten years. Nevertheless, it is an interesting coincidence that Pavitt (1991) holds the view 
that usually about 10 percent of all industrial R&D projects lead to a commercial success. 
The boom of high-value patents in the pre-World War I years could be interpreted 
as an anomaly brought about by the German inflation of the post-World War I years. 
Table 6.2 shows that in this period the wholesale prices increased much faster than the 
renewal fees of the patents which means that the deflated present values of the patent 
costs considerably decreased between 1914 and 1923. As a result more patents could 
have been judged to be worth to renew than it would have been the case in a situation 
without inflation. 
 
Table 6.2 Wholesale prices and renewal fees during the German 
industrialization 1914-1923, 1913=100a 








June 1921 / July 6, 1921b 1,428 156
June 15, 1922 / June 27, 1922b 6,775 667
November 25, 1922 122,919 3,333
March 24, 1923 482,700 46,667
July 10, 1923 / July 9, 1923b 4,864,400 222,222
Sept. 4, 1923/Sept. 2, 1923b 298,153,200 11,111,111
Oct. 30, 1923 /Oct. 29, 1923b 1,865,850,000,000 69,111,111,111
 
a Statistisches Reichsamt (ed.), Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich (Berlin 
1923), pp. 284 f. Blatt für Patent-, Muster- und Zeichenwesen, various years. 
b The first date refers to the wholesale prices, the second to the renewal fee. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
136  Mokyr (1990), p. 284. 
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A detailed analysis of the annual mortality rates of the patent cohorts 1902 to 
1924, depicted in table 6.3, however, shows that this inflation story is wrong. The rows of 
table 6.3 show the annual mortality rate of a particular patent cohort during its life span. 
For example, the number 17.4 in the upper left cell means that of all the patents first 
granted in 1902 only 82.6 percent were renewed at the beginning of the year 1903. Of 
those prolonged patents, in 1904 again 26.9 percent were not prolonged. The columns 
present for different patent cohorts the annual mortality rate in a particular age of the 
patents. Column 1, for example, reveals that the mortality rate of the patent cohort 1902 
was in the first year higher than the respective rate of the patent cohort 1903 that was only 
15 percent. In table 6.3 the years 1915 to 1918 were coloured grey. So we can easily see 
that with respect to both the columns and the rows the annual mortality rates already 
decreased in 1915, kept their low level during the whole First World War, but increased 
again during the years of high inflation. This sharp drop in mortality rates resulted from a 
governmental decision to exempt the patentees from the renewal fees during wartimes.137 
Obviously, a lot of patentees that would otherwise have decided to give up their patents 
took the chance to prolong them for free thereby creating the boom of high-value patents 
between 1910 and 1917. This behavior very well goes with our basic assumption that the 
increasing renewal fees were the major reason for a patentee’s decision not to prolong his 
patent. 
 
                                                          
137  See Bekanntmachung, betreffend vorübergehende Erleichterungen auf dem Gebiete des Patent-, 
Gebrauchsmuster- und Warenzeichenrechts vom 10. September 1914, Blatt für Patent-, Muster- und 
Zeichenwesen, (1914), p. 290, Bekanntmachung, betreffend weitere Erleichterungen auf dem Gebiete des 
Patent- und Gebrauchsmusterrechts vom 31. März 1915, Blatt für Patent-, Muster- und Zeichenwesen, 
(1915), p. 118. 
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Table 6.3 Mortality rates of the patent cohorts 1902-1924 in year t of their life span, in percent of the patents still alive
in the preceding year (the years 1915-1918 marked grey)a 
 
 3 4      10     
 
Cohort 1 2 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14
1902 17,4     2 0        26,9 27,5 24,5 21,8 3, 19,3 16,9 14,2 15,7 15,6 18,6 18,4 9,7 
1903             15.0 24.4 25.7 24.3 24.0 22.4 17.2 19.5 16.3 18.3 17.5 16.3 16.7 9.6 
1904            14.1 22.6 26.6 26.9 23.2 20.4 18.1 15.6 17.0 27.7 26.4 10.3 7.2 24.0 
1905           14.2 25.5 28.0 27.7 23.3 19.9 17.1 18.1 24.3 24.9 11.1 6.0 8.4 45.2 
1906          15.1 28.4 28.4 26.7 23.2 19.6 18.3 24.6 26.4 10.4 4.9 10.3 18.6 30.3 
1907       15.7 26.7 27.8 24.0 20.8 19.5 24.0 25.3 10.6 3.6 6.1 8.0 17.4  31.4
1908 15.5 25.2 26.1    24.0 19.8 28.7 23.1 8.9 3.1 11.4 9.4 15.8   26.8 29.0
1909       15.4 22.8 24.3 24.3 27.4 21.0 14.1 3.9 11.0 20.6 23.8    24.5 40.4 47.6
1910      14.6 22.4 24.5 32.3 29.5 5.7 2.9 7.2 11.3 15.6     27.3 19.0 23.9 16.5
1911     15.5 24.2 34.4 24.3 6.0 3.9 7.5 13.6 19.2      31.8 19.7 26.4 24.7 9.7
1912   15.1 36.1 22.5 6.2 3.1 5.1 14.1 23.4       35.8 15.9 37.8 36.6 10.9 7.8
1913   16.5 30.1 5.4 3.3 6.1 9.3 20.6        34.2 18.3 22.6 28.8 19.2 20.1 12.5
1914  10.8 15.9 3.8 3.3 11.4 13.1   37.9 17.7 23.4 23.3 11.1 17.0 15.6 10.9 
1915 9.2 7.4 2.7 5.0 20.9   28.6       31.0 19.9 25.3 17.6 16.7 12.7 16.1 13.3
1916 6.7 3.7 4.3 13.3       28.1 28.5 25.5 31.9 21.5 19.5 15.7 17.2 22.4 22.1
1917 6.3 13.2        27.3 24.7 32.2 43.1 23.0 25.2 20.3 24.7 28.3 39.5 39.4
1918 0.8 1.4           8.7 25.4 23.1 24.7 41.1 28.7 18.1 17.0 17.9 18.5 22.6 32.6
1919           0.3 5.3 20.0 22.8 21.4 35.3 22.5 28.3 15.7 17.8 18.7 21.2 30.0 19.1
1920               1.2 11.2 15.5 21.2 31.5 21.9 15.7 13.0 13.7 17.1 17.3 25.5 17.2 20.5
1921               1.5 8.8 17.1 32.0 24.5 18.9 15.9 16.3 19.3 22.5 31.3 20.6 22.2 17.5
1922             1.4 9.8 25.2 22.3 18.9 16.9 17.1 17.8 21.4 30.6 22.7 21.0 13.7 11.3
1923 1.7              13.4 17.2 17.4 16.2 17.6 18.6 20.3 29.0 21.8 21.3 14.2 9.3 9.6
1924               2.4 9.6 13.8 14.8 16.4 18.7 20.4 28.0 23.2 22.2 14.6 21.1 2.1
3.5 
 




Now we discuss these modifications one by one. The patent yearbook lists all patents 
granted in the preceding years that are still valid. Therefore, we know the life span of each 
patent when we subtract a patent’s birth year from the patent’s death year. We decided for 
1879 as a starting year of our analysis due to the fact that for patents registered in 1877 and 
1878, the residence places of patentees were not recorded in the patent yearbook, thus we do 
not know the patent’s countries of origin. 
                                                          
 
6.3 DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
In the first five chapters of this dissertation, we used only that patents that had 
survived for more than ten years. In this chapter, we modified our database in order to study 
patent mortality and survival. The following changes were made to our database.  
(1). We focus on patents from four technological classes (chemical, electrical engineering, 
dyes, and instruments); 
(2). We focus on patents registered by patentees from six nations (Germany, USA, England, 
France, Switzerland, and Austria); 
(3). We focus on patents registered from 1879 to 1885 (in total 7 years)138;  
(4). We are no longer bound by the ten-year limitation of survival. We include all the patents 
that meet the requirements above into our new data bank (no matter in which year these 
patents died).  
The patent office assigned a technology class to each patent. In our research, we use 
four prominent technological classes as examples: Chemical, electrical engineering, dyes, 
and instruments. These four classes together accounted for 29% of all patents that were 
renewed for at least ten years (high-value patents).139 More precisely, during the period 1877-
1918, 8.51 % of patents granted in the class of electrical engineering survived longer than ten 
years, followed by chemical patents (7.22 % surviving more than ten years), dyes (5.61 %) 
and scientific instrument (4.03%). For the patents in the remaining technological classes, less 
138 As patents can be maintained maximally for 15 years, the longest-living patents in this new data bank 
survived till 1900. We would like to extend this data bank (1879-1885) to include patents that were registered 
after 1885. Yet we do not have the necessary labor to handle the additional work of data compilation.  
139 Please see table 1.1 in chapter 1 for the ranking of high-value patents by technological classes. 
 
 157
Share in All  
than 5 % patents lived for more than 10 years during the period indicated above. As a matter 
of fact, these four sectors are still pillar industries of the German economy. 
Regarding the foreign patents, their representation in the patent pool is of 
significance, that is about 27 percent of the total high-value patents. The patent yearbook also 
clearly specifies each patent’s country of origin. In this chapter, we use patents from six 
countries of origin: Germany, USA, UK, France, Switzerland, and Austria, the top six ranked 
countries that were holding patents in Germany during the period under investigation (see 
table 6.4 below). Among the high-value foreign patents, those of American origin account by 
far for the most patents granted in Germany during the period 1877-1914. Their share is 1.6 
times higher compared to the English patents, and 1.9 times than the French ones.  
 
Table 6.4 Ranking of foreign patent’s country of origin 1877-1914 
 
Rank 
Country of  
Origin 
Number of High-
Value Patents Foreign Patents 
Cumulated Shares 
1 USA 2,676 28.92% 28.92% 
2 England 1,646 17.79% 46.71% 
3 France 1,400 15.23% 61.84% 
4 Switzerland    892   9.64% 71.48% 
5 Austria    782   8.45% 79.93% 
 
Given these circumstances, we could assume that the net returns for USA patent 
holders were quite high in comparison to the remaining patentees, and thus it paid off to 
renew the intellectual property right. Additionally, the countries listed in table 6.2 comprise 
for more than 80 percent of all high-value patents in Germany. 
 
Renewal Rates by Technological Class 
The patent renewal rates vary across technology classes and nationalities, 
respectively. Figure 6.5 to figure 6.10 represent the renewal rates in different technology 
classes, for each of the six nationalities, which are of significance for the present study. 




nationality, there is substantial mortality as patents age. About 50 percent of the patents die 
before reaching the age of five years. This phenomenon indicates a concentration of low-
value patents granted in Germany during the period 1877-1888. Additional explanation for 
those developments could be the fact, that the majority of patentees during the indicated 
periods were individuals. This in combinations with the high renewal fees led to the above-
described situation. Contrarily, Schankerman (1998) finds out that about 50 percent of the 
French patents registered from 1969 to 1982 drop out before they reach age ten. Those 
results should be taken into consideration more cautiously due to differences between the 
German and French protection regulations. 
For instance, among the patent holders of German origin the technological class dye 
comprises for the greatest renewal rate. More precisely, 48.29 % of the dye patents have been 
renewed after the fifth year, and 33.08 % after the tenth year (see figure 6.5 below). The dye 
patents held by German patentees have by far the highest likelihood to survive longer period, 
thus we could assume that the net returns from holding a dye patent were among the most 
profitable. We observe similar developments for patentees of American and Swiss origin, 
while for the remaining nationalities, dye patents do not account for the highest survival rates 
during the period under investigation. Electrical engineering and instrument patents have the 
lowest renewal rate among the patentees of German origin.  















































































Regarding the American patentees registering in Germany (see figure 6.6), the 
emical class indicates the lowest survival rates, in particular, only 25 % of the chemical 
tents have been renewed after the second year. A possible cause for that development 
ght be the better quality of the domestic patents that might lead to stronger competition in 
 chemical sector, and lower net returns for American patent holders. The situation among 
 English and French inventors patenting in Germany differs from the American and 
rman ones. The highest propensities of being renewed within the first four years have the 
tents in the chemical class (see figure 6.7 and 6.8). In the long term, the greatest chance to 
rvive has the chemical class regarding the English patent holder, and among the French 
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As for patent holders of Austrian and Swiss origin, the developments seem to be quite 
lent (see figure 6.9 and 6.10 below). Additionally, for either nationality the worst 
val chances have the instrument patents. Electrical engineering patents indicate stable 
al rates after reaching age of four. 
 
 


























































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Age Chemical Elect r ical
Dye Inst rument
Secondly, the ranking of technology classes in terms of mortality rates varies across 
nationalities. Instrument sector has higher mortality rates than other sectors in all six 




industries for Germany, France, Switzerland, and Austria. But it is not the case for the USA 
and England. 
 
Renewal Rates by Patentee’s Nationality 
Based on the patentee’s nationality, there exist differences in the survival time 
measured by the median during the period under investigation (see table 6.5). For instance, 
the highest survival rate indicates patents of Swiss origin, an on the other side foreign patents 
tend to live out German ones. 
Table 6.5 Median survival time of patents from different countries 
Country Austria England France Germany USA 
Median survival time 2.70 2.90 2.85 2.76 3.38 2.72 
 
Figures 6.11 to 6.14 illustrate the differences in renewal patterns across nationalities. 
More precisely, in the chemical technology class, Austrian-owned patents have the highest 
likelihood to reach age of seven, followed by patents of Swiss, German and French origin. 
The lowest renewal rate in this technological class accounts for USA-patentees. For instance, 
only 25 percent of the American-owned chemical patents have been renewed after the first 
year.  
 
In similar vein, Swiss- and Austrian-owned patents in the electrical class show the 
highest survival, thus we can imply that those patents pay off the initial investments and 
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Additionally, German-owned patents do not stand out except in the dyes sector. In 
omparison to the Swiss-owned patents in this class, they indicate higher propensity to 
urvival in the long run, e.g. longer than five years. But in the period of five years, Swiss 
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Finally, USA-patent holders account for better survival chances in the instrument 
chnological class. However, as the slope of the curves (see figure 6.10) depicts, all six 
ountries do not fare well in the stated technology class. The hazard rate in the first three 
ears after granting the patent right is extremely high for all countries considered in the 
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In modeling survival likelihood of patents’ survival, the quantity of fundamental 
interest is the so-called hazard rate, which can be defined variously as: 
 
analysis. We will apply next econometric techniques to explore what are behind the above-
addressed differences.  
 
6.4 METHOD OF ESTIMATION 
 
The techniques of survival analysis or event-history (Blossfeld, Hamerle and Mayer 
1989; Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995) are used to test the outlined theoretical arguments. More 
precisely, to maintain intellectual property protection the patentee has to pay a particular 
annual renewal fee, otherwise the patent lapses permanently. The renewal fees following the 
German Patent Law alter with age and possibly with the cohort of the patent. The basic 
assumption of the patent survival model is that renewal would take place if the cost of 
renewal were less than the discounted expected revenue steam obtained by that renewal 
process, otherwise the protection assured by the patent right would lapse. In this context, the 
variable of interest in the analysis of patent survivals is the length of time that elapses from 
the beginning of intellectual property protection either until its end (liquidation) or until the 
measurement is taken into consideration (censoring), which may precede termination. The 
process under observation may have begun at different points in time; therefore, censoring is 
a pervasive and usually unavoidable problem in the analysis of duration data. In the present 
analysis, we apply right censoring, which requires us to take year 1888 as event year (as the 
average survival time of patents is three years). 
0
Pr( | ) ( ) ( )( ) lim
1 ( ) (t
T t t T t f t f th t
t F t∆ →
≤ + ∆ ≥
= =
∆ − )S t
=   (1) 
where t  denotes time, T  is the random variable for the time of the event and ( ), ( ) f t F t and 
 depict the density, cumulative distribution, and the so-called survival probability 
respectively. 
( )S t
The quantity  in equation (1) gives the probability of having the 
event (patent lapse) between time t  and t
Pr( | )T t t T t≤ + ∆ ≥




this quantity provides the probability that the event will emerge between “now”, as indexed 
by , and some time in the future, as indexed by tt + ∆ . For event appearing in conditional 
time, it is desirable to define over all possible positive denoted by the limit in (1).  
2 2x
where 
The hazard rate, however, is more interesting to be modelled than the survival rate of 
the density. Various model specifications can be applied for this purpose. Therefore, for 
reasons pertaining to the theory on the one side, and on the other due to the data set used in 
the present study, the Cox’s proportional hazard model represents significantly the data on 
patents granted versus not been renewed in Germany during the period 1879-1888. 
Moreover, models such as the log logistic, the Weibull and the exponential respectively have 
been estimated. Sometimes theory provides ground to motivate a particular choice, but more 
often practical considerations underlie these choices. Unfortunately, estimated effect of 
covariates can vary across different functional forms, complicating matters for the analysis. 
One reason for this sensitivity is that the models differ in their specification of time variation 
in the baseline hazard rate.  
In the single transaction case, the Cox’s model is not based on any assumption 
concerning the nature or shape of the underlying survival distribution. The model assumes 
that the underlying hazard rate is a function of the covariates; no assumptions are made about 
the nature or shape of the hazard function. Thus, in a sense, Cox’s regression may be 
considered to be a nonparametric method. The model of estimation may be written as: 
 
( ) ( )}{ ( ) ( )1 2 0 1 1, , , , .expn nh t x x x h t x xβ β β= + +K    (2) n+K
 denotes the resultant hazard rate, given the values of the  covariates for the ( ),h t K
relevant case 
n
( )1 2, , , nx x xK  and the respective survival time ( )t . The term  indicates 
r the respective patent when all independent 
( )0h t
the baseline hazard rate; it is the hazard rate fo
variable values are equal to zero. 1 2, , , nβ β βK are the regression coefficients to be estimated.  
We can linearize the model by dividing both side of equation (2) by , and then 
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  (3) 
 
While no assumptions are made about the shape of the underlying hazard function, 
the model equations shown above do imply two assumptions. First, they specify a 
multiplicative relationship between the underlying hazard function and the log-linear 
function of the covariates. In practical terms, it is assumed that, given two observations with 
different values for the covariates, the ratio of the hazard functions for those two 
observations does not depend on time t . Second, there is a log-linear relationship between 
the independent variables and the underlying hazard function.  
Additionally, when examining the explanation strength of the covariates that are 
included in the model, likelihood theory provides straightforward test for determining the 
best model for the observed data and for comparing parameter values among different 
treatments. Both types of tests are carried out by calculating the differences of the log-
likelihood obtained under a constrained null hypothesis from the value obtained under a less 
constrained alternative hypothesis. The magnitude of the difference is estimated under the 
null hypothesis and the value of under the alternative describes the strength of the evidence 
again the null hypothesis. Significance tests are carried out by noting that has a distribution 
with degrees of freedom (df) equal to the number of additional constrains in the null 
hypothesis. This method is sufficiently general to provide test of hypotheses that least-
squared methods (including non-linear regression) do not allow. 
Finally, Cox proportional-hazards regression allows analyzing the effect of several 
risk factors on patent survival. It provides information whether the patent survival rate is 
influenced in a positive or a negative way by the independent variable(s). As it fits our 
research objective and on the other side the proportional assumption holds for the data set 
employed, we use the Cox regression to perform a survival analysis. In our model, the hazard 
indicates the probability of a patent to die after a time . The data on patent registration is 
available for the birth years from 1879 to 1885. Correspondingly, the death years are from 




estimated: First, we explore the impact of different technology fields on survival of patents, 
while distinguishing between foreign and German patent holders. Among the patents with 
different countries of origin, we use foreign patents as reference group. The econometric 
specification of the model is as follows: 
 
( ) ( )} ( ){ 0
1 2 3 4 5
log , , , , , /german chemical electrical dye patentee
german chemical electrical dye patentee
h t x x x x x h t
x x x x xβ β β β β
  =
 
= + + + +
   (4) 
 
where germanx  is a dummy indicating that the patent holder is of German origin. , 
, and 
chemicalx
electricalx dyex  are covariates indicating the influence of the particular technological class 
on the hazard rate.  is a dummy estimating the effect on survival cause by the nature 
of patentee, individual versus firm. 
patenteex
Second, we examine the survival likelihood among all six countries of origin 
accounting for technology diversity (instrument industry serves as a reference group among 
the technology classes), while we distinguish between individual and firm as a patentee. 
 
6.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
6.5.1 Test for Proportional Assumption 
The Cox proportional hazard model is based on the assumption that the effects of 
given two observations with different values for the independent variables, the ratio of the 
hazard functions of those two observations are constant over time. Does this assumption hold 
in our case? Before we proceed with survival analysis employing the Cox model, we will 
first test for the proportional assumption. The above indicated test is conducted for both 
German and foreign patent holders and the results are depicted in table 6.6. Additionally, we 
distinguish between individual and firms as a patentee. 
 
Table 6.6 Test for proportional assumption of German and foreign patents 
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Patents held by German firms Patents held by German individuals 
 Coefficient Significance  Coefficient Significance 
Test 0.032 0.698 Test 0.032 0.698 
Foreign 0.019 0.717 Foreign 0.019 0.717 
Individual 0.036 0.568 Firm -0.036 0.568 
Chemical -0.407 0.000 Chemical -0.407 0.000 
Dyes -0.693 0.000 Dyes -0.693 0.000 






Chi-square 86.848 Chi-square 86.848 
Significance 0.000 Significance 0.000 
 
Note: The reference group regarding the technological classes included in the analysis is instruments. 
 
In testing this proportional assumption, the null hypothesis that the effects are 
constant cannot be rejected, as the test variable including in the analysis is insignificant. 
Thus, we can go further to apply the Cox regression. 
 
6.5.2 Factors Influencing the Survival of Foreign and German Patents 
We have shown in a descriptive manner above that foreign patents tend to survive 
longer than German patents. This outcome is well expected as the patent registering 
procedure for patentees of foreign origin involves extra administrative bureaucracy such as 
contacting an intermediary representative in Germany, and as a consequence of it, the foreign 
holder has to anticipate higher fix costs prior to patent granting. Given that foreign patentees 
face higher costs than German patentees, it hypothesizes that the foreign patent has higher 
returns in comparison to the German ones in general. Thus we can conclude that the 
decision-making process regarding the patent application of non-German origin is well 
thought-out assuming the costs, which have to be paid, and on the other side, the quality of 
the foreign patents has to be better. 
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Does the country of origin, foreign versus German patentee, have an impact on the 
patent mortality rates? Two different econometric specifications of the Cox’s proportional 
hazard model have been estimated. First, we distinguish between foreign and native 
patentees, while the group of the foreign ones is taken as a reference in the empirical 
analysis. Second, we consider the impact of the different countries on the survival rates of 
patents granted by the German Patent Office. The empirical results are depicted in tables 6.7 
and 6.8.  
 
Table 6.7 Cox regression results for the survival of German patents, hazard rate 
Model with Individual as a Patentee 
Covariates Included 
Coefficient Std. Error Exponential Value 
German Patentee  0.019 0.053 1.019 
Individual Patent Holder -0.036 0.062 0.965 
Chemical Class     -0.408*** 0.082 0.665 
Dyes     -0.695*** 0.082 0.499 
Electrical Class     -0.177*** 0.058 0.837 
-2 Log-Likelihood 27305.214   
Chi-square 86.675   
Significance 0.000   
 
NOTE: *** Statistically significant at 1 % level; ** Statistically significant at 5 %; * Statistically  
  significant at 10 %. The reference group regarding the technological class dummies is  
  scientific instruments. 
 
As assumed, the Cox regression results for the hazard rate confirm our hypothesis 
that patents of German origin do not tend to survive longer compared with these of foreign 
origin. The relative risk of German patents in comparison to the foreign patents to die is 
higher and accounts for 1.019. This result should be taken into consideration cautiously due 
to the fact that the estimated covariate is insignificant. Moreover, patents granted to 
individuals show better survival likelihood. The estimated hazard for individual patent 
holders is 0.965 of that of patents granted to firms, that is a 3.5 percent decrease in the risk of 
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death, even though the estimated covariate for the legal status of the patentee (whether it is a 
firm or an individual) is not significant. One explanation for the better survival chances of 
individual patentees is the fact that they need highly possible longer tenure to figure out the 
actual value of the patent, therefore, the lower hazard rate. 
The technological class appears to enhance the mortality rates of patents granted in 
the period under investigation. The dye technology class accounts for the best survival 
contrasted with the scientific instruments (reference group in our analysis), followed by 
chemical industry and electrical engineering. The relative risks for the above-addressed 
technologies are 0.499, 0.665 and 0.837 respectively. In other words, the decline in the 
mortality rates computed in percentage is 50.1 percent for the dye, 33.5 percent for the 
chemical, and finally 16.3 per cent for the electrical technology class. The outstanding 
performance of dye patents is not surprising at all, as in 1900, for instance, the German 
dyestuff industry held already 90 percent of the global market within that sector (Ziegler, 
2000). Additionally, this share indicates a stronger competition among the patentees in the 
day technological class, which in turn lead to higher renewal rates versus longer survival. 
 
Table 6.8 Cox regression results for the survival by country variation, hazard rate 
Model with Individual as a Patentee 
Covariates Included 
Coefficient Std. Error Exponential Value 
Technological Classes    
  Chemical     -0.412*** 0.082 0.662 
  Dyes     -0.693*** 0.082 0.500 
  Electrical     -0.163*** 0.059 0.849 
Countries of Origin    
  Austria  0.152 0.135 1.164 
  England -0.012 0.094 0.988 
  France  0.074 0.096 1.076 
  Germany  0.097 0.080 1.058 
  Switzerland  0.025 0.205 1.025 
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Individual Patent Holder -0.038 0.063 0.963 
-2 Log-Likelihood 27303.164   
Chi-square 88.775   
Significance 0.000   
 
NOTE: *** Statistically significant at 1 %; ** Statistically significant at 5 %; * Statistically  
  significant at 10 %. The reference group regarding the technological class dummies is  
  scientific instruments, and United States for the country ones. 
 
While including country dummies in the Cox regression analysis, the already 
discussed above results do not change considerably. For instance, the impact of renewing a 
patent by individual holder improves slightly from 0.965 to 0.963, but its influence on the 
hazard rate remains negative and statistically insignificant. Among the countries incorporated 
in the present study (United States as reference group), the lowest mortality rate has patents 
of English origin, whilst Austrian patents account for the highest one with comparison to 
American patents (see the estimated survival functions, Figure 2, Appendix). 
Finally, the survival chances of dye patents deteriorated slightly after considering the 
country of origin effects. The estimated relative risk is 0.500, that is a decline of 50 percent 
in the mortality rate compared with the scientific instruments. All technology class effects 




Using unique German patent data set consisting of 2,563 patents for the period 1878-
1888, we aim to provide econometric evidence on the factors that influence the survival of 
patents for different technology fields and countries of origin in this chapter. Why do some 
patents die young while others survive longer? What factors are behind the heterogeneity of 
patent mortality? 
The main findings suggest that firstly, patents by German patentees tend to die sooner 
than foreign patents. Secondly, patents from different countries have different median 
survival time. For example, patents registered by Swiss patentees tend to live longer than 
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patents from the remaining countries included in the analysis, even though the differences 
among patentee’s country of foreign are not statistically significant in the Cox regression. 
Thirdly, industry sectors show to impact significantly the patent renewal rate, and dye patents 
account for the best survival given the scientific instrument as a reference group in our 
estimation. Fourthly, patents registered by individuals tend to survive patents registered by 
firms, although the difference is not statistically significant. In total, renewal rates of patents 
granted by the German Patent Office during the period of 1779-1888 differ regarding 
technology fields and country of patentee’s origin. Nevertheless, further analysis on the 
private value of the patents is required in order to gain more comprehensive insight. 
Finally, one possible implication of our results is the distinction between measures of 
the quantity and the value of patents. The noise to signal ratio in the patent count as a 
measure of the value of patents, for instance, is considerable and calls for caution. Lanjouw, 
Parkes, and Putnam (1996) argue that if they are used properly, patents weighted with 
renewal data may remove half of the patent counts as a measure of innovation output, a 
rather considerable improvement. In this sense, our empirical outcomes will enable use to 
attach weights to patents and to produce weighted patent count indices which are more 
precise measures of innovative output than raw patent counts, which are very imperfect 


















survival at end 
Hazard rate 
0 1411 0 1.0000 0.000 
1 1411 0 0.6889 0.3684 
2 972 0 0.4415 0.4376 
3 623 0 0.3395 0.2613 
4 479 35 0.2953 0.1390 
5 384 39 0.2597 0.1285 
6 301 21 0.2373 0.0899 
7 255 23 0.2256 0.0505 
8 220 18 0.2192 0.0288 
9 196 24 0.2180 0.0054 
10 171 14 0.2180 0.0000 
11 175 12 0.2180 0.0000 
12 145 16 0.2180 0.0000 
13 129 28 0.2180 0.0000 


















survival at end 
Hazard rate 
0 1002 0 1.0000 0.0000 
1 1002 0 0.6966 0.3576 
2 698 0 0.4581 0.4131 
3 459 0 0.3373 0.3036 
4 338 24 0.2763 0.1990 
5 255 27 0.2442 0.1231 
6 200 18 0.2251 0.0817 
7 167 23 0.2135 0.0528 
8 136 25 0.2066 0.0329 
9 107 30 0.2066 0.0000 
10 77 14 0.2066 0.0000 
11 63 15 0.2066 0.0000 
12 48 13 0.2066 0.0000 
13 35 15 0.2066 0.0000 

















survival at end 
Hazard rate 
0 90 0 1.0000 0.0000 
1 90 0 0.6556 0.4161 
2 59 0 0.4333 0.4082 
3 39 0 0.3111 0.3284 
4 28 2 0.2189 0.3478 
5 18 1 0.2064 0.0588 
6 16 0 0.1677 0.2069 
7 13 1 0.1275 0.2727 
8 9 1 0.1275 0.0000 
9 8 2 0.1275 0.0000 
10 6 1 0.1275 0.0000 
11 5 2 0.1275 0.0000 
12 3 1 0.1275 0.0000 
13 2 0 0.1275 0.0000 

















survival at end 
Hazard rate 
0 303 0 1.0000 0.0000 
1 303 0 0.7228 0.3218 
2 219 0 0.4752 0.4132 
3 144 0 0.3696 0.2500 
4 112 10 0.2971 0.2176 
5 81 9 0.2544 0.1549 
6 61 6 0.2368 0.0714 
7 51 5 0.2319 0.0208 
8 45 11 0.2202 0.0519 
9 32 8 0.2202 0.0000 
10 24 4 0.2202 0.0000 
11 20 3 0.2202 0.0000 
12 17 5 0.2202 0.0000 
13 12 4 0.2202 0.0000 


















survival at end 
Hazard rate 
0 274 0 1.0000 0.0000 
1 274 0 0.7044 0.3649 
2 193 0 0.4635 0.4125 
3 127 0 0.3175 0.3738 
4 87 8 0.2525 0.2282 
5 62 5 0.2228 0.1250 
6 50 4 0.2135 0.0426 
7 44 6 0.2031 0.0500 
8 36 3 0.1913 0.0597 
9 31 9 0.1913 0.0000 
10 22 7 0.1913 0.0000 
11 15 4 0.1913 0.0000 
12 11 4 0.1913 0.0000 
13 7 3 0.1913 0.0000 

















survival at end 
Hazard rate 
0 35 0 1.0000 0.0000 
1 35 0 0.7429 0.2951 
2 26 0 0.5429 0.3111 
3 19 0 0.4286 0.2353 
4 15 2 0.3673 0.1538 
5 11 0 0.3340 0.0952 
6 10 1 0.1933 0.5333 
7 5 0 0.1933 0.0000 
8 5 1 0.1933 0.0000 
9 4 0 0.1933 0.0000 
10 4 0 0.1933 0.0000 
11 4 1 0.1933 0.0000 
12 3 2 0.1933 0.0000 
13 1 0 0.1933 0.0000 

















survival at end 
Hazard rate 
0 300 0 1.0000 0.0000 
1 300 0 0.6700 0.3952 
2 201 0 0.4333 0.4290 
3 130 0 0.3200 0.3009 
4 96 2 0.2829 0.1229 
5 83 12 0.2536 0.1096 
6 63 7 0.2450 0.0342 
7 54 11 0.2349 0.0421 
8 41 9 0.2349 0.0000 
9 32 11 0.2349 0.0000 
10 21 2 0.2349 0.0000 
11 19 5 0.2349 0.0000 
12 14 1 0.2349 0.0000 
13 13 8 0.2349 0.0000 































































































                                                          
Conclusion 
 
This Ph.D. dissertation examines several major aspects of innovation in Germany 
(1877-1914), a time period when German underwent industrialization. We must 
acknowledge that our research is by no means conclusive. Though the reader may find this 
scholarly cliché disappointing or even frustrating, knowing and acknowledging “what we 
don’t know” is the beginning of wisdom, and also a guide to avoid fallacies in public policy. 
A few general facts about innovation are relatively clear. Our analysis of patent data 
confirms a variety of widely held views about the German industrialization. We have 
successfully identified several waves of patents from various technological classes. Patenting 
activities had been dominated by railway, dyes, chemicals, and electrical engineering sectors 
consecutively. The order well corresponds with the industrial development in Germany 
during the time period. Moreover, we found out that inter-industry knowledge spillovers 
between technologically, economically and geographically related industries were a premier 
source for innovative activities during the German industrialization. 
In terms of the geography of innovation, we learnt that patents come in the main from 
the industrial belt that runs from west to east across Germany from the Ruhr area via Berlin 
to Saxony. We observe convergence of regional patents over time. In general, regions with 
high human capital and better infrastructure tend to be more innovative. Industrial diversity 
is conducive to innovation. Knowledge spillovers are geographically bound.  
These broad findings seem quite robust, and have policy implications for both public 
policy-makers and corporate decision-makers on fostering innovation. Innovation policy can 
be defined as public action that influences technical change and other kinds of innovations. It 
includes elements of R&D policy, technology policy, infrastructure policy, regional policy, 
and educational policy. 
It is certainly true that the market mechanism and capitalist firms best fulfill most 
economic functions in a modern society. The private sector has a track record of funding 
successful innovations over several centuries.  In contrast, governments seem poor at 140
140 Kealey (1996) points out that, throughout the nineteenth century, British academics complained about the 
lack of government support for research and looked jealously at their French counterparts who enjoyed state 
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allocating money for innovation.141 Koppel (1995) presents an overview of induced 
innovation theory. This is the view that consumer demand and the supply of different inputs 
determine the course and speed of innovation.142 Koppel’s book assumes that the free market 
can allocate resources to innovations that make economic sense and divert funds away from 
those that do not. He questions whether political and ethical agendas should supersede 
economic determinants of the direction of innovation. However, his view treats innovation as 
a normal commodity and ignores the fact that innovation has unique properties that cause 
market solutions to be sub-optimal in many cases, an unsatisfactory situation that suggests a 
possible role for government in fostering innovation. 
It is almost indisputable that market should play the premier role in allocating scarce 
resources. Yet government exists because sometimes it is necessary to complement the 
market and capitalist firms through public policy. This is true in the areas of defense143, 
justice, environment, infrastructure, education, social security, income distribution, etc. After 
all, there is no pure market economy in the real world, perhaps with Hong Kong (a former 
British colony) as the only exception.144 What is at issue here is what should be performed by 
the state or public sector and what should not. This is an issue that is not only subject to 
ideological judgments, but could and should be discussed in an analytical way as much as 
possible.  
 
subsidized research schemes. Yet, the British economy outpaced the French economy by every measure of 
growth during that century, and British scientists performed privately-financed, path-breaking basic and applied 
research. Kealey argues that, although French scientists did important work, their research had little economic 
impact because the free market did not guide it. 
141 Until recently, Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was considered as perhaps the 
sole exception. MITI had been credited with the Japanese economic boom. It was thought to have chosen 
winners early on, financed them generously, and created globally competitive Japanese firms. We now know 
that this is totally true. In the first quantitative study of MITI’s allocation of capital to firms, Beason and 
Weinstein (1996) find that MITI mainly subsidized losers, and that firms that received subsidies from MITI 
tended to perform worse afterwards. 
142 An example is that the falling price of fertilizer relative to that of rice led to the development of highly 
fertilizer-responsive rice varieties, which induced the “green revolution” (Koppel, 1995). 
143 A group of individuals might pool their resources to build a missile defense system. But they could not 
prevent a neighbor, who claims that she has no need for such a system even though she does, from enjoying the 
protection that they are paying for. 
144 See Friedman (1997) for an argument that the economic freedom in Hong Kong has contributed significantly 
to Hong Kong’s prosperity.  
 
 184
                                                          
What, then, are the reasons for public policy intervention in a market economy? 
Regarding innovation, normally two conditions must be fulfilled for there to be reasons for 
public intervention in a market economy.  
(1). the market mechanism and capitalist players must fail to achieve the objectives 
formulated, that is, a problem must exist; 
(2). the state (national, regional, local) and its public agencies must also have the ability to 
solve or ease the problem.  
The term “market failure” came into frequent use by economists during the 20th 
century. Arrow (1962) clearly articulates the problems with the allocation of resources by 
market force to invention. The paper emphasizes that, more than most other economic goods, 
the production of new economic knowledge generally suffers from three sources constituting 
market failure: indivisibilities and monopoly, uncertainty, and externalities. The first source 
of market failure emanates from the propensity for knowledge to be a discrete rather than a 
continuous commodity. As a result, both economies of scale and scope are often associated 
with the production of knowledge (Mueller and Tilton, 1969). The second source of market 
failure involves the extraordinarily high degree of uncertainty inherent in new economic 
knowledge. While virtually every economic good is subject to uncertainty, almost none is 
exposed to the degree of risk involved knowledge-based new technologies. There are two 
additional elements of uncertainty inherent in innovative activity that are not present in other 
goods. The first is in the realm of production. How a new good can be technically produced 
is typically shrouded in uncertainty. The second element involves marketing the product. 
Whether a demand for the new product exists is not known. Even if the knowledge can result 
in a new product, it is not at all clear that the product can be profitably sold. Knowledge 
leading to a new economic good can be produced, but there is no guarantee that the new 
knowledge is economic knowledge. Therefore, not only is it uncertain, ex ante, how a 
particular research project may turn out, but it may also be uncertain, ex post, whether results 
obtained have interesting commercial possibilities. The market for genuinely new products 
may not be immediately recognized.145 Griliches (1979) and Nelson (1982) further argue that 
145 For example, the fundamental innovation embodied in the now ubiquitous Post-it sticker was essentially an 
adhesive substance that was not highly adhesive, originally developed by the American company 3M in 1968. 
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unlike the physical capital, the market prices for knowledge do not exist which could guide 
R&D investment decisions. Consequently, innovation is especially risky and therefore it is 
undersupplied.  
The third source of market failure stems from the public good nature and non-
exclusive externalities inherent in knowledge-based economic activity. The production of 
knowledge does not preclude other economic agents from applying that knowledge for 
economic gain. It is difficult to delineate and enforce property rights to newly created 
knowledge. The externalities associated with the production of new knowledge make it 
difficult for firms undertaking such activities to appropriate the economic returns accruing 
from their investment. Therefore, Arrow’s paper suggests that there exists under supply of 
innovations because the social benefits of innovative ideas are bigger than private benefits. 
Mansfield et al. (1981) report that 60 percent of successful patented innovations were 
imitated within four years of introduction. For a sample of 100 US manufacturing firms, 
Mansfield (1985) reports survey evidence indicating that rivals have information about R&D 
decisions in 12-18 months, and information about new products or processes in 12 months or 
less. Such leakages occur because input suppliers and customers are important channels 
(since they pass on a great deal of relevant information), patent applications are scrutinized 
very carefully, and reverse engineering is carried out. In still other industries, the diffusion 
process is accelerated by the fact that firms do not go to great lengths to keep such 
information secret, partly because they believe it would be futile in any event (Mansfield, 
1985, p. 221). Sometimes, simply knowing that some lines of research work, while others do 
not, will allow follow-after firms to carry their own independent work forward more rapidly 
and at a lower cost than first innovators. Knowledge spillover is not unambiguously bad, 
from a social point of view. But it does reduce the incentives of firms to invest in innovation. 
After identifying these three sources of market failure, Arrow (1962) concludes that 
government should play a role in innovation.146 Other scholars have identified more sources 
 
The product was not introduced into market until 1980, 12 years later. For more information, see URL 
http://www.3m.com/about3M/pioneers/fry.html. 
146 World War One brought home to every government involved the importance of having its armed forces 
equipped with the most advanced scientific techniques. Since then it has been generally accepted that it is 
frequently desirable to encourage research and development for reasons of economic growth as well as national 
security. Arrow wrote his paper five years after the Soviet Union launched the artificial satellite Sputnik and 
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of market failure in generating innovation. For instance, there are a set of reasons to believe 
that financing investment in innovation is subject to market failure owing to a combination of 
asymmetric information and moral hazard under uncertainty.147 Similar arguments may also 
apply to investments in human capital and can be used to make the case for subsidies to 
various forms of education and training. Moreover, some have argued that certain industries 
are “strategic”, in the sense that they are either important for national security, or for 
advances in many other industries. This might imply targeting of research subsidies towards 
such industries. Finally, it is fair to say that technological standards (even those as simple as 
weights and measures) are a public good, and will therefore often be subject to government 
policy. This fact has the obvious implication that investment in standards will face the same 
tradeoffs as other innovation investments: either insufficient incentives or monopoly 
provision. Either outcome has welfare consequences.  
Can government facilitate innovation by adopting sensible government policies? To a 
certain extent, it can. As market does not have the omnipotent power in managing 
innovation, we need innovation policy. One implication of endogenous growth model is that 
economic policies, such as R&D subsidies, can affect long-term economic growth.148 
Because of technology’s contribution to economic growth, technology promotion is now an 
important element of state’s economic development initiatives (Coburn and Berglund 1995). 
As a matter of fact, innovation policy is now an integral and important part of public policy 
in most industrialized nations. For instance, the transformation of Ireland from a relatively 
 
inaugurated the Space Age. The Soviet success threw the US government into crisis. The Sputnik crisis was a 
turning point of the Cold War. Shocked by the Soviet success (which is aggravated by the Cold War 
atmosphere), the US federal government started infusing money lavishly into R&D efforts. In the years prior to 
Sputnik, the US’s investment in R&D as a percentage of the GDP stood at approximately 1.5%. Private sector 
investment represented nearly half of that total. By 1964, total R&D spending reached nearly 3.0% of GDP with 
nearly two-thirds funded from federal coffers. For 1959, the US Congress increased the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) appropriation to $134 million, almost $100 million higher than the year before. By 1968, the 
NSF budget would stand at nearly $500 million. The US government also initiated some educational programs 
to foster a new generation of scientists and engineers. In 1969, the Pentagon started building a computer 
network project called ARPANET (mainly for military use), which would later turn into the Internet. See 
Dickson (2002) for the various effects of the Sputnik shock. Today the US federal government remains the 
largest supporter of R&D activities in the world, although compared with other countries, the US invests a large 
share of its R&D fund for military use (which has spillover effect on civil activities). 
147 See Hall (2002) for a survey of evidence and the policy solutions.  




                                                          
backward country into a rich, high-tech state leads many countries to imitate. The success 
story of Ireland has been attributed to good policy, good timing and good luck.149 In the 
United States, innovative regions are prominent and economic boosters make painstaking 
efforts to promote silicon deserts, farm, forests, and prairies to compete with California’s 
Silicon Valley, Massachusetts’ Route 128, and North Carolina’s Research Triangle, to name 
a few. However, most of these efforts have not been very successful.150 Historians Leslie and 
Kargon (1997) conclude that there are too many unique factors that created Silicon Valley to 
ever duplicate its success.151 Although this claim might sound disappointing, we have to 
accept the fact that innovation is a rather complicated process. It is not the product of lone 
individuals nudging technology forward, but encompasses a broad landscape of many 
interdependent people, firms, and institutions working within networks of social and 
economic relations (Arthur, 1989; Nelson and Wright, 1992). An understanding of the 
conditions that advance the innovative capacity of regions and nations is slowly emerging. 
Innovation is ubiquitous. The regional innovation approach evolves around the fact that one 
can expect to find regional innovation systems everywhere. Therefore, although it is not clear 
to what extent we can generalize from this case study of German regions, we should be able 
to draw some policy implications from this research. 
The conventional menu of innovation policy responses to the presence of market 
failure is the following: (1). internalize the externality, (2). tax or subsidize the activity, or 
(3). regulate the activity. In this arena, the last option is rarely used, perhaps because of the 
difficulty of regulating an activity that is still highly unpredictable and spreads across a very 
large number of actors. It is difficult to argue that quotas (mandating technological 
performance) or price controls (on the wages of scientists and engineers) would be an 
effective way to deliver more innovation cheaply. Perhaps the only area where the regulatory 
149 For the case of Celtic Tiger (a nickname for the Republic of Ireland during its period of rapid economic 
growth after the 1990s), see Sweeny (1999). Opinions vary about the extent to which the Irish growth is 
sustainable and whether it has alleviated poverty, increased inequality, or indeed done both. See Battel (2003) 
for a detailed discussion of various opinions. 
150 For German government’s efforts, see Dohse (2000). For British government’s endeavors, see DTI (1999). 
151 Becker (2000) even claims that government subsidy and intervention thwarts innovation. On the contrary, he 




approach is used in an affirmative way to encourage innovation is in the determination of 
technological standards.  
The second option, the policy of encouraging private R&D expenditure via tax credits 
and/or subsidizing R&D projects, is used sometimes. This type of policy requires taxation at 
some level to sustain it, which may have its own welfare costs. Moreover, direct public 
subsidies for private R&D run the risk that government-funded R&D will simply pay for the 
R&D that the private sector would have paid for in any case. 
In the case of innovation (unlike pollution), the externalities that result from market 
failure are usually positive and involve the spillover of information and ideas from the entity 
that paid for them to other entities. Internalizing the externality implies designing a 
mechanism whereby the inventor receives the social surplus from his or her invention in 
order to induce him or her to make it. This can be done either by allowing firms to form joint 
research ventures without the antitrust enforcement, or by granting an individual or firm a 
limited right to exclude others from using its ideas, that is, by granting it intellectual property 
protection in the form of patent on its invention.  
To be specific, we put a few examples of innovation policies in table 1. The list is by 
no means exhaustive. Yet it does give us some concrete, common policy measures.  
Table 1 Domains and common measures of innovation policies 
Policy domain Measure 
Fiscal/financial corporate taxation and subsidies 
Information/education technical training, library, database 
Organizational/political international cooperation 
Infrastructure railway investment 
Legal/regulatory patent laws 
Science and research research labs 
Industrial/commercial trade agreements 
 
How well do these policies function? To answer this question, considerable efforts 
have been devoted to the evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of innovation policy. 
Some of these efforts have resulted in more conclusive evidence than others. For instance, 
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Hall and van Reenen (2000) find that the level of industrial R&D is positively influenced by 
the existence of R&D tax credits, although whether the tax credits reduce the gap between 
the social and private return to R&D is less clear. The productivity of direct government 
R&D subsidy is more controversial, with large but very diffuse benefits seen in the hard-to-
measure areas of basic scientific research, and considerably more mixed evidence on the 
social benefits of funding research nearer to commercialization (David et al., 2000; Klette et 
al., 2000).152  
The results of our research show that both education and infrastructure have great 
impact on innovation. And the effects are statistically significant. Thus, in order to boost 
regional innovativeness, governments should be committed to education and infrastructure. 
Lucas (1988) showed that the private return of investments in human capital is inferior to the 
social one. So, as we have argued human capital is a relevant driver of innovation and 
economic growth, public intervention is very probably needed in this field. Our research also 
shows that capital intensity is closely related to innovativeness. One implication is that 
government can provide support for technology financing to boost regional innovativeness. 
The association between firm size and innovation is not conclusive in this research. There is 
no firm evidence that regions with big firms tend to innovate more. Thus, our research results 
do not lend powerful support to some governments’ mania of big firms (such as Korean 
chaebols), at least from the viewpoint of innovation. Nor do our outcomes back up the “small 
is beautiful” thesis as put forward originally by Schumacher (1973). Our research results are 
echoed by other researchers. For instance, Poot (2002) argues that human capital policies that 
focus on education, on-the-job training and policies that enhance regional infrastructure are 
likely to be more effective in knowledge economy than tax cuts or local demand stimuli.  
Innovation is an extremely complicated subject. This Ph.D. dissertation is a rather 
comprehensive study of innovation in the German context. It has investigated innovation at 
various geographic units: Baden region (chapter 4), Prussian regions (chapter 2 and chapter 
5), German cities (chapter 3), and German regions (chapter 1). And it has examined various 
topics: spillover (all chapters except chapter 6), clustering (chapter 1, chapter 3, and chapter 
152 For a survey of earlier evidence on this topic, see Hall (1996), and for a proposal to improve the evaluation 
of government R&D programs, see Jaffe (2002). 
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4), regional convergence of patenting activities (chapter 2), determinants of innovation 
(mainly chapter 2, chapter 3, and chapter 4), and patent survival (chapter 6). Yet still, the 
dissertation is by no means conclusive or exhaustive. So many meaningful works remain to 
be done. In future, we will strive to contribute more to our understanding of innovation 
policy with our empirical research. The economic return to innovation is surely an intriguing 
topic worth exploring. We will use firm’s market value to study this subject. The private 
value of patent protection for different technology fields is also a fascinating subject. As we 
have already compiled patent survival data, we are well positioned to do further research on 
this issue. It is our sincere hope that our research helps to further our understanding of 
innovation, an interesting and important subject whose truth takes prodigious genius and 
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